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Abstract
This thesis consists of three independent chapters on the Macroeconomics of Liquidity and Taxation.
The first chapter studies how concems about future funding difficulties and liquidity dry ups
influence investment decisions. In an environment with financial frictions, investors need to take
liquidity management into account when deciding between different investment alternatives and
when designing financial arrangements with other fund providers. Their decisions affect both
idiosyncratic and aggregate exposure to shocks and fluctuations. When shocks occur to external
liquidity sources, such as changes in the cash-flows that support mortgage-backed securities or other
non-corporate assets, these are transmitted through financial arrangements towards the real sector.
The anticipation of these shocks and its reflection in asset prices influence project selection and
change the pattern of fluctuations, creating additional comovement across sectors of economy and
different assets. Likewise, the anticipation of variations in the internal liquidity of firms, resulting
from shocks to their productivity, changes their choice of projects. For moderate liquidity scarcity,
the effect through project choice is shown to lead to the dampening of these underlying productivity
shocks; while for more severe shortages, amplification emerges. Despite the possibility of excess
exposure to risk being generated endogenously, equilibrium allocations are constrained efficient.
Policy implications are then discussed in light of this result.
The second chapter focuses on the auxiliary role of taxes in helping smooth income fluctuations.
From a mechanism design perspective, it studies the characterization of the constrained optimal
allocation in an economy with endowment fluctuations which are private information, where agents
are also able to trade assets unobservably. In this environment, production and aggregate savings
can be manipulated by a planner through the use of capital taxation. Using this instrument,
the planner is capable of affecting prices on the unobservable trades. In this environment, the
constrained optimal allocation can be implemented in a simple decentralized way, which takes the
form of a bond market economy with capital taxes. The chapter provides conditions ensuring
that an untaxed economy would fail to achieve an efficient allocation. The essential element for a
possible Pareto improvement is a wedge which is introduced between the returns on capital and the
market return on bonds. Around the undistorted economy the sign of a welfare improving wedge
depends centrally on the covariance of asset holdings and marginal utility in the cross-section of
the population. The covariance term represents the redistributive impact of a combination of price
changes and lump-sum revenue rebates: a bond price increase affects agents negatively in proportion
to their asset holdings, while the rebate increases their individual welfare in proportion to average
savings. A necessary condition for the optimal tax is also presented. This condition takes that
redistributive effect into account, in addition to the combined consequences that each price change
has on revenues across periods.
The third paper is product of joint work with Plamen T. Nenov. Its central concern are the
effects of increased uncertainty on financial stability. By studying a debt roll-over coordination
2
game with dispersed information and a market-determined liquidity scenario, it describes conditions
under which an improvement in the precision of individual information about financial institutions'
fundamentals leads to greater financial stability. For the limiting case of arbitrarily precise private
information, that condition obtains a simple form in terms of payoff elasticities. Conversely, we
characterize when an increase in uncertainty leads to a higher frequency of debt runs and show how
this deleterious effect is amplified through the deterioration of prices for liquidated assets.
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Thesis Supervisor: Robert M. Townsend
Title: Elizabeth and James Killian Professor of Economics
Thesis Supervisor: Ivin Werning
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Chapter 1
Liquidity Scarcity, Project Selection, and Volatility
Abstract
The severe contraction that followed the recent financial crisis highlighted the exposure of the real sector to financial
markets and the volatility in credit conditions. Unreliability of future funding influences the way in which firms
balance risks when choosing investment projects and designing financial arrangements. This chapter studies the
behavior of project choice in an environment with financial frictions and its consequences for the aggregate behavior
of the economy. I focus on responses to fluctuations in the external supply of liquidity and in the liquidity created by
the entrepreneurial projects themselves. When shocks occur to external liquidity sources, such as changes in the cash-
flows that support mortgage-backed securities or other non-corporate assets, these are transmitted through financial
arrangements towards the real sector. The anticipation of these shocks and its reflection in asset prices influence
project selection and change the pattern of fluctuations, creating additional comovement. Likewise, the anticipation
of variations in the internal liquidity of firms, resulting from shocks to their productivity, changes their choice of
projects. For moderate liquidity scarcity, the effect through project choice is shown to lead to the dampening of
these underlying productivity shocks; while for more severe shortages, amplification emerges. Despite the possibility
of excess exposure to risk being generated endogenously, allocations are constrained efficient. Policy implications are
then discussed in light of this result.
JEL Codes: E22, E44, GO1, G11
Keywords: Business Cycles, Liquidity, Financial Frictions, Transmission, Synchronization, Amplification.
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1.1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis was followed by one of the sharpest credit contractions since the Great
Depression. Major drops were experienced in syndicated lending, down by 79% of its peak volume
((Ivashina and Scharfstein 2010)), and in industrial and commercial loans by U.S. commercial banks,
which dropped by approximately a quarter from the Oct/2008 peak to the Oct/2009 bottom1.
Concerns about a market freeze in commercial paper also led to an unconventional intervention,
with the creation of the Commercial Paper Funding Facility by the Federal Reserve System at the
height of the crisis. This special purpose vehicle, by acting as buyer of last resort in the commercial
paper market, eventually held up to approximately U$350 billion in commercial paper ((Adrian,
Kimbrough, and Marchioni 2011)). Shock-waves of the crisis were felt across multiple sectors of
the economy and the severe recession that followed highlighted the exposure of the real sector to
financial factors and to the volatility in credit conditions. A few important questions emerge. First,
how call the financial system be imade inore resilient, to prevent other such crises from emerging?
Second, how does the anticipation of unreliability in future funding affect decisions of non-financial
firms regarding their exposure to both real and financial risks? Last, is this exposure excessive,
creating a case for future intervention?
The elusive answer to the first of these questions has attracted a number of important contri-
butions2 . The present chapter attempts to address the remaining set of questions. To do so, it
is necessary to study an environment in which unreliable financial conditions and fluctuations in
asset markets matter for real economy activity. Also, one in which agents in the real sector face
trade-offs in their exposure to the different risks involved in production and its financing.
I build on the framework of (Holmstr6m and Tirole 1998; Holmstr6m and Tirole 2001), which
provide a model environment in which liquidity conditions affect investment, asset prices and out-
put. There, however, investment prospects are fixed. I extend their baseline model to incorporate
the choice over different investment projects and to endogenize the economy's response to a set
of shocks which includes asset return fluctuations, productivity volatility and financial distress
possibilities.
There are three time periods. Investments on projects are made over the first two and they only
mature, generating revenues, on the third one. Projects differ in how their productivity, costs and
capacity to attract external funding respond to shocks. Entrepreneurs and lenders design financial
contracts to cover the random costs of these projects and need to take into account constraints that
arise from both sides of the agreement. As a consequence, decisions regarding project selection and
financial arrangements are intertwined.
From the entrepreneurial side, only a limited share of the cash flows generated can be cred-
'Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Release H.8
2 Some examples include (Adrian and Shin 2009; Acharya, Mehran, and Thakor 2010; Brunnermeier 2009; Curdia
and Woodford 2010; Diamond and Rajan ming; Farhi and Tirole 2011b; Geanakoplos 2009; Gertler, Kiyotaki, and
Queralto 2011; Hanson, Kashyap, and Stein 2010; Kurlat 2010; Lorenzoni 2008; Shleifer and Vishny 2010; Stein 2011)
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ibly committed to the repayment of other agents, i.e., there is limited pledgeability of output.
Consequently, a project's potential to guarantee the funding necessary for its own completion is
compromised and there is limited internal liquidity. Since financial needs of projects might exceed
available internal liquidity, there is a demand for pre-arranged transfers of resources from lenders.
From the lenders' side, limited commitment constrains their promises to transfer resources in
the future to help fund the project. As a result, other assets available in the economy play a role in
this arrangement, as they can serve as collateral and help back reinvestment promises. These assets
serve as external liquidity and are demanded as part of the optimal financial contract. Important
practical examples of non-corporate assets which are either held directly by firms for contingent
liquidation or back funding delivery promises include cash, sovereign bonds and mortgage-backed
securities.
Jointly, the availability of internal and external liquidity in the economy determine its aggregate
liquidity conditions and asset prices. In turn, these asset prices influence optimal financial con-
tracts and project choices. Through these interactions, endogenous project selection and general
equilibrium effects are key determinants of the behavior of the aggregate economy and its responses
to shocks.
My first main result originates from an application in which I study the choice over projects
which differ in the volatility of their capacity to generate output and revenues. As only a fraction
of this output is pledgeable, internal liquidity drops in case of a negative productivity shock and
financial needs, which need to be backed by external assets, increase. The opposite occurs when
positive productivity shocks hit projects. The optimal financial contract specifies which project is
chosen, under which conditions it is completed, downsized or terminated, as a well as all relevant
transfers and the asset acquisitions that are necessary for their backing. The possibility of control-
ling the exposure to productivity risk, by choosing among different projects, is shown to work in
this environment as an imperfect substitute for external asset purchases.
When the economy features a single risk-less asset that can be used for backing transfer promises,
its price signals its scarcity and determines how liquidity-constrained entrepreneurs are in equilib-
rium. Project selection and financial contract design work together in ensuring that pledgeable
resources are available in the states where they are the most valuable. When asset prices are low,
entrepreneurs purchase enough of these assets to be constrained only in states with low productivity.
Therefore, choosing projects with lower volatility helps move resources to those states. However,
when assets are sufficiently scarce and prices are high, entrepreneurs find themselves constrained
even in states with higher productivity. The relative value of resources across those different states
determines in which direction they want to bias project choice. As prices increase and entrepreneurs
become more liquidity constrained, they choose projects with higher volatility, to make sure they
have resources to finance ongoing investments at least in the situations in which the project is the
most productive. Therefore, the deterioration of aggregate liquidity conditions leads to the choice
of riskier projects, showing that endogenous project selection can be a powerful determinant of
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aggregate volatility.
I then turn to the consequences of fluctuations which are driven by changes in the values of
non-corporate assets, i.e., by shocks to external liquidity. Some examples of central relevance given
recent events include the possibility of a drop in house prices leading to a collapse in mortgage-
backed securities or sudden changes in the value of sovereign bonds. In the model studied, such
fluctuations are introduced as variations in payouts from a set of trees which are in fixed supply.
Contingent claims are traded, serve as external liquidity and are backed by these trees. Asset
trades are sufficiently sophisticated and allow for positions that include but are not restricted to
the holding of risk-less claims. I study how shocks to the payouts of these trees are transmitted
towards corporate investment policies and also how endogenous project selection, by generating
additional comovement of entrepreneurial output and asset values, can work as an amplification
mechanism for these shocks.
In this setting, liquidity premia3 are always higher for assets that pay out in states where tree
output scarcer. Additionally, completion rates for entrepreneurial projects and their final output are
always non-decreasing in the trees' output. Since, claims on trees play the role of a financial input
in an entrepreneurial sector which is liquidity constrained, a lower payout from them is transmitted
towards entrepreneurial output whenever there is a shortage of internal liquidity. This is a natural
transmission mechanism and generates some output comovement on its own.
When project choice is introduced in this environment, an additional degree of comovement
arises endogenously. Whenever internal liquidity falls short of the necessary costs of investment,
investment opportunities and external assets payouts are complementary. Therefore, a project
that offers these opportunities in future states in which external liquidity is more plentiful and,
consequently, cheaper to acquire in advance is preferred by entrepreneurs. As a result, the en-
trepreneurial sector biases its investment towards projects that comove positively with the trees'
output and ends up being endogenously more exposed to the factors which determine that level.
A third set of results relates to constrained efficiency in the environments studied. Despite the
possibility of additional exposure to risk and amplification of fluctuations emerging endogenously
through project selection, all outcomes are constrained Pareto efficient. Therefore, a planner that
does not have advantages in the creation of liquidity nor in its contingent reallocation across
firms cannot improve the overall efficiency of production nor increase welfare. This generates
a characterization of which classes of policies cannot lead to improvements. Examples of such
policies are the ones which ban projects deemed excessively risky, mandate minimum liquid asset
holding levels or preclude the use of risky assets as part of financial arrangements. On the other
hand, that does not imply the inexistence of policies that could lead to improvements; but if they
do exist, they need to rely on an governmental advantage in the creation of liquid assets 4 , on its
3 Liquidity premia are present as assets might sell above their value for consumption purposes. They are defined
as a ratio of asset prices to their expected payouts.
4 As in (Holmstrdm and Tirole 1998), which discusses how exclusive ("regalian") enforcement powers give the
public sector a unique opportunity to create liquidity backed by its ability to tax citizens in the future.
10
greater flexibility in reallocating resources after realizations of aggregate states of the economy or
on its capacity of improving the underlying contractual environment.
The chapter also includes a series of additional results. First, a general model is introduced.
A few closed-form criteria for project selection in this environment are analyzed. For instance, as
a consequence of these frictions, there is an important departure from standard net-present-value
criteria largely used in corporate practice. Output generated in a given period is treated differently
and needs to be decomposed according to its shares which can be credibly pledged to outsiders
and the one that needs to be claimed by entrepreneurs. Also, given credit constraints, optimal
leverage determination plays a key role. After this analysis, specialized environments are proposed,
to illustrate the different aggregate consequences of the interactions between liquidity scarcity and
project selection. The central conclusions from most of these have been reported in the previous
paragraphs. The last environment studies the consequences of enriching the set of assets trades in
the economy with endogenous choice of output volatility. It shows that although allocations change
in interesting ways, the main qualitative conclusions regarding incentives for the amplification or
dampening of productivity fluctuations are robust to these more sophisticated trades and are, thus,
not a consequence of the single risk-less asset assumption initially made.
Related Literature- The present chapter is related to different strands of economic literature.
As anticipated, it is the most closely related to the literature on liquidity asset pricing which follows
from (Holmstr6m and Tirole 1998; Holmstr6m and Tirole 2001). My focus, however, is on the joint
determination of the exposure to real and financial risks which occurs when real investments have
to be selected and financed by arrangements which need to take into account the frictions that arise
from both sides of a relationship. This focus brings into light interplays between technological and
financial decisions, as well as their aggregate consequences.
Difficulties in securing future funding and the need to manage liquidity buffers also seem to
be a growing concern in corporate practice. A dramatic increase in corporate liquid holdings has
been observed in the last few decades, through a a steep growth in the cash-to-asset ratio of U.S.
industrial firms, which more than doubled in the 1980-2006 period ((Bates, Kahle, and Stulz 2009)).
Indeed, that study also reports that the average corporation has enough cash to withdraw all of
its debt and that a common measure of leverage which nets out cash holdings, the net debt ratio 5 ,
has suffered a substantial secular decline. The picture becomes even more impressive when we take
into account additional instruments for liquidity hoarding beyond cash. For instance, (Campello,
Giambona, Graham, and Harvey 2011) report results of a survey which shows that the average firm
has credit line access amounting to 24% of the value of their total assets, about twice the volume
of cash they additionally hold6.
Some recent empirical papers have also studied the behavior of the mix between cash and credit
5 Defined as debt minus cash, divided by book assets.
6 1t is worth noting a significant discrepancy in cash ratios in (Bates, Kahle, and Stulz 2009) and (Campello,
Giambona, Graham, and Harvey 2011), due to sampling among firms with different characteristics.
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lines and highlighted the importance of covenants in determining the availability of these pre-
committed funds7 . In particular, (Acharya, Almeida, and Campello 2010) discusses the importance
of aggregate risk in triggering covenant violations and reducing the amount of resources available
for covering corporate expenses. The recent financial crisis has also provided rich data on the
interaction between liquidity dry-ups and the responses in corporate investment policy, employment
and financial management8 . The current chapter focuses on how production decisions and financial
arrangements anticipate these possibilities and, especially, on the consequences on the aggregate
behavior of economy in face of real and financial shocks.
It is thus also related to another set of papers which have addressed the broad issue of project
selection, or investment composition, in environments with financial frictions. For example, (Mat-
suyama 2004; Matsuyama 2007a; Matsuyarna 2007b), which study deterministic aggregate implica-
tions of imperfect credit markets, such as credit cycles, leapfrogging, aggregate demand spill-overs,
reverse international capital flows and traps. Or (Aghion, Angeletos, Banerjee, and Manova 2010),
which studies the choice between a low volatility, but financially exposed investment, versus a more
volatile short-term investment, across economies with borrowing constraints of different severity. It
shows that the determination of investment composition can help account for empirical patterns in
levels of cross-country growth rates and their volatility. The present work differs from these papers
in studying how the joint selection of projects and financial arrangements respond to the scarcity
of aggregate liquidity and the importance of this mechanism in determining the pattern of fluctu-
ations in the economy. Its conclusions add a new perspective to this broad set of macroeconomic
consequences of imperfect financial markets.
One of the central results of the chapter regards the emergence of the choice of riskier projects
in economies which face severe liquidity scarcity. I identify a form of risk-seeking behavior on en-
trepreneurial decisions. To the best of my knowledge, it significantly differs from previously known
channels, such as an agency problem leading to asset substitution and risk-shifting ((Jensen and
Meckling 1976)) and non-convexities in the entrepreneur's value function derived from a combi-
nation of credit constraints and occupational choice ((Vereshchagina and Hopenhayn 2009)). The
key driver of this risk-seeking mechanism lies in the partial pledgeability of output and on the way
through which output fluctuations move pledgeable resources across states of the world. These re-
sources are useful for backing the financing of investment, substitute for costly asset hoarding and
are especially valuable when investment is more productive. Unlike in the risk-shifting literature,
the contracts between lender and borrower that I study offer sufficient state contingency and the
choice for riskier projects is an ex ante decision on which both lender and borrower agree as the
best response to the constraints and environment they face.
7Data on credit line availability and drawdowns have typically been hard to obtain. A few recent papers such as
(Sufi 2009) and (Acharya, Almeida, and Campello 2010) made progress in its obtainment and analysis.
8 See, for instance, (Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira, and Weisbenner 2009; Campello, Giambona, Graham, and
Harvey 2011; Ivashina and Scharfstein 2010).
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The chapter is also related to the literature on optimal risk management 9 , but takes a less
cornmon approach by studying how investment decisions interact with financial arrangements; and
also by doing that in a general equilibrium environment. The first of these elements is present in
a recent paper by (Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach 2011)(ACW), which studies investment and
risk management when future financing involves frictions. Its main insight is that the possibility
of future financing shortfalls leads to investment in projects with earlier payouts and lower risk ex-
posure. Some key distinctions are responsible for generating different analysis and complementary
results between our papers. In ACW, investment opportunities are independent across periods.
The potential for funding shortages on an upcoming decreasing returns to scale investment oppor-
tunity creates a form of risk-aversionio and, without temporal dependence in productivity across
projects, biasing is always towards safer projects. In the environment I study in Section 1.4.1, the
same project is financed sequentially, which naturally introduces an inter-temporal dependence in
investment productivity. A more volatile project, while more severely affected by shocks on the
downside, generates more pledgeable output, which backs its own financing, exactly in the situa-
tions in which reinvestment is more productive. This mechanism is at the heart of the emergence
of the form of risk-seeking behavior which is identified in that section. Other sources of comple-
mentarity lie in the study of the aggregation of multiple firms in general equilibrium on the current
chapter, which is essential for its focus on aggregate consequences, and also on the presence a richer
set of macroeconomic shocks.
Last, it can also be related to the literature on financial development and volatility, when
different comparative statics on the magnitude of the underlying frictions and the availability of
non-corporate assets are conducted. For instance, the result linking liquidity scarcity, if interpreted
as low financial development, to the choice of riskier projects is consistent with the finding that less
developed countries specialize in riskier sectors ((Koren and Tenreyro 2007)), which is difficult to
reconcile with models based on optimal portfolio choice approaches in face of a mean and volatility
trade-off.
Structure- The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 proposes the general
model. Section 1.3 studies incentives driving project choice in this environment. Section 1.4
discusses the interactions and aggregate consequences in specialized environments. Section 1.5
proves the constrained Pareto optimality result and policy consequences, while section 1.6 concludes.
All proofs omitted from the main text are in the appendix.
9 For instance, (Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein 1993; Leland 1998; Holmstr6m and Tirole 2000; Rampini and
Viswanathan 2010).
1 0As first illustrated by (Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein 1993).
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1.2 The Model
The central features of the model are the presence of a set of agents with a menu of investment
opportunities, entrepreneurs, and a set of agents without these opportunities, who act as lenders.
They design a financial contract subject to constraints from both sides of the arrangement: limited
pledgeability from the entrepreneur side and limited commitment from lenders. The presence of
random costs before the completion of projects occurs creates a need to ensure the availability
of resources for those situations, generating a rationale for liquidity insurance and management.
Entrepreneurs try to make sure they have resources in situations in which they can be used produc-
tively, for salvaging a project under distress or for taking advantage of investment opportunities.
Limited commitment constrains liquidity insurance by lenders and creates a role for asset purchases
from third parties in enabling some limited insurance. The markets for these assets are potentially
incomplete, to allow for potential difficulties in fully state-contingent liquidity trades.
Time and uncertainty
Time is described by t = 0, 1, 2. There is a single good in each period, which can be used for
both consumption and investment.
The state of the world is fully described by w C Q, where Q is a finite set with #Q elements.
All uncertainty is realized at time t = 1 and 7r : Q -> [0, 1] is a probability mass function.
Agents
Entrepreneurs - The economy is populated by a continuum measure one set of identical en-
trepreneurs, indexed by j E [0, 1). They are the only agents in the economy with access to
a menu of investment technologies, soon to be described. Each one has initial net worth A
at I = 0 and no endowment in future periods. They are risk neutral, with utility given by
U (co, CI, c2) = E [co + ci + c2] -
Lenders/consumers - There is a continuum of agents without direct access to investment op-
portunities, but with large endowments in the first two periods, AL and AL and no endowments
in the last period. We assume that the measure of this set is strictly greater than one, so there
are more lenders than entrepreneurs available. They are also risk neutral and also evaluate con-
sumption streams according to U (cO, Ci, c2) = E [co + ci + C2]. The large endowment assumption
ensures that scarcity of resources does not limit investment, leaving the determination of scale to
be a consequence contractual frictions and not resource scarcity. Lenders are not able to commit
to payments at t = 1, 2.
Assets
There are K assets in fixed supply L C RA, which are initially held by lenders. The payout
vector at state w is given by z (w) C R K. To emphasize the role as stores of value and not as physical
inputs, let us assume that these resources are only available for consumption at t = 2. Additionally,
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let the payoff matrix have full rank K and K < #Q. Therefore, there are no redundant assets and,
for each asset k, zk (w) > 0 for at least some w E Q.
These assets are traded at prices q E R at time zero, with qk representing the price of asset
k. For simplicity, there is no market for such assets at t = 1. Given the ability to pledge payoffs
from assets in financial contracts and common preferences, this assumption is innocuous.
This general formulation nests the case in which there are only real assets that can be purchased
with the purpose of backing promises of transfers across agents, as well as an economy in which a
complete set of Arrow-Debreu state contingent financial securities can be traded.
Definition 1.1. A liquidity premium on asset k is defined as the excess payment made for this
asset at t = 0 relative to its expected output, that is, q - 1TZk]
Projects
Entrepreneurs choose from a menu of projects. These are described by the choice of y E F, where
F is a compact subset of R". Each of these projects involves a constant-returns-to-scale technology
that generates pi (w, y) units of output per-unit of investment if brought to completion. Investment
is made at time t = 0 and output becomes available at t = 2. However, due to a contractual friction,
only po (w, Y) < pi (w, y) can be pledged to lenders. This friction can be motivated using a moral
hazard problem, limited commitment or other distortions. The set-up cost of these projects is # (y)
per-unit at t = 011.
Project choice can be narrowly interpreted as a technological decision, describing different ways
to produce a final good or as alternative investment possibilities in different sectors of an economy.
More broadly, it can also involve choices over different costly actions that can be taken by manage-
ment during the implementation of a single enterprise which lead to changes in its returns, costs
and responses to risks.
The projects involve a time-to-build component and might suffer additional cost shocks at t = 1,
which make projects require essential reinvestment before completion occurs. These reinvestment
shocks are denoted by p (w, y). Each unit of project -y will only be brought to completion and
deliver output at t = 2 if an additional amount p (w, y) of resources is invested in the intermediate
period, t = 1. An incomplete unit does not generate any output.
Partial continuation at any state contingent scale x (w) E [0,1] is possible. That means that
if entrepreneurs face liquidity shortages that render them unable to fully continue the project, a
downsizing possibility exists. By downsizing the projects to a fraction x (w) of their initial scale,
total and pledgeable returns can still be collected for the relevant share of completed units.
Financial Contract
"Given constant returns to scale, assuming that projects have different set-up costs is equivalent to normalizing
this cost to be one and scaling all relevant returns and liquidity shocks by a multiplicative factor of d ( 1.The
additional function is left for convenience in the applications that follow.
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At the beginning of period t = 0, each entrepreneur competitively offers a financial contract to be
accepted by a single lender. The contract specifies {I, {x (w)}WCQ , -', a}, where I is an investment
scale, {x (w)} is the fully-state-contingent continuation policy, -y is the project chosen and
a E RKh is the portfolio of external assets held by the entrepreneur-lender pair as part of the
financial arrangement. This contract also determines time and state contingent transfers T =
{ 0, T I(w) , r2 (w) } from the lender to the entrepreneur. Given limited commitment, the lender can
walk away at t = 1, losing rights to any payoffs from the project or external assets that are held as
part of the financial arrangement. Since lenders lose access to the payoffs from assets in case they
do not deliver the specified transfers to entrepreneurs, external assets play the role of collateral in
the financial arrangement.
Taking as given an outside option of T, lender participation at t = 0 requires
T !ET 0 + T1(W) + T,(W)]I. (1. 1)
The lender commitment problem, imposes an interim participation constraint for each W C Q
at t = 1 of the form
0 > r I (W) + T 2 (w) . (1.2)
That means that, in order for the lender not to walk away from the contract at t = 1 when state
w e Q is realized, the sum of continuation transfers from the lender to the entrepreneur has to be
non-positive.
Feasibility of the plan and entrepreneurial consumption (c0 ,E c1,E, 2,E requires
T0 + A = (y) I+ q - a + c,E (1.3)
which means that transfers from lenders plus initial entrepreneurial wealth need to cover the costs
of investment, portfolio purchases and any entrepreneurial consumption,
TI (W) = p (W, ) x (w)I + c1,E () , for eachw C Q, (1.4)
that is, transfers from lenders need to cover any additional project costs at t 1 plus any en-
trepreneurial consumption at that stage and, last,
P1 (W, -) X (W) I + T 2 (W) = c2,E (W), for eachw C Q, (1.5)
total output generated by the project plus any additional transfers equal entrepreneurial consump-
tion at t = 2.
The cases of interest are the ones in which w2 (W) < 0, indicating that there is repayment from
entrepreneurs to lenders. These repayments are bounded by limited pledgeability, which imposes
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that -- 2 (w) needs to be covered by pledgeable income from the project and the assets held,
po (w, y) x (w) I + z -a ;> - 2 (w). (1.6)
Entrepreneurs therefore solve
CEjmax _Ia, E cOE + C1,E + 2,E] (1.7)
subject to constraints (1.1)-(1.6).
The timing of consumption and the transfers between lenders and entrepreneurs are not particu-
larly interesting in this environment, given perfect substitution in consumption. As a consequence,
the study of the environment and allocations can be much simplified once we work in terms of
surpluses from investment, which are defined below. Additionally, there are two simplified formu-
lations of the entrepreneur's problem, which do not depend on these elements, and are justified
through the use of Lemma 1.1, which follows shortly.
Definition 1.2. We define the total unit surplus of an investment and portfolio plan as
B1 (w; q; y, x,) pi (w, y) x (w) - p (w, -) x (w) - (-y) - [q - z (w)] .
The pledgeable unit surplus is
Bo (w; q; y, x,&) - po (w,-y) x (w) - p (wv) x (w) - (y) - [q - z (w)] -t.
The non-pledgeable component of investment is
B1 _o (, -y) - [pl (wy) - po (w, y)] x (w) .
The total surplus, B1 (w; q; -y, x, 6), is simply the final output per unit generated by the invest-
ment at t = 2, taking into account the completion rate x (w), plus the payout from the portfolio
of assets z (w) - a net of all opportunity costs of generating this value. By investing and buying a
portfolio at t = 0, entrepreneurs and lenders forgo # (w) + q - & units of consumption. At t = 1,
an additional p (w) x (w) are spent to ensure completion. Given identical and linear preferences,
consumption in any period is evaluated at a one-to-one rate by the lenders or entrepreneurs. The
pledgeable unit surplus, Bo (w; q; y, x, &), is analogously defined, with pledgeable output replacing
total output. Finally the non-pledgeable component of investment, a wedge B1_0 (w, -y), is simply
the difference between total output and total pledgeable output per unit. These surpluses are
useful in simplifying the entrepreneurs' problem, dropping all the determination of transfers, and
simplifying the set of constraints, as done below.
Lemma 1.1. Whenever the entrepreneur's problem admits a solution, the optimal entrepreneurial
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choice relative to investment, continuation decision and asset purchases,{I, {x (o)}- , y, a}, solves
max Ew [B1 (w; q; y, x, d)] I (1.8)
S.t.
E [Bo (u; q; y, x, 6)] I + A > t (1.9)
z(w) -l+po (w, y) x (w) > p (w, -y) x (w) I, f or each w e Q (1.10)
and
max Ew [Bio (w; -y, x)]J (1.11){I{.()}0},Q}
s.t. (1.9) and (1.10). Where we define & from a -I, so that it acts as a normalization of the
portfolio by the investment scale.
According to Lemma 1.1, entrepreneurs can be thought of as solving either one of two problems.
The first one is the maximization of total surplus subject to the constraints to be explained in
detail momentarily. The second equivalent formulation leads to the maximization of non-pledgeable
benefits, that have to be consumed by entrepreneurs, subject the the same two constraints.
The first constraint (1.9) is derived from a combination of feasibility constraints and the par-
ticipation constraint for the lender. It determines that investment is limited by the entrepreneur's
capacity to generate pledgeable surplus and initial net worth A. The cases of interest are the ones
in which despite its efficiency, investment is limited by difficulties in generating sufficient pledge-
able surplus. Whenever projects are sufficiently productive, entrepreneurs would like to lever up by
pledging all that is possible from the project to outsiders. As such, (1.9) is a leverage constraint,
which pins down the maximum scale of investment given initial entrepreneurial net worth and the
choices made regarding project selection, continuation policies and asset purchases.
The second set of constraints (1.10) follow from the lack of commitment from lenders. They
can be interpreted as liquidity constraints in the following way. On the left-hand side there are the
two sources of pledgeable income that entrepreneurs can rely on to ensure that they get funding for
continuation. The z (w) -a term is the payout from assets acquired that are external to the project,
therefore external liquidity. The second term, po (L, -y) x (w), is the pledgeable output that can be
still generated by the project if a continuation share x (w) is guaranteed. On the right-hand side,
there are the resource requirements from the project in state w C Q at time t = 1.
Whenever po (w, y) > p (w, y), the project alone offers enough pledgeable income (internal
liquidity) to guarantee full continuation of all units, even without reliance on the payoffs from the
assets. Pledgeable income is sufficient to ensure sufficient financing from the lender and the project
is said to be self-refinancing. Those are the states against which entrepreneurs would typically like
to borrow to finance investment at t = 0.
On the other hand, whenever po (w, -y) < p (w, y) , pledgeable income from the project itself does
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not fully cover the additional cost at t = 1. Project y is not self-refinancing in state W and is said
to be under financial distress. In the absence of any external assets, lenders would be unwilling to
transfer any additional amounts to fund continuation of the project. This possibility is responsible
for generating a demand for external liquidity. The purchases of external assets can be either inter-
preted as entrepreneurial savings towards those states or as the acquisition of collateral to enable
transfers from lenders in state w at t = 1 and, consequently, insurance of continuation possibilities.
Allocations and Equilibrium
Let E be the space in which entrepreneurial decisions towards investment, portfolio and contin-
uation decisions lie with u {1, {x (-)} , y, &} E E being the typical element1 2 . In all examples
analyzed, E can be made compact to ensure the existence of solutions to the entrepreneurs' prob-
lem 13 .
We then define an allocation as a mapping from the set of entrepreneurs to their decision space
E. This definition is purposely leaving out specifics of the borrower-lender relationship, which
determine the timing of consumption and all potential transfers. Whenever an equilibrium under
the definition to follow exists, these elements can be easily obtained.
Definition 1.3. An allocation is mapping a : [0, 1] -* E such that each coordinate is Lebesgue
measurable over [0,1]. An allocation naturally defines a probability measure F, over E, that is, a
distribution of entrepreneurs over their decision space.
Definition 1.4. A competitive equilibrium consists of an allocation a, an outside option for lenders
T and asset prices q E IR, so that:
1. For every entrepreneur j E [0, 1], a (j) is a solution to the entrepreneur's problem given asset
prices and the outside option of lenders T.
2. For each asset k C {1, ... ,
qk = E [z (w)] and akdi < Lk, (1.12)
or
qk > E [zk (w)] and Jakdj = Lk. (1.13)
3. The presence of excess lenders drives their outside option T to zero.
The definition of a competitive equilibrium requires entrepreneurial maximization, allowing for
indifference between several equilibrium strategies. It is important that it allows for ex post het-
erogeneity, which emerges in some of the applications studied. Even with indeterminacy at the
12Note that E = I x [0, 1]#O x F x A, where I C Ris the space of allowed scales andA C RK is the space of allowed
asset holdings
13 x (w) and -y belong to compact sets and a and I can be restricted to lie in sufficiently large closed intervals
without loss of generality.
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individual level, aggregates are uniquely defined in these cases. Market clearing conditions take
into account that consumers are willing to hold any amount of assets as long as their prices equal
their expected payouts (as in condition 1.12). Otherwise, when a liquidity premium emerges for
any given asset, this has to be held exclusively by entrepreneurs as part of financial arrangements
(as in condition 1.13).
1.3 Project Choice
The two frictions introduced have the potential to drive up asset prices and change the costs of en-
suring reinvestment in the different states of the world. Additionally, pledgeable and non-pledgeable
income offer different benefits to entrepreneurs. Pledgeable income, can be promised to lenders,
helping raise more funds to finance the project's costs, increasing leverage possibilities. However,
entrepreneurs can only consume any non-pledgeable resources generated by the projects, as these
cannot be credibly transferred to other agents. As projects differ in their liquidity requirements,
pledgeable income and non-pledgeable income, all these factors are taken into account in the optimal
choice of projects.
In this section, we analyze general criteria for the choice of projects in this environment.
Given the constant-returns-to-scale property of the production function and the linearity of the
entrepreneurs problem, an optimal project is one that offers the highest shadow value on en-
trepreneurial wealth or , equivalently, one which has the highest Lagrange multiplier associated to
the leverage constraint. Under complete markets, that shadow value is a ratio of expected non-
pledgeable benefits to the net liquidity costs of the project, properly weighted by the prices for
liquidity delivery in all states of the world. That multiplier can also be interpreted as the product
of a leverage ratio and the non-pledgeable returns on investment.
1.3.1 Project choice under complete markets
The central assumption for this section is that the set of assets is composed of a full set of Arrow-
Debren securities and that entrepreneurs are allowed to short those, as long as there is sufficient
pledgeable income to back this sale. When entrepreneurs are borrowing constrained, they in-
vest all their net worth in the project and pledge all that is possible to lenders. As such, they
consume only the non-pledgeable component B1 _o (w, -y) = [p1 (w, -y) - po (w, -y)] x (w). To sim-
plify the expressions derived, I introduce the wedge between total and pledgeable income per unit
P1- (a,7) -= P (7) - P0
Under this situation, the entrepreneur's problem for a fixed project -Y can be written as
max r () p1_o (W, -y) x (W)I (1.14)
{ I,{xMw}~,rna}
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s.t.
a. > (p (w, y) - po (w, -)) x (w) I, f or each wC Q, (1.15)
A-E7r (w) (p (w, y) - po (W, )) x (L) I - (q (w) - 7r (a)) a -#()I = 0, (1.16)
I >x(w)I > 0. (1.17)
Taking the necessary first-order conditions for an optimum while treating x (W) I as a single
choice variable, we obtain
= (W)I > 0, if x(w)1,
X (W) I:7r (W) pI-o (W, -) - (AWz (W) + yI (W)) (p (,7 po (W, 7)) = 7-) ,( = 0, if X (W) E(0, 1) , (1-18)
< 0,w)(P)w = 0, if X)({) =0.
a. : p (o) = A (q (co) - 7r (Lo)) , (1.19)
and
I: #(y) A = Er l()I, (1.20)
where pL (w), A and n)x(,), are respectively the multipliers on constraints 1.15, 1.16 and I > x (w) I.
A few insights emerge from these conditions. First, after optimization, only a subset of states
enter the expression for the marginal value of wealth to the entrepreneur (A). These are the states
in which entrepreneurs strictly prefer to fully continue the project and which are associated to a
multiplier 77x(,)I > 0, represents the shadow benefit of a scale expansion in a given state. Let this
subset be denoted by Q+ (-y, q). States in this subset are all the states in which,
7r (w) p1_o (w, y) - Aq (w) (p (wi, ) - po (w, y)) > 0,
that is, states in which the private benefit from completion outweighs the opportunity cost in terms
of liquidity consumption necessary for continuation, (p (w, -y) - po (w, -y)), properly weighted by the
price q (w). This condition is naturally satisfied for all states in which financial distress does not
occur, as both pi-o (w, y) > 0 and p (w, y) - po (w,-y) < 0.
The shadow value of entrepreneurial wealth can be rewritten as
A* (q) CQ(,q) ' P) P1 0 (1.21)
A*(,y) , q + Z o Y~ ) q (w) (p (w, -) - po (w, ))
Given linearity of the entrepreneur's problem, the value obtained from investing in project -y and
choosing optimal continuation policies and portfolios is given by A* (-y, q) A. Project choice is then a
matter of choosing the project y* C F which is associated to the highest multiplier A* (-y, q). From
equation 1.21, we can study which characteristics make a project more desirable. For instance,
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fixing all other elements, an increase in the non-pledgeable benefits has that effect. Alternatively, a
project with a lower requirement of expensive liquidity (p (w, y) - po (a, -y) > 0 in states associated
to high q (L)) is reduced. Both t = 1 costs p (W, y) and pledgeable income po (w, -y) enter the
denominator and are weighted by the price of the relevant Arrow-Debreu security. The set-up cost
at I = 0 also consumes net worth and enters additively the denominator of the shadow value of
wealth. This multiplier increases in a state price whenever the project is a net liquidity supplier
in that state and decreases in prices whenever the project is in financial distress in that event but
still taken to completion.
Notice that pledgeable and non-pledgeable income are treated significantly differently according
to this project selection criterion. This procedure, based on the shadow value of pledgeable income,
also reflects a departure from a net-present-value criterion, which indicates how projects should be
optimally chosen in a frictionless environment. The essential distinction are different roles played
by pledgeable and non-pledgeable income of the project. While pledgeable income is evaluated at
the same prices as costs at t = 1, since they enter the same liquidity constraints, non-pledgeable
income enters in the numerator, as in a rate of return calculation.
Notice also that * (* q) =, which gives rise to a leverage interpretation.
Given the leverage constraint of the form E [Bo (w; q; y, x, &)] I + A > 0, under the optimal policy,
entrepreneurs lever up their net worth by a factor of Ix1 and can reap all theA - -B(w;q;y,x* &*)adcn]epal h
social benefits from completion of the project. All elements in the denominator, which include
set-up costs, additional costs at t = 1 and pledgeable income can be viewed in light of the effects
they have on leverage of the entrepreneurial net worth and, therefore, on the determination of the
scale of the project.
1.3.2 Project choice under incomplete markets
Under incomplete markets, in the entrepreneur's problem, constraint
A - r(w ) (p (, y) - po (w, y)) x () I - > [qk () - E (zk)] ak - (-) I = 0 (1.22)
k<K
replaces constraint (1.16).
The first-order conditions (1.18) and (1.20) are unchanged. The conditions relative to asset
purchases become
P (C) Zk (W) = A (qk - E (zk)) , (1.23)
for each asset k. On the left-hand side, we see the benefits of relaxing liquidity constraints which is
a product of the relevant Lagrange multipliers and the asset returns on the different states. That
benefit term is equalized to the term on the right-hand side, the cost of tightening the leverage
constraint, that arises from purchasing an asset which features prices that are above its expect
payouts. That naturally implies that '4. +- - 1 works as a stochastic discount factor, for7r(w) A* (L;,y* 7,q)
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each entrepreneur j and for every project y* (j) that is selected in equilibrium. Despite all agents
having linear preferences, this stochastic discount factor can be above unity, given the presence of
a stochastic liquidity premium which is reflected on asset prices.
Additionally, it follows from (1.20) and (1.23) that
A_ EZ (w)I _ p (W) zk (W)
# (-y) qk - E (Zk)
indicating a trade-off between the two possible uses of pledgeable income. Entrepreneurs might use
pledgeable income to expand scale, which leads to a shadow benefit of , or alternatively, to
purchase more assets for liquidity insurance purposes, for a shadow benefit of E AMwZk(W) which
is obtained from relaxing the liquidity constraints.
Again, given linearity of the entrepreneur's problem, the criterion for project selection is one of
choosing the investment prospect that leads to the highest shadow value for entrepreneurial wealth
or, equivalently, on pledgeable income generated by the project.
A stronger characterization can be obtained when the economy features a single risk-less asset.
In that case, the optimality condition for the asset purchase can be reduced to
p (w) = A(q- 1),
indicating that the purchase of the only asset available helps relax all the liquidity constraints.
Given asset prices and a project chosen, we can partition the set of states in three disjoint sets:
Q+ (q, -y), the set of states in which entrepreneurs strictly prefer to fully continue and exhibit a
multiplier >x(w)J y 0 indicating a gain from a scale increase; Q, (q, -y), the set of states with partial
continuation and ( = 0; and last, Qo (q, y), representing states in which the entrepreneur would
prefer to fully terminate the project.
For all states in which partial continuation occurs and the liquidity constraint binds, it is easy
to find and interpret the multiplier on that constraint. Simple algebraic manipulation allows us to
write
7r (W) P- (W' Y) - A = (w) > 0.
Ip (W, -Y) - po (W, -Y))
In those states, the binding liquidity constraint imposes that x (W) I = P(WaPo(W-). Notice a
leverage effect in place, as a units of asset payouts used to ensure completion at state w can
generate P(WY)Po(WY) completed project units. In any of those states, payoffs from assets have an
opportunity cost: if they were simply pledged to outsiders and the project were fully terminated,
they would generate an expected 7r (w) a units of fully pledgeable income. That has a shadow value
of Air (w) a to entrepreneurs. Completion of the project to the maximum extent allowed by the
liquidity constraint consumes some net worth, since in a distress state p (WI ) - P0 (W, -y) > 0.
On the other hand, it enables a total non-pledgeable benefit of P1 O(W"y) to be collected by
the entrepreneur, if that state is reached. Therefore, the shadow value of the liquidity constraint
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in states where entrepreneurs choose to partially continue up to the point in which the liquidity
constraint binds is the levered non-pledgeable component of income ( P"('Y) ), net of the
opportunity cost of the pledgeable income dissipated (A), all of which multiplied by the probability
of state w.
Notice that for all states with full continuation
a ;> [p (P, -/) - po (P, -)]0I
This constraint can only bind for a single state: the one with the largest financial shortfall p (w, Y) -
po (W, Y). Let that state be called C. For all other states with full continuation, liquidity constraints
are slack and y (w) = 0. As a consequence of the existence of a single non-entrepreneurial asset
used for liquidity management purposes, for a fixed project -y, there is a single state CJ that can
have both a positive shadow value on scale increases and a binding liquidity constraint. We can
write further that
# (7 A =27r(W) { pio (0o, -) - A (p (P, -Y) - po (P, -)) - (p (D , _) - po (P, -Y)) P (M
indicating the shadow value of wealth used in a increase in scale as being the sum over all states
with full continuation of the private benefit net of liquidity opportunity costs minus the shadow
value of the tightening of the liquidity constraint on D. Also,
A (q - 1) = E 7r (w){j jjY) + p ).
pP1' (w, -Y) - po (w, -)
A purchase of external liquidity, in the form of the single risk-less asset, helps relax all the binding
relevant liquidity constraints, both in the states with partial continuation, as in the single full
continuation state with a binding liquidity constraint. Indeed, using & = a/I, the normalized asset
holdings, it is possible to rewrite the shadow value of entrepreneurial wealth as
EQ* 7q) (W') P1-0 (w, -Y) + EQr P--o(w) 7a
(-y) + (q - 1) & + E 7r () & Q+ 7r ) (p (w, Y) - P0 ( -))
The interpretation of A* (q, -y) is similar to the case with complete markets. The shadow value of
the entrepreneurial wealth is a ratio of private benefits collected, both in states with full continua-
tion and in states with partial continuation (in which a leverage on liquidity, ' , term
emerges), relative to all costs of the project implementation and risk-less asset purchases in terms
of pledgeable income. As stated before, project selection boils down to choosing argmaxryA* (q, -).
Once a significant departure from a standard Arrow-Debreu benchmark is acknowledged in the
selection of projects, a remaining question concerns whether it leads to significant macroeconomic
consequences. That question is addressed in the next section, which illustrates the macroeconomic
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effects of the interactions between liquidity scarcity and endogenous exposure to risks through
project selection and optimal financial arrangements.
1.4 Macroeconomic Consequences
In this section, I specialize the general model into particular cases to analyze the aggregate con-
sequences of the interactions between liquidity scarcity and project selection. In the first environ-
ment, entrepreneurs face ex ante and ex post credit rationing and choose projects which differ in
the volatility of their output. As a consequence of partial pledgeability of output, these projects
also differ in their ability to guarantee their own financing in future events. In this environment,
the main source of fluctuations is in the corporate sector itself and works through variations in
the internal liquidity of projects. Therefore, it is useful for understanding how aggregate liquid-
ity scarcity interact with corporate liquidity fluctuations in determining the endogenous degree of
volatility that firms face in the economy.
In the second environment, the fluctuations studied arise from the supply of external liquidity,
which is stochastic. There, shocks which are external to the entrepreneurial sector, such as a hous-
ing market collapse, are transmitted towards it through their impacts on financial arrangements.
I then introduce project choice, in which some projects are allowed to co-vary more strongly or
weakly with the factors behind fluctuations in external liquidity, and show that project selection
responses lead to additional endogenous comovement. Behind this comovement results lies a a
complementarity between projects, which might need additional investments before completion,
and assets payouts that back reinvestment promises. This environment illustrates how this comple-
mentarity is responsible for biasing project choice in a direction which makes corporate investment
and output covary strongly with external factors that determine aggregate liquidity conditions of
the economy. Due to this positive comovement, fluctuations are also intensified in this set up.
Finally, I go back to a variant of the first environment and introduce a more complex set
of instruments for liquidity distribution. As a consequence, financial arrangements and project
choices change, highlighting a complementarity between different forms of contingent liquidity and
different projects. Strong forms of specialization might emerge, despite the initial homogeneity of
entrepreneurs. Although this leads to changes in the allocations and the possible specialization
of firms with the introduction of richer asset trades, the qualitative results regarding dampening
or amplification of productivity fluctuations remain similar. For example, for sufficient liquidity
scarcity there is still amplification at an aggregate level. Therefore, this environment illustrates that
amplification of fluctuations in economies with severe liquidity scarcity is robust to the introduction
of more sophisticated financial arrangements.
1.4.1 Environment 1: Liquidity Scarcity and Volatility, with a single risk-less
asset
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When output is partially pledgeable to outsiders, variations in how much output can be generated,
such as the ones caused by productivity shocks, change the volume of resources that can be used
to finance both the project set-up and continuation in case of distress. The impact on the latter
is of particular importance. As such, productivity shocks have the potential to change how much
internal liquidity is available across states of the world and the depth of the financial shortfalls
that need to be covered by external liquidity. When there are negative shocks to total output that
can be produced, pledgeable output which is useful for ensuring external financing is reduced and
creates more difficulties for funding the continuation of the project. The opposite is true for a shock
that leads to an increase in total and pledgeable output.
By choosing among projects with different levels of volatility in productivity, entrepreneurs alter
their liquidity needs across states of the world and, indirectly, the value which external assets have
in their financial arrangements. Therefore, project selection interacts with liquidity management.
If projects differ in their output volatility, the choice over this variable is of particular importance.
In this section, we study an environment in which there is a single risk-less asset that can be
held as a buffer of external liquidity14 . The equilibrium price of this asset is shown to be of central
importance for the joint determination of which projects are selected, the quantity of the asset that
is purchased and which continuation policies are implemented. In particular, while for low prices,
entrepreneurs choose full continuation and low volatility of productivity, once prices are higher,
partial continuation emerges and high volatility might be chosen.
The intuition for this mechanism is that by controlling volatility, entrepreneurs move pledgeable
resources across states of the world and this works as an imperfect substitute for asset purchases.
When asset prices are low, entrepreneurs are only constrained in a low productivity state. Therefore,
at the margin, it is worth to choose projects with less volatility and relax that constraint. On the
other hand, when acquiring assets is too expensive, entrepreneurs purchase less of these and end up
liquidity constrained in multiple states. Pledgeable resources can then be the most valuable at the
margin in states with higher productivity, but binding funding needs. Choosing higher volatility,
in that case, helps move resources to those states.
Uncertainty- There are four states of nature. Financial needs at t = 1 are given by an
aggregate shock which belongs to {0, p}, with p > 0. Their realization is p with probability irp.
Additionally, the aggregate determinants of the productivity of projects belong to {g, b} and occur
with respective probabilities of 7r9 and 7rb 1 - 7r9 . In the g (good, higher productivity) states
each unit of each project is capable of delivering its highest possible output, while in the b (bad,
lower productivity) states it is capable of delivering a lower output. Productivity and reinvestment
need shocks are assumed to be independent. Therefore, the state of the world is fully described by
W C Q _ {g, b} x {0, p}.
14 The case in which trades on external liquidity can be made state-contingent is studied later. This example is
particularly useful for its simplicity and for contrasting its results with what is achieved when richer contracts for
external liquidity trades are feasible. Formally, if one wants a justification for the absence of contracts for deliveries
of risk-less assets at t = 1 across firms, we could resort to spatial separation or commitment problems.
26
Projects- There is a continuum of projects which differ in their initial set-up costs and in the
magnitude of their productivity fluctuations. Formally, there is a compact set of projects indexed
by -y EF [- 7 C R++. The project specific parameter -y measures the dispersion of output of a
given project across the aggregate productivity states. Let
p1 + -L , for w g} x 0, p}P1 (W, Y) =r "
P -I , for w E (b} x {0, p)
Notice that, conditional on full completion, all units of all projects have the same expected
output of pi, but differ in their variance, which is increasing in -Y. Therefore, the higher 7, the
more volatile the output of a project is. In particular, the extreme project 77 is the one that is the
most adversely affected by the realization of an event with low productivity, while also the one that
is the most positively affected by a high productivity event.
Assume that there exists a baseline, lowest cost project, 7o with # (yo) = 1. The output
process of this project provides the benchmark level of fluctuations, around which amplification
and dampening are defined. A project involving -y > -yo features more output fluctuation than the
baseline project and is said to lead to amplification. Analogously, a project with -y < yo fluctuates
less than the benchmark project and is said to lead to dampening. Let #(y) be C2 and strictly
convex.
Let us assume that limited pledgeability is caused by an agency problem, with a severity which
does not vary across states of nature. That means that a constant, state independent, private
benefit p1_0 > 0 per continued unit of the project has to be offered to entrepreneurs in order to
ensure diligent behavior. As a consequence, pledgeable output will move one-to-one with total
output and po (w, Y) = pi (w, -y) pi-o, for each state w and project -. This assumption is chosen
for two reasons. The first is that private benefits are not made pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical in
themselves, so that all incentives guiding project choice are entirely financial and related to liquidity
costs. The second is that it generates greater tractability by allowing the entrepreneurs' problem to
take an average-cost formulation, in which dependence on total output produced, pi, disappears.
Assets- There is a single risk-less asset that pays out a certain unit of consumption in all states
w C Q at t = 2.
Additional Assumptions- The following set of assumptions about parameters in the produc-
tion functions is made:
Al 0 < po < p < pi,
A2 p + < 1 + 7rPP,
A3 pi > 1 ,
A4 po + -<p.
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Assumption Al ensures that financial distress occurs when the refinancing shock is p. Assumption
A2, that it is optimal to fully continue even the project that is most adversely affected by a negative
productivity shock if there is no premium on the risk-less asset. Jointly, Al and A2 imply finite
leverage. Assumption A3 implies that entrepreneurs are willing to undertake the project even when
unable to continue in the distress states. Assumption A4 ensures that not even the project that
is the most positively affect by a high productivity realization becomes self-financing in the (g, p)
state.
Analysis
The purchase of the existing asset will enable entrepreneurs to simultaneously relax the two relevant
liquidity constraints, which are
a + p - ') x(b, p)J > px (b, p) 1 (1.24)
and
a+ P0+ 2 x(g, p)I > px (g, p)I, (1.25)
since {(g, p) , (b, p)} are the two states in which financial distress occurs 15 . The first term on the
left-hand side of both constraints is the level of purchases of risk-less assets (a) or, alternatively,
how much externality was acquired at t = 0. The second term is the amount of internal liquidity
available after the realization of the productivity shock is learned, for a continuation at scale x (w) I.
To back financing, given the absence of commitment from lenders, the sum of those two terms needs
to cover the required disbursement of p for the x (w) I units of the project that should be taken to
completion.
Output shocks create and destroy internal liquidity across states of nature, as seen in second
term on the left-hand side of the liquidity constraints (1.24) and (1.25). Therefore, the negative
productivity shock state (b) always involves a more stringent liquidity constraint than the positive
state (g). For any level of asset purchases, continuation in the b state needs to be weakly lower than
in the positive state, g. Therefore, productivity shocks induce supply shocks on aggregate liquidity
and represent a force towards higher liquidity premia on the asset. By choosing less productive
projects that involve dampening (lower -y), entrepreneurs can shift internal liquidity to the b state,
where it is scarcer. This provides a rationale for why output shocks can lead to incentives for the
dampening of fluctuations.
However, there is another force in place. The return on liquidity hoarding towards a given state
is also influenced by the productivity shocks. A unit of liquidity in a state W where a liquidity
1 5Assumption A4 and x (w) I > 0 imply that a > 0 from 1.25. As a consequence, the liquidity constraints relative
to all states in which the reinvestment shock is 0 are always slack.
28
constraint binds enables the completion of project units that have a social surplus of p1 (w, -y) - p.
From the liquidity constraints, the completion of each of these requires p - po (W, Y) units of external
liquidity in that state. Notice that a multiplier or leverage effect is in place: a unit of liquidity
brought into state w can enable the production of 1 units of output, which create a non-
pledgeable benefit of P1.0
When the aggregate productivity shock is more favorable, both total, pi (w, Y), and pledgeable
outputs, PO (w, ), are higher for all projects. Completion becomes more valuable in the g state,
given that a unit of the project completed delivers more social surplus. The multiplier effect
on external liquidity is larger, meaning that each completed unit offers the entrepreneur more
pledgeable income on which she will be able to lever up at t = 1. These effects are in place as long
as constraint (1.25) binds, which occurs when external liquidity is still necessary at the margin in
the higher output state.
These two combined generate a higher potential return on liquidity in the high productivity
state and provide a rationale for the choice of projects that offer more liquidity in the g state.
Those are the projects with higher -y, potentially involving amplification.
The proposition below helps understand the results that follow, by characterizing optimal de-
cisions regarding asset holding and continuation policies, when entrepreneurs are restricted to an
arbitrary fixed project.
Proposition 1.1. For any fixed project -y E F, there exist two cutoffs, q (-Y) and q (-Y), such that
1. For 1 < q < q (-y), full continuation in all states is optimal. Asset holdings are exactly sufficient
to ensure full continuation in the w=(b, p) state, with ' p + . Constraint (1.24)
holds with equality and constraint (1.25) is slack.
2. For q (-y) < q < q (q), an optimal policy features full continuation in the (g, p) state and
partial continuation in the (b, p) state. Asset holdings are pinned down by = (P -p - .
Constraints (1.24) and (1.25) hold with equality.
3. For q > q (-y), it is optimal to set a = 0 and fully terminate the project in the distress states.
Whenever the costs of liquidity hoarding are relatively low, it is optimal to purchase enough
assets to guarantee full continuation even in the worst possible state of nature. In that situation,
entrepreneurs are only effectively liquidity constrained in the (b, p)-state16.
In this full continuation regime, there are incentives towards dampening, as the choice of a
project with lower volatility reduces the need for asset hoarding. This can be seen in constraint
(1.24), which is relaxed with the choice of lower y. The forces pushing towards amplification are
absent, given that the liquidity constraint for the (g, p) state does not bind.
1 6As x(b, p) = x(g, p) = 1, it follows that Po + - + a > PO -- ) 1+ a = pI, implying that constraint (1.25)
is slack.
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However, once the liquidity premium is sufficiently high, it is optimal to switch to a policy of
limited liquidity hoarding. In that situation, resorting to partial liquidation in case reinvestment
needs coincide with low productivity helps reduce asset purchases, economizing on the use of
expensive external liquidity. Since both liquidity constraints bind, there are forces in place both in
the direction of dampening (relaxing constraint (1.24) by choosing a project with lower volatility
) and of amplification (relaxing constraint (1.25) by choosing a project with higher volatility) if
project choice is permitted. Which one dominates depends on the costs of asset hoarding.
Finally, for every project, there are sufficiently high prices leading to optimality of full liquidation
in case of distress. Enabling insurance through the accumulation of stores of value becomes too
expensive from the entrepreneurs' perspective. Later, when equilibrium conditions are taken into
account, prices cannot rise beyond the point in which entrepreneurs stop demanding liquidity.
This general behavior remains similar once project choice is incorporated: there will be three
relevant regimes for the solution of the individual problem as a function of asset prices. A first one
with full continuation in all states, a second with full continuation only in case of high productivity
shock and a third with full termination in case of distress. Within each one of these, which project
is optimal can be determined by a first-order condition. Determining actual cut-offs for the switch
between these regimes requires comparisons across solutions and either closed-form examples or a
computational approach. Nonetheless, the essential qualitative properties can be proved without
resorting to those. They are summarized by the proposition below.
Proposition 1.2. The solution to the individual problem features three regions, delimited by the
prices q and q. The following properties hold:
1. For 1 < q < q, there exists a unique optimal project, which features dampening and full
continuation. In this region, optimal project choice is a decreasing function of q.
2. For q < q < q, there exists a unique optimal project with full continuation in the (g, p) state
and partial continuation in the (b, p) state. Project choice is an increasing function of q and,
for sufficiently high q within this range, there is amplification.
3. For q > q, there exists a unique optimal project, involving full termination. It is the lowest
cost project, yo.
4. For q = 1, yo and full continuation are optimal.
5. At the thresholds q and q, two projects with respective different continuation policies are
optimal.
Figure 1-1 below illustrates the main results from Proposition 1.2, regarding continuation shares,
asset purchases and project choice as a function of the price of the risk-less asset's.
When prices are interpreted as a partial equilibrium measure of the intensity of the external
liquidity scarcity, a characterization of the behavior of the equilibria emerges. If liquidity is plentiful
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Figure 1-1: Optimal entrepreneurial decisions, as functions of asset price (liq. premium)
enough, no premium is present (q = 1) and, as a consequence, continuation decisions and project
choice are efficie onuatinuation always occurs and the most productive project, , is chosen
by all entrepreneurs.
As liquidity becomes moderately scarce, the economy moves to the behavior described in Propo-
sition 1.2, part 1. The relevant binding liquidity constraint is in the low productivity state and,
as a consequence, entrepreneurial choice over projects takes the relaxation of that constraint into
account. That leads to projects that, although less productive due to the higher cost, fluctuate
less and dampen the underlying shock. As such, they require less hoarding of liquidity, even for
full continuation. In these economies, no financial crises involving termination of projects are ever
observed.
If liquidity is more severely scarce, entrepreneurs opt to sacrifice continuation in the worst state
of nature as in part 2 of Proposition 1.2. Asset purchases are just enough to ensure full continuation
in the best financial distress state. By choosing projects that fluctuate more, entrepreneurs can save
on the costly asset hoarding necessary to ensure this level of continuation, but end up sacrificing
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efficient continuation in the worst financial distress state. When liquidity is scarce enough, as
signaled by a high liquidity price, the gains from moving internal liquidity to the high productivity
state to economize on external liquidity become large. The losses in terms of continuation in the
bad productivity state are more than offset and projects leading to amplification end up being
preferred.
Eventually, with sufficiently high prices, it becomes optimal for entrepreneurs not to buy any
assets and to choose the most efficient project -yo again. Conditional on the policy of full termination
in case of distress, there is no role for the relaxation of liquidity constraints through the choice of
any other projects.
Moving back towards general equilibrium, we can construct an aggregate demand for assets from
the behavior of the individual demand. Aggregation helps smooth out the discontinuities around the
two thresholds, q and q, by exploiting the indifference of entrepreneurs between different projects
and associated continuation policies. Together, the aggregate demand for assets and the inelastic
supply of external liquidity pin-down the asset price and liquidity premium, q. A sketch of the
equilibrium determination is provided in Figure 1-2.
q
q
a
Figure 1-2: Sketch of equilibrium determination for economies with different levels for the supply of
stores of value, L and L'. In the flat parts of the aggregate asset demand, two projects are optimal
and the supply of risk-less assets determines the fraction of entrepreneurs that chooses each one the
possible optimal policies, with their different underlying project choices and continuation decisions.
Changes in the liquidity supply, L, or in the pledgeable component of income, po, have similar
qualitative effects. Both can be thought of as measures of financial development and a reduction
in either moves equilibrium asset prices towards higher levels. By doing so, the economy moves
within and across the regions described in the partial equilibrium analysis.
32
Economies with severe financial underdevelopment experience higher fluctuations of output
and severe financial crises, with the discontinuation of many projects. Economies with moderate
financial development experience dampened fluctuations relative to first-best, but at cost in terms
of lower productivity in entrepreneurial projects.
1.4.2 Environment 2: Fluctuations in non-corporate assets; Transmission and
Synchronization
When financial conditions matter for economic activity, an important source of fluctuations lies
outside the corporate sector itself. Liquidity conditions in the economy fluctuate as the value of
assets that back promises of reinvestment in the economy change. The sudden drop in the prices
of mortgage-backed securities in mid-2007 and the ensuing contraction of credit and investment
highlight the practical importance of this particular channel.
In the framework proposed here, these fluctuations occur through the realization of different
payouts for the assets available. A variation in external liquidity can be captured by the introduction
of a mass L of trees, which produce a stochastic payout, or fruit. Suppose the output from these
trees can be high (zn) or low(zd), with z, > Zd. I allow for the contingent trading of this output
through assets, to be described shortly. As these assets back financial arrangements and enable
some insurance for the continuation of projects, competition for them might drive their prices above
their expected output, creating liquidity premia.
In the first section to follow, I study the transmission of the fluctuation in the value of these
assets into output from the entrepreneurial projects. In the presence of aggregate distress, the value
of tree output determines how much reinvestment the economy as a whole can afford. Asset prices,
investment scale and continuation policies are jointly determined in equilibrium. In this environ-
ment, premia on assets are always decreasing in the realization of tree output, while continuation
shares of projects under distress and, consequently, entrepreneurial output are increasing. In this
sense, shocks to the trees' capacity to generate fruit are transmitted towards the entrepreneurial
sector and influence its capacity to take investment under distress to completion. In itself, this
creates comovements across sectors of the economy, in which one sector is the provider of liquid-
ity (trees) and another sector is the one that needs that liquidity in its financial arrangements
(entrepreneurial projects).
I then show that if entrepreneurs face a choice of exposure to the same risks that drive tree
output, they endogenously choose to increase their exposure to these risks. This is done in section
1.4.2.2, the synchronization result. The intuition underlying the mechanism is that when reinvest-
ment shocks are proportional to the output that can be generated, projects that comove positively
with the trees will have more plentiful, and therefore, cheaper external liquidity as complements.
As a consequence, this economy creates an even stronger comovement across sectors than the
transmission mechanism alone.
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1.4.2.1 Transmission
We specialize the structure of the general model to the following particular case.
Uncertainty- Assume that financial distress and the realization of the trees' output are inde-
pendent. The economy features four relevant states of nature: Q = {U, d} x {p, 0}. Projects might
suffer an aggregate refinancing shock p > 0 with a probability irp e [0, 1]. Otherwise, no additional
costs have to be paid to ensure continuation of investments towards completion. Additionally, total
external liquidity, derived from the fruits of the trees can take two realizations in {zu, zd} with
zu > Zd. Let 7rr be the probability of the high realization and -d 1 - 1ru. Independence of exter-
nal liquidity shocks and refinancing needs is imposed and the probability of each realization of the
state of the world 7r (w) is naturally defined as the product of the relevant marginal probabilities.
Project- Suppose there is a single project available in the economy, by setting ' = {1}, and
normalize its cost to unit,#(1) = 1. Both total output per unit completed and the pledgeable
component do not vary across states of nature. That means p1 (w, 1) = p1 and po (w, 1) = po. When
the aggregate reinvestment need shock happens, firms find themselves under financial distress. In
that case, they are required to pay an additional p > po to bring each unit of the project to
completion. Otherwise, no additional cost has to be paid and firms are not under financial distress.
Assets- Let two assets be traded' 7 which are contingent on the output of the tree: , (d) is
a claim on all the output of a tree contingent on it being revealed to be z, (zd) and is traded at
price qu (qd) at t = 0. Therefore, asset u pays out z, in states w E {(u, p) , (u, 0)} and 0 otherwise.
Similarly, asset d pays out zd in w E {(d, p) , (d, 0)} and 0 in other states. Let au and ad be the
quantities of these claims purchased as part of a financial arrangement between an entrepreneur
and a lender. Both of these assets are available in fixed supply L.
Parameter Assumptions- We make the following assumptions about the parameters of the
production function:
Al 0 < po < p < pi
A2 p < 1_
A3 p1 > 1
Assumption Al ensures that financial distress occurs when the refinancing shock is p. Assumption
A2 guarantees that it is optimal to fully continue the project if liquidity premia are sufficiently
close to zero. Jointly, Al and A2 imply finite leverage. Assumption A3 implies that entrepreneurs
are willing to undertake the project even if unable to continue in the distress states.
17 Trade in these two assets is sufficient to fully span both all contingencies of the trees output and to allow
independent continuation decisions in all distress states.
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Analysis
We proceed in the following way. First, we analyze the solution to the entrepreneurs problem and
describe it graphically. Then, equilibrium conditions are imposed over that graphic description.
Different regimes are possible for the behavior of the equilibrium and the total availability of
liquidity in the economy determines which one holds. Finally, the key proposition of the section,
concerning the transmission mechanism, is analyzed.
In both states that do not involve additional investment needs, projects are self-financing at
t = 1 and offer excess liquidity. It is easily shown that liquidity constraints cannot bind in those
states and that full continuation under those contingencies is optimal. Therefore, without loss of
generality one can restrict attention to policies that set x (w) = 1 for w c {(u, 0) , (d, 0)}. The two
possibly binding liquidity constraints that entrepreneurs face are given by
zia + pox (i, p) I > px (i, p) I, for i = u, d. (1.26)
The minimum purchase of these contingent assets that needs to be made to enable continuation is
obtained by solving for an equality in the conditions (1.26). By proceeding this way, one obtains the
minimal amount of asset purchases necessary to enable continuation of a share x (i, p) of investment,
denoted as 6i (x) = -po), which can be plugged into the entrepreneur's problem to write it
as
max E [Bi (w; q; y, x, i (x))] 1 (1.27)
I,x(w)
s.t.
A + E [Bo (w; q; y, x, h (x))] I > 0, (1.28)
where again B1 and Bo represent, respectively, the total and the pledgeable surpluses from invest-
ment as defined in section 1.218.
A more complete description of the equilibrium behavior is offered in the appendix. Figure
1-3 describes the key elements of the characterization. In a graphical representation of the en-
trepreneurs' problem, there are four main regions, with the liquidity premia on both assets being
the key elements for determining optimal continuation policies.
Around the lower-left corner of Figure 1-3 is found the region with low liquidity premia on both
assets, in which full continuation in all states is optimal. When premia are sufficiently close to zero,
liquidity hoarding is relatively inexpensive and entrepreneurs choose to fully insure against distress
shocks. Thus, a policy of full continuation described by (xu, Xd) = (1, 1) is optimal.
The region above it, marked with (xu, xd) = (1, 0), displays the area in the liquidity premium
space in which full termination in the (d, p) state and full continuation in the (u, p) state is optimal.
18In the entrepreneurs' problem: E [B1 (w, -y, q, x, 6 (x))] = (1 - 7r) PI + 7T, (pI - p) [nux (7u, p) + 7TdX (71, p)] +
i-rd (P--PO "P) - 1. E [Bo (w, -y, q, & (x))] can be analogously obtained by substituting po for piin
that expression.
35
-~ W1 _)1
q~j
Figure 1-3: Optimal Continuation Policy Regions, as function of liquidity premia.
There, the premium in the d asset is sufficiently high while the premium on asset u is relatively
low. The frontier between these two areas, described by a segment, is the locus of points where
entrepreneurs would be willing to partially liquidate in case of a combination of low output and
high liquidity needs. This will be an important object in the characterization of the equilibrium.
Analogously, the region in the lower-right corner is the one in which the premium on asset
u would be sufficiently high as to induce termination, while the premium on asset d is not. As
liquidity is scarcer in the (d, p) state than on (u, p), it will not be a relevant region once equilibrium
conditions are taken into account. Finally, the rectangular region in the upper-right corner describes
the area in which both liquidity premia are so high that it is optimal for entrepreneurs to fully
liquidate in both financial distress states, choosing continuation shares (x, Xd) = (0, 0).
Aggregate liquidity scarcity in a distress state has two possible equilibrium consequences. It
might constrain the scale of investment, by creating an equilibrium liquidity premium which en-
sures that liquidity insurance becomes sufficiently costly and consumes a fraction of the initial
entrepreneurial net worth, as seen in equation (1.28). This way it would reduce the average en-
trepreneurial leverage and the scale of the average project. Alternatively, it might drive a liquidity
premium to such a high level that entrepreneurs become indifferent regarding liquidity insurance
for a given state of the world and some termination happens in equilibrium. In the brief description
to follow, liquidity scarcity in one state of the world might be responsible for limiting the aggregate
scale of investment. If that is not the worst possible state in terms of aggregate liquidity supply,
all states with worse conditions will involve some termination of investment.
Equilibrium with a positive asset payout in both states imposes that full termination in a given
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state can never be uniquely optimal. Therefore, the border segments between the four regions
represented in the previous figure are the loci where equilibrium prices have to lie. As formalized in
the appendix, possible equilibrium price and allocation behavior can be described by the numbered
(i)-(v) points and segments displayed in Figure 1-4.
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Figure 1-4: Loci of possible equilibria: premia and policies.
At point (i), liquidity even in the state with the most severe degree of scarcity, (d, p), is sufficient
to allow for full insurance of a scale of investment which is the highest possible. Liquidity premia on
both assets are zero and the scale of investment is only constrained by entrepreneurial net worth,
not by costs of asset hoarding. In all alternative cases to follow, liquidity premia are a feature of
the equilibrium.
At point (ii), a liquidity premium in asset d alone is sufficient to increase the cost of liquidity
insurance, crowding out investment in scale while still guaranteeing full continuation in all states.
However, if the required premium is too high, as at point (iii) and above, entrepreneurs become
indifferent regarding liquidation in that state. For all points above (iii), such as loci (iv) and
(v),scarcity in the (d, p) state no longer limits aggregate investment scale and liquidity crises with
termination of projects happen on that state.
For sufficiently low Lzd, changes in the supply of the scarcer liquidity induced by either a change
in the number of trees, L, or in the payout in low output states, Zd, change aggregate availability
of insurance for that state and, as a consequence, the share of projects that face termination.
This equilibrium reduction frees up entrepreneurial net worth, which is spent on an increase in the
scale of the average project, as opposed to being spent on costly liquidity insurance. For very low
tree output, it is then possible the aggregate liquidity constraint also binds in the higher liquidity
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availability distress state and that a liquidity premium emerges on asset u as well as on d, as in
regions (iv) and (v).
Region (iv) involves full continuation in the (u, p) state under all policies. There, in equilibrium,
aggregate investment scale is such that there is just enough liquidity in that state as to enable
continuation of all projects. Last, at point (v), liquidity premia on both assets are equalized and
set to the maximum that entrepreneurs are willing to pay to enable insurance of continuation
possibilities. Entrepreneurs are just indifferent between hoarding any asset or not being capable of
withstanding financial shocks at t = 1.
Notice that liquidity premia are always higher in the d-contingent asset, as illustrated by the
fact that all possible equilibria have prices that lie on or above the 45-degree line. Higher liquidity
availability in states with higher tree output is always translated into lower premia on the u-
contingent asset than on the d-contingent one.
Additionally, in regions (iii)-(v), some aggregate liquidation of projects occurs when financial
distress happens. In these areas, aggregate continuation of investment under financial distress at
t = 1 is constrained by the limited availability of external liquidity in the economy. Therefore,
higher returns from the trees are always translated into strictly higher continuation shares in the
state involving zu, > Zd once the economy is in any of these regimes, in which liquidity is scarce
enough. These elements are the essence of Proposition 1.3.
Proposition 1.3. In the competitive equilibrium of this economy:
1. Liquidity premia are higher for the asset contingent on low tree output: 6 ;> _ .7
rVdZ, - 7Tr1Zu
2. Continuation shares are higher in the high output state than in the low output state: x (u, p) >
x (d, p), with a strict inequality if some termination ever occurs.
Output from the trees serves both as a consumption good itself and as backer of the liquidity
reserves held by the entrepreneurs. Resources from the trees are not consumed directly in the
production process (as fruits are only available at t = 2), but the holding of claims on trees helps
guarantee reinvestment for projects under distress. At t = 1, news about more availability of fruits
in the future enable more continuation of projects if distress happens.
Whenever the aggregate economy is ex post liquidity-constrained and partial continuation of
projects occurs in equilibrium, negative shocks to the trees' output imply strictly lower continuation
shares and lower output from the investment projects in the economy. In this sense, shocks to the
sector of the economy which is a net supplier of liquidity (trees) are naturally transmitted towards
the sector of the economy which holds it. In this environment, unlike in the one to follow in the
next subsection where which project choice is endogenous, that transmission and comovement of
output only works through the aggregate distress states.
Notice that the economy has always enough resources at t = 1 to enable full continuation
of all projects, given the large consumer endowment assumption. The output from trees is not
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necessary as a physical input in the entrepreneurial projects (it is not even available yet when
distress happens), but the claims it backs are an essential input into their financing plans.
The economy analyzed was assumed to be closed, but the use of international liquidity can be
easily incorporated. As pointed out by (Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2001; Caballero and Kr-
ishnamurthy 2003) and (Holmstr6m and Tirole 2011), even with relatively plentiful international
liquidity, specific economies might be constrained in their capacity to access foreign financial mar-
kets, especially due to limited capacity to generate internationally pledgeable income or tradable
goods.
As such, the supply of aggregate liquidity can also incorporate some foreign component and
shocks to the trees can also include fluctuations in international liquidity itself or in an economy's
ability to access those markets. Therefore, the mechanism for the transmission of liquidity shocks
into output fluctuations highlighted can also work across different countries, when there are inter-
national markets for liquid assets. This is specially clear when one central country provides a less
financially developed economy with liquid stores of value.
In addition to these transmission effects, there might be incentives in place for entrepreneurs
to select more pro-cyclical investment projects, synchronizing entrepreneurial output with external
liquidity cycles, as the next example highlights.
1.4.2.2 Synchronization
The structure of the economy is mostly the same as in the previous section, with one important
distinction. Now entrepreneurs can choose how intensely the output of the projects covaries with the
output of the trees. In the case under study, pledgeable output and potential reinvestment shocks
are proportional to total output that a project can generate in a given state. That production
structure is interpreted as a sequential investment problem in which in the first stage (t = 0)
entrepreneurs choose projects that give them investment opportunities at t = 1 which comove in
different ways with the output from trees.
Uncertainty, Assets and Parameter assumptions- Same as in Section 1.4.2.1.
Projects- There is a continuum of projects F = [-r, rd] and each entrepreneur can choose
any -y E F. Total output of project y in state w, conditional on full completion, is given by
pi (w, 7) = pin (w, y) . (1.29)
Analogously, pledgeable output is po (W, y) = pon (w, -y) and the costs of completion under the
financing shock are p (w, -y) = pn (w, y), for w E {u, d} X {p} .19 The mapping from -y E [-7r,, 7rd]
into n (W, Y) is given by
1 +y 7 for u states
1 for d states
19 Notice that in all states in which the financing shock does not happen, i.e. in O E {u, d} x {0}, p (w, -y) = 0.
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Notice that E, [n (w, -y)] = 1. We assume there exists a baseline benchmark, a "neutral investment"
-y = 0, which has the lowest possible cost per unit, # (0) = 1, and that # F -: l R+ is twice
continuously differentiable and weakly convex, so that
, > ) 0, ify 0,
< 0, ify < 0,
and " (-y) > 0.
This production structure can be motivated in the following way. An initial investment at t = 0
generates a fixed expected number of profitable investment opportunities ("ideas") at t = 1. The
cost of taking advantage each one of these opportunities is determined by an aggregate shock: it
can be p with probability 7r or zero with probability 1 - P.
The output from each implemented project is not fully pledgeable, as incentives have to be
provided for diligent entrepreneurial behavior. Each investment opportunity which is implemented
generates a total output of pi, of which only a component po is pledgeable to outsiders.
Whenever the cost of additional investment is zero, these investment opportunities are self-
financing at t = 1. Otherwise, entrepreneurs need to have assets in place to back investment, since
p > po, and pledgeable income from projects themselves is not sufficient to finance all costs of
investing at t = 1.
Project -y 0, the neutral investment, provides entrepreneurs with one investment opportunity
in each state of nature. Importantly, for this neutral project, the emergence of these opportunities is
independent from the realization of the trees' output. At a higher cost, entrepreneurs might choose
projects that give them investment opportunities which comove more positively or negatively with
the trees' output. That is, entrepreneurs might choose within a menu of projects that differ by
offering these opportunities in a more strongly pro-cyclical or more strongly anti-cyclical way, where
the cycle is defined relative to the aggregate shock causes high or low tree output. Thus, a higher y
biases the distribution of ideas towards being more strongly related to the cycle from the trees, but
keeps the expected number of ideas constant. For instance, setting -Y = irj makes all ideas appear
in the states where tree output is learned to be at its highest possible value, Lz,,.
Besides the constant number of expected investment opportunities, all projects also share the
same structure per-unit in terms of refinancing costs at t = 1, total and pledgeable returns. They
differ however on the set-up cost and, as a consequence, also on their returns per-unit of the
consumption good invested. In an environment without liquidity premia, y = 0 would dominate
all other investment possibilities, due to its lower (y).
Analysis
The central synchronization result is summarized by the proposition below:
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Proposition 1.4. Suppose the set-up cost function & (-y) is strictly convex. Then, in any equilib-
rium with a premium differential, i.e. where -a'> q, there is a unique optimal project * > 0,7rdZd 7ruzn'
which features biasing of investment opportunities towards the high tree output states.
In this environment, there exists a complementarity between investment that leads to profitable
ideas at t = 1 and liquidity that allows the implementation of these ideas when they turn out not
to be self-financing. Once a liquidity premium differential emerges, reflecting the relative scarcity
of liquidity delivered in the event of low tree output, projects that offer investment opportunities
in a more strongly pro-cyclical way will have as complements a cheaper form of liquidity.
As such, there will be incentives for this synchronization of liquidity needs and liquidity supply,
which is made possible by choosing a project with y > 0. Despite having a lower return per-unit of
the good invested in the technology itself, pro-cyclical projects offer an advantage, as the portfolios
that enable their continuation involve the use of cheaper, pro-cyclical liquidity.
In the previous section, output from the entrepreneurial sector covaried with the trees output
only once partial continuation occurred. Under those circumstances, completion rates exhibited a
cyclical behavior and this was inherited by the entrepreneurial output. This transmission mecha-
nism only worked through the financial distress states.
The present example highlights that once more strongly pro-cyclical projects are chosen at
t = 0, their output covaries positively with the trees' return. This happens not only on the
financial distress states, but even in the states where projects turn out to be self-financing. This
comovement does not depend on a lower completion rate as in the previous example, but on a ex
ante preference towards projects that require more plentiful liquidity as complements.
1.4.3 Environment 3: Liquidity Scarcity and Volatility with multiple assets
In this section, I study the result of the introduction of a more complete set of assets in the
economy described in section 1.4.1, in which exposure to output fluctuations is endogenous. The
assets introduced allow entrepreneurs to purchase external liquidity in a way which is contingent
on the realization of the productivity states.
A corplementarity between specific assets and projects is shown to exist. As a consequence, in
economies with severe liquidity scarcity and high premia, entrepreneurs specialize in two projects
and holdings of a single asset. One of these projects has strong output volatility, while the other
has mild volatility. In case of aggregate financial distress, one of these projects is fully taken to
completion, while the other is fully terminated. In that sense, these economies feature extreme
levels of partial insurance and crises are always associated to failures in a large set of firms.
Additionally, these economies feature aggregate amplification of productivity fluctuations due
to two forces. First, firms which hold liquidity which is contingent on positive productivity shocks
are willing to pay high costs to economize on those, which they can do by choosing highly volatile
projects. Second, there are more of these highly volatile firms than firms which choose to have
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projects with low levels of productivity fluctuations.
The environment is a special case of the general model proposed and is summarized by the
following:
Uncertainty, Projects and Parameter assumptions- Same as in 1.4.1.
Assets- Now, unlike in Section 1.4.1, there are two assets that can be traded. Assets g and
b, which pay out respectively in the high and low productivity contingencies. Asset g pays out
1 unit of consumption in states w C {(g, p) , (g, 0)} and 0 otherwise. Asset b pays out 1 unit of
consumption in states w E {(b, p) , (b, 0)} and 0 otherwise. Both assets are in fixed supply L.
As in the previous section, these two assets are sufficient to fully span the subspace of states
of the world in which external liquidity is essential for continuation. That means that there en-
trepreneurs can independently move liquidity into each state where projects are under financial
distress and external assets are essential for continuation. As a consequence, equilibrium outcomes
are the same that would be achieved if asset markets were complete, with the presence of four state
contingent securities, while we avoid indeterminacy problems on asset holdings.
Analysis
We first analyze the asset pricing consequences of this enriched set of assets when project choice
is shut down, i.e., when all entrepreneurs are constrained to managing the baseline -yo project. In
section 1.4.2.1, the consequences of the shocks to external liquidity, through the output of the tree,
generated all pricing and equilibrium characterization results. It is useful to contrast the behavior
of the optimal continuation policies when productivity shocks induce shocks to internal liquidity,
as they now do, with that case.
As illustrated in Figure 1-5, the two effects that the productivity shock have on the possible
prices of external liquidity are present. Following the same reasoning from the previous examples,
the competitive equilibrium of a given economy has to lie in regions (i)-(v). Liquidity in the b state
is always less plentiful than in the g, so if asset g carries a liquidity premium, the scarcer asset b
will also need to carry one.
However, locus (iv), the set of points in which entrepreneurs are indifferent regarding hoarding
liquidity to withstand the refinancing shock in the presence of low productivity, crosses the 450 line.
Therefore, liquidity in the g asset might be valued at a premium above that embedded in asset
b. This reflects the higher return on liquidity hoarding in the high productivity state, which had
already emerged in the single-asset environment of Section 1.4.1.
Once project choice is available under the same assumptions as in the previous section, a few
new features emerge. First, it is no longer the case that entrepreneurs can be indifferent between
choosing a full continuation or a full termination policy, as in point (v) in Figure 1-5.
If this were the case, a joint deviation in choosing a project with a different degree of intrinsic
volatility and holding only one of the contingent assets would dominate these options. That is
due to the fact that project choice exhibits a complementarity with liquidity purchase decisions:
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Figure 1-5: Optimal continuation policy regions, as functions of liquidity premia. For a fixed project
a project that which involves amplified fluctuations leads to a higher willingness to pay for the
pro-cyclical form of liquidity (asset g). The reverse is true for projects involving dampening, which
display a higher reservation value for the b contingent asset.
The graph representing the optimal continuation policy as a function of liquidity premia on the
two assets displays a typical behavior as the one in Figure 1-6. Behind each of the possibly optimal
policies, there lies an associated optimal project choice.
Due to the complementarity between project choice and liquidity portfolio decisions, a region
in which policies leading to continuation in only one of the two financial distress states dominate
both full continuation and partial continuation emerges. It illustrated by locus (vi) in Figure 1-6.
Given that the economy has a set of assets which is rich enough to allow for the contingent
allocation of external liquidity, equilibria in this region lead to the emergence of fully specialized
firms: one with a project which fluctuates more severely, featuring amplification, and which is
insured against financial distress only in the event of high aggregate productivity and another that
fluctuates less, featuring dampening, and is insured against financial distress only in low aggregate
productivity states.
The fact that locus (vi) lies below the 45-degree line has important consequences for project
choice: in this region, firms choosing the pro-cyclical continuation policies favor projects leading
to amplification and, given that they face a higher liquidity premium on the relevant asset, have
stronger incentives for choosing projects away from the baseline -yo than do firms which choose
less-cyclical projects and anti-cyclical continuation policies.
Indeed, that can be clearly seen from the entrepreneur's problem for fixed continuation policies.
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Figure 1-6: Optimal continuation policies, conditional on optimal policy choice, as functions of
liquidity premia.
An entrepreneur that fully continues on state (g, p) and all non-distress states, but fully terminates
on state (b, p) needs only to purchase asset u, not b. The relevant binding liquidity constraint is
then
an=p- po - -I
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implying that asset purchases have to be just enough to cover the gap between refinancing needs, pl,
and pledgeable income in that state, (po + I. It can then be easily shown that the entrepreneur's
problem, subject to this fixed continuation policy, can be rewritten as
mina 0 cio (q, -y) ,
where
#(1y) + rp7rg (p - 71g) + (qg - 7rg) (p - po -
c1o (qg,-) = -
- 7p) + 7pig
is an average cost per project unit completed project. An interior optimum for project choice
immediately implies that
#(-Y10) = r,+ 40 -1
( 9
Fixing the continuation policy, entrepreneurial incentives regarding project choice take into ac-
count the possibility of saving on the relevant asset, by choosing projects with a different level of
productivity fluctuations. The liquidity premium on asset g, - 1), naturally appears in the
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expression.
An analogous procedure shows that the optimal project choice for a policy of full termination
in distress state (g, p) and full continuation in all other states is given by the first-order condition
which takes into account the liquidity premium on asset b, the relevant one for this policy. The
fact that the locus of indifference between these policies lies below the 45-degreee line immediately
implies that incentives for entrepreneurs holding the pro-cyclical form of liquidity (the g asset, with
a higher premium) to deviate from the baseline yo are stronger.
Despite the possible specialization of firms in holding a single form of liquidity and choosing
a complementary project, which could not happen under the single-asset environment, the main
results regarding amplification and dampening are maintained. Therefore, the emergence of am-
plification or dampening of fluctuations at the aggregate level is not a direct consequence of the
absence of sophisticated contingent arrangements, but a response to the value to liquidity scarcity
in accordance to its value across different states of the world.
For a sufficiently high supply of liquidity, the economy features dampening of the underlying
shock. That is, a single project with -y < -yo is chosen by all entrepreneurs, as in locus (ii).
Once liquidity shortages are more severe, entrepreneurs specialize into two different projects. In
regions (vi) and (vii), where policies (xg, zb) = (1, 0) and (x 9 , Xb) = (0, 1) coexist, there is aggregate
amplification. Entrepreneurs running the pro-cyclical projects, involving amplification, face higher
incentives for deviating from -yo, given that by doing so they save on a form of liquidity with higher
equilibrium premium. Additionally, in equilibrium, there is a higher mass of these projects than of
the project involving dampening.
These results can be summarized by the proposition below.
Proposition 1.5.
1. An equilibrium regime in which a pro-cyclical ('y1o > yo) project with associated continuation
decisions (xg, Xb) = (1, 0) and an anti-cyclical project (yo1 < yo) with associated continuation
decisions (x9 , Xb) = (0, 1) coexist occurs for sufficiently scarce external liquidity, L.
2. Assume that # (-y) is strictly convex and symmetric around -yo and that project choice is
interior. Then, in regimes (vi) and (vii), there is aggregate amplification: ||Y10 - -yoll >
I Ioi - yo II and a higher share of entrepreneurs choose 7y1o and (xg, £b) = (1, 0).
In both environments, with a single asset or with two contingent assets, there are in place two
mechanisms for the equilibrium determination of prices, liquidity premia and project choice.
The first mechanism is mostly a supply-contraction effect: a shock to productivity reduces
internal liquidity and makes liquidity scarcity more severe in the low productivity states. Aggregate
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liquidity constraints are always tighter in these states, in the sense that if any continuation share
is feasible in that state, it is also feasible in the higher productivity distress state.
On the opposite direction, there is an effect on the entrepreneurs' willingness to pay for liquidity:
a demand-side effect. When the economy is constrained in all distress states, liquidity in states
with higher productivity is more valuable than liquidity in states with lower productivity. Higher
productivity makes a unit of liquidity have a higher multiplier effect into units of the project
salvaged and also increases the total output of each one of these units. Therefore, when scarcity is
sufficient to make prices be driven by this demand-side effect, the liquidity premium is higher on
the asset that offers payments conditional on the high productivity events.
For moderate liquidity shortfalls, the scarcity effect dominates and influence project choice
towards costly dampening. Once these shortfalls are more severe, as they are likely to be in
economies with less financial development, termination of projects becomes more common and
projects with more intrinsic volatility become more desirable.
The main consequence from a richer asset structure is the emergence of specialized firms. With
sufficiently severe liquidity scarcity, all projects face the threat of termination in equilibrium, but
external liquidity is efficiently used for salvaging projects with the best prospects in a given state
of the world. In a distress state with lower productivity, projects involving dampening offer an
advantage in their productivity, as they suffer less from a negative shock. On the other hand, the
opposite is true in a distress state with higher productivity: projects with higher volatility have an
advantage when relatively better shocks occur. Projects are also chosen in a complementary way
to the form of liquidity that entrepreneurs choose to hold. This insight goes beyond the model
with homogenous entrepreneurs, which endogenously specialize, and would also apply to examples
that involve some original heterogeneity in exposure to productivity fluctuations. Specialization in
the use of liquidity is a response to financial frictions and, once present, introduces a feedback into
technological decisions that affect the economy's behavior under aggregate risk. Partially insured
firms have higher incentives to manipulate their business-cycle exposure to economize only on the
few assets they need to buy.
One might be surprised by the stark level of specialization of firm holdings of liquidity, which
have a corner solution behavior. In equilibrium, projects are either fully insured or fully uninsured
against financial distress shocks in a given state. This is a direct consequence of the constant-
returns-to-scale assumption: if a set of firms holds a marginal unit of liquidity and is responsible
for driving its price above the willingness to pay of firms with different projects, then these firms
will also be the holders of all infra-marginal units. The insights about the complementarity between
project choice and liquidity holdings and some degree of specialization in liquidity holdings should
extend to economies with decreasing returns to scale, where less extreme forms of partial insurance
would emerge.
It is also worth noting that the same allocation could be implemented without state contin-
gent trades, as long as multi-project firms or financial intermediation (a lender with multiple en-
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trepreneurs) are allowed. This way, external liquidity can be ex post allocated in the most efficient
way.
1.5 Constrained Pareto Optimality and Policy
I first ask the question of whether a planner which is subject to the same constraints as private
agents regarding bilateral contracts, limited pledgeability, limited commitment and asset market
incompleteness, but which can choose contracts, projects and reallocate assets across the whole
economy, can create a Pareto improvement over the original allocation. As previously anticipated,
the answer is negative. Therefore, conditional on other frictions, a planner which has no advantages
in the creation or distribution of liquidity over the private sector 20 cannot improve project choices
or asset allocations.
Definition 1.5. An allocation is constrained Pareto optimal if there is no other set of pairwise
financial arrangements (transfers, project choice, continuation decisions and asset holdings) and
transfers of pledgeable resources at t = 0 that respects feasibility and constraints on pairwise
financial arrangements (constraints 1.2 to 1.6), which Pareto dominates it 21 .
Proposition 1.6. Every competitive equilibrium of the economies described in Section 1.2 is con-
strained Pareto optimal.
The constrained efficiency result highlights that incentives regarding project choice and asset
holdings are properly aligned, not only at the lender and entrepreneur level, but also relative to
the rest of the agents in the economy. When agents decide on their project choice, continuation
decisions and asset holdings, they have internalized all impacts on other agents. For example, in
section 1.4.1, when agents decide to dampen or amplify productivity fluctuations to relax their
relevant liquidity constraints, they purchase less risk-less assets and free up this valued collateral
to be used by other agents.
The use of external assets for backing transfers between a pair of agents excludes other agents
from using these, but that effect is properly reflected in equilibrium asset prices and, as a conse-
quence, asset reallocation at t = 0 can never lead to a Pareto improvement. Most importantly, there
are no fire-sale externalities in the interim stage (t = 1) which a planner could address. Those are
present in similar models in which constrained efficiency fails, such as (Lorenzoni 2008), (Shlcifer
and Vishny 1992) or (Stein 2011).
The constrained optimality result in this environment generates a clear policy message related
to which policies have the potential of creating improvements in this environment and which ones
2 0These advantages would be such as being able to issue assets agents cannot or use instruments for the contingent
delivery of liquidity across firms which are more complete than the ones allowed by the original asset markets.
2Given the continuum of agents, for a Pareto improvement, a strict utility increase is required for a positive mass
of agents.
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do not. For instance, no policy distorting or mandating project choice alone can generate a Pareto
improvement over the original allocation. That includes banning the choice of the riskiest projects
in an economy as the one described in section 1.4.1. The unintended consequences of such policy,
in economies in which it effectively constrains project selection, would be a drop in the value of
external assets, thus hurting their initial holders, and a potential increase in the number of firms
that have to discontinue projects in case of financial distress, as other firms are not allowed to
economize on their use of external assets by choosing more volatile projects.
Analogously, another policy that cannot lead to any Pareto improvement is one that forces the
exclusive use of risk-less assets in backing financial arrangements. Although it could reduce the
transmission of external financial shocks into the corporate sector and eliminate any endogenous
increase in exposure the sources of such shocks generated by project choice, it leads to the wasting
of valuable resources that fail to pay out in all contingencies. It therefore leaves the entrepreneurial
sector excessively exposed to financial needs that could at least be satisfied in some instances.
On the other hand, the constrained optimality result does not imply that there is no room for
policy at all in this environment. It does however determine clearly conditions which any improving
policy needs to satisfy. Any such policy needs to feature an advantage from some central authority
in creating or distributing liquidity which is not shared by the private sector. One example is
the use of exclusive taxation powers that could make a bigger share of resources in the economy
pledgeable, as suggested by (Holmstrom and Tirole 1998). That relies on the assumption that the
government has some enforcement power, such as non-pecuniary penalties for tax evasion, which is
not shared by other agents in the economy. Another set of policies that could be welfare improving
have to do with changes the legal and corporate governance environments, which determine the
shares of resources which are pledgeable or not in the economy. An increase in enforcement abilities
of private agents induced by policy can lead to a Pareto improvement 22.
1.6 Conclusion
The present chapter analyzed project choice in an environment with financial frictions, with par-
ticular emphasis on its aggregate consequences. Given unreliability of future funding, which stems
from a limited commitment problem from lenders, real investment decisions and financial policies
are intertwined. Arrangements for future investment have to be backed by transferable cash flows
from projects (internal liquidity) or external assets that play a role as collateral (external liquidity).
Therefore, shocks to these two influence the economy's fundamentals and create business cycles.
As project selection is endogenous, in a general equilibrium environment, it interacts with asset
prices and is a key determinant of the pattern of fluctuations of the aggregate economy.
In the environments studied, different forms of endogenous increase in exposure to risk can be
2 2 1t is essential, however, to compensate the initial holders of external liquidity for a possible decrease in the rents
they derived from the presence of premia on those assets.
48
driven by project selection. When there is severe scarcity of non-corporate assets which work as
essential inputs for financial arrangements, endogenous project selection is biased towards riskier
projects. Essentially, the economy is sufficiently constrained so that resources in the downside, or
the worst states of nature, become less valuable than resources in situations in which constraints
are less stringent but still present. The use of higher volatility emerges as a natural instrument for
dealing with these constraints and transferring resources to where they are the most productive.
Alternatively, fluctuations might also originate from crunches in the value of these non-corporate
assets. Under these conditions, there is not only a natural financial transmission mechanism that
translates reductions in payouts of non-corporate assets into lower investment and output from
corporations, but also an additional comovement effect that emerges in anticipation of these fluc-
tuations, through project selection. The fundamental cause of this additional comovement is a
complementarity between asset payouts that enable future investment and specific projects that
deliver these investment opportunities.
All outcomes in the economies studied are constrained efficient. Project choice and financial
policies respond adequately to the constraints faced by agents in the economy. There are no gains
for a planner in distorting asset allocations, as prices properly reflect the assets' scarcity and their
shadow value. Nor are there gains in targeting project choices or financial policies. Any gains
from policy can only come from natural advantages in the creation of liquidity, in its contingent
reallocation in ways that are not allowed by the original assets or in generating improvements in
the fundamentals of the contracting environment.
An interesting extension would include the study of situations in which project selection cannot
be perfectly contracted upon, so that financial policies and asset purchases play an additional role
in providing incentives for project selection. A question to be addressed in that environment is
whether asset prices would still properly reflect their value for society or whether an intervention
through their reallocation or taxation could then lead to an improvement. Another interesting
extension would include the study of overlapping projects, so that their liquidity demand could
create spill-overs across the different vintages of investment. Whether constrained efficiency would
survive in that environment is also an interesting open question.
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1.7 Appendix
A. General Lemmas
Proof. (1.1) - If the problem admits a solution a, i,&, it admits a solution a, t, & in which entrepreneurial
consumption at t = 1 and t = 2 is as low as possible (as much anticipation as possible is done), in which
C2(W) = [pi ( ) -po (P, ) () ,
P1 (w) 0,
It follows that
PO (w, ~ M z o + z - 4 =-2 (W)
and
ii () = p (u, i (
It suffices to set io = ±o+E [i2 (w) + i (u) - i 2 (w) - l (w)] and ao = o+E [a2 (W) + a1 (w) - a2 (w) - 1 (w)]
No constraint is violated and the same value for the objective function is achieved.
When we restrict attention to solutions with these properties, the problem can be simplified into the one
of finding an optimal co and -, in which all consumption in other periods and transfers can be substituted
away:
max co + E [[pi (P, Y) - po (, Y)] I X(w) I]
s.t.
E [po (w, y) x (w) I - p (w, y) x (w) J - [q - E (z)] -a] - A - co
z (w) -&J+ po (w, y) x (w) I > p (w, y) x (w) 1, for eachw C Q
This problem can only admit a solution when the first constraint binds and has a shadow-value A* > 1. In
both the A* = 1 and A* > 1 possible cases co = 0 is part of an admissible solution. Therefore, a needs to
solve (1.11). Also, Ihe constraint can he added to the objective function and simplifications carried out to
write the problem as (1.8).
Lemma 1.2. Whenever pi (w,,y) > po (wyy) > 0, for all (w, -y), one can restrict attention to policies with
full continuation, x (w) = 1, in the states in which financial distress does not occur, i.e.,. for all w E ( with
p (, Y) < PO (P, ).
Proof. Suppose or* is an optimal plan. For a contradiction, assume that in some state w in which financial
distress does not happen, x, (w) < 1. Then a plan a' which coincides with a*, except for setting x,, (w) = 1,
leads to a strictly greater value for the objective function, without violating any of the constraints.
B. Proofs of results in Section 1.4.1
To simplify notation, let og =x (g, p) and Lb = (b, p). Using Lemma 1.2, we restrict attention to strategies
setting x (i, 0) = 1, for i = g, b.
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Now, E [B 1 (w; q; y, x, e)] can be written as
E [Bi (w; q; y,x,6)] = p1 (1 7rp) +?rp 79 P1 + xY +7rb (P1 Xb]
- {7rpp (?rgxg + 7rbxb) + #(y)} - (q- 1)d
and E [Bo (w; q; -y, x, a)] is defined analogously.
Substitution of the leverage constraint into the objective function and the definition of &
transform the entrepreneurs problem in
max A
'y,x,a c (q; -y, x, a) - po
&±(po+ x9  > px9\9 9/
a + (PO ) Xb > PXb,
7rb
2 can
(1.30)
(1.31)
(1.32)
in which
{$(7)+7rp[7rgxy
c (q; -y X, a) - (
(1I
is similar to an average cost function, where the
refinancing shocks becomes clear.
(P- +rbxb (P)+ +(q-1)
- 7rp) + rp [7r 9Xg + lrbXb]
equivalence of productivity shocks learned at = 1 and
Lemma 1.3. The value function defined in
c (q; y) min c (q; y, x, a')
x,a'
s.t. (1.31); (1.32)
for q > 1 is bounded from below by c (q = 1;y) = 4 (y) + 7rpp > & (-/o) + 7rpp and from above by .
Proof. Since & > 0, c (q; y) is increasing and will have a minimum at c (q = 1; -y). At that point x. = Xb = 1
and & set to satisfy (1.32) with equality are optimal, leading to c (q = 1; y) = (-y) + 7rpp > # (-yo) + 7rpp.
Finally, since xg =b = = 0 is always feasible and leads to c (q; -y, x, 6) , it follows that c (q; -y) <
1-7r,'
Proof. (Proposition 1.1) We can
and (1.32). The FOCs are
solve the entrepreneur's problem by minimizing (1.33) subject to (1.31)
c* (q; -y) +2 
< 0
> 0
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s.t.
(1.33)
7r 7r - , if X9 = 1
,if X9 e (0, 1)
, if x9 = 0
(1.34)
+ b( ) 0 , if xb 1
Xb b D* - c* (q; -y) *p7Fb + p -- pWrb = 0 ,if Xb E (0 1) (1.35)(P DP 75)b {
> 0 , if xb = 0
(q-1) =0 if&>0
D* : , -pgrg - plr g > f& O(1.36)D __>0 , if &= 0
where pgrg and pblrb are the multipliers on constraints (1.31) and (1.32) and D* is the denominator of the
average cost evaluated at the point studied. Additionally,
-P- Po - ) xg1 pg = 0 (1.37)
9.
p - po + j xb pb = 0 (1.38)
?rb
We study possible solutions through three mutually exclusive cases: xb being 1, 0 or interior.
i) Xb 1. If that is the case, Constraint (1.32) implies that constraint (1.31) is slack. Thus, pg = 0.
Therefore, given A2 and the previous leimna, the FOC for xg holds with the "<" inequality, meaning that
o = 1. Additionally,
q - 1 = D*pb7rg, (1.39)
which implies that
7rp7rb p+ -c* (q; -y) -rt + p - po + (q - 1) 0. (1.40)
7rb ) 7rb)
Assuming £g = Lb 1 is a solution also leads to c*(q; y) = (-y) + 7rpp + (q - 1) (p - Po . Therefore,
expression 1.40 is violated for sufficiently large q.
ii) xb = 0.
& > 0 would imply a slack liquidity constraint (1.32) and A = 0. The combination of A2' and Lemnia
(1.3) implies that this cannot be the case or 1.35 would lead to a contradiction. Therefore, a = 0, which
also forces xg= 0 from the liquidity constraint (1.31). Note that og = Xb = 0 as a solution leads to
c* (q; -) = .
iii) Lb is interior.
& > 0 from (1.32). pg > 0 is necessary otherwise for the same reasons as before, 1.34 would lead to a
contradiction.
From (1.35) and the usual combination of A2' and the lemina, y1b > 0. Therefore, (1.32) and (1.31)
imply that Xb = 
.
Therefore there are 3 regimes to consider: full continuation (x, = Xb = 1), full termination upon distress
(xL = xb = 0) and some continuation with & =(p - PO - Y (p - p + x and an interior xb.
To better characterize thresholds of transitions between the three behaviors, it is useful to solve two
auxiliary, restricted, optimization problems. Problem 1 assumes that both liquidity constraints bind as in
(7)~~~ ~~ + -2rp ]rx pI rxs 7 + (q - 1) (p - p. - -L g
cx* (q; -) - min9E[0,1] (1 - 7rP) + 7rp [7rgxg + 1Irbgra ('7)]
(1.41)
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with r,(' P ( being such that zb = x,(). The FOC for x. is
p )+rbK (-Y) p - - ?rpc] (q; -y) [7rg + 7rbK (-Y)]
< , ifxg =1
+ (q - 1) (P - PO - 0 ,if xg E [0,1] (1.42)
0 , if xg = 0
Notice that whenever x9 = 0 is a solution, c* (q; -y) = . Therefore, by substituting in that value,
a threshold where indifference between following (xg, za) (1, , (7)) and full termination occurs is defined
implicitly, as in
rp- + 7r (b) p + + (q ()-o-7rg 7b P g
# (Y)
=7r,, [7r_, + grab ( -)] . (1.43)
For any q < q (y), c* , (q; -y) < and (x, ,b) (1, K (-y)) dominates both full termination and any other
policy involving an interior Xb.
Problem 2 assumes that og = 1 and optimizes on Xb, assuming that the liquidity constraint only binds
in the bad state. It is written as
#')+7rp ( z + rbb (p+ + (q - 1) (P - Po± -- ) xb
' . (e;[,1] (1 - 7rg) + Irp [7rg + 7rbXb]
and has a FOC given by
<0 ,if Xb= 1
1)p - 7rP7rbc*, (q; -y) + (q -1) p-p + = 1]
0 ,if Xb=0
Let cu1 (q; y) = (-y) + 7rpp + (q -1) (p - po + be the cost associated to full continuation. An
interior solution for Xb will be admissible on Problem 2 iff
c*, (q; -y) = c 1 (q;) = (p± ) + (7rp7rb)- (q - 1) p- Po - .
This defines implicitly another threshold as q (-y) to the left of which full continuation is preferred to any
strategy with xg 1 and interior Lb. At this threshold, any policy with partial continuation in Xb is
equivalent. In particular,(xg, Lb) = (1, 1) and (X9 , Lb) = (1, K (-y)) lead to the same value for the objective
function. To the right of this threshold, Xb = 1 cannot happen in the solution and regime (i) is not possible.
Finally, notice that c11 (q; -y) crosses the cost of termination upon distress 17t at the point where
cu ((Y) ; -) = -Y = p + (7rp) ((Y) - 1) {p - po + -Y).
-p \r Xb)
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c1I (q; y) < 7,if q is less than the value (') implicitly defined above. It is then easily verified by coi-
paring their two implicit definitions that q (y) < Q (y) and it follows that at cu (q(y) ;1 ) c*,, (q (-y) ; y) <
1 , which proves that q (y) < q (Y).
Proof. Proposition 1.2:
For a fixed project, the last proposition has shown that at least one of (x, zb) (1, 1) ,(X.q, xb) (1, s (y))
or (xg, Xb) = (0,0) solves the optimization problem, with the first one being strictly preferred for a low price
range, the second for an intermediate price range and the third for high prices.
One can therefore solve the entrepreneur's problem in two stages. One optimizes on the project for each
of these three continuation policies of interest. Then, one optimizes over the three policies.
Let us define cost functions for fixed policies and projects as
cnI(q; y) + ()+rp (q- 1) p-Po + )
\ rb/ 
- q -1 ( o -- L{#()+7rp 7rg(p- ) +7rbt(Y) (P+ +)}(q-1)(p- p-
ci K (q;) 7r 7(1 rp) + irp [7rg + 7rbs (Y))
#) (-Y)
coo (q;) 1-
1 -7rP
Analogously, we define the value functions of the first stage of this optimization, which minimizes cost
for a fixed continuation policy, as in
c3 (q) z min cj (q; -y) ,
for j 11, 1K,00
First, notice that coo (q) as the problem is trivially solved at the lowest cost project 'yo.1-Wr
Additionally, cul (q) > # (yo) + 7rp + (q - 1) (p - po), which is the cost of full continuation if shocks were
not present in the most efficient project. This crosses coo (q) = at 4 implicitly defined in
p + (p - po)= .Yo) (1.44)
..- 7rP 1 - 7r P
As a consequence cul (q) > coo (q) for all q > 4.
Now, ciK (q) < cl (q; yo). ci, (q; yo) crosses coo (q) at q(yo) implicitly defined in
?r9 (P 2- + 7Fbr (-YO) (P+ 71 (P -- o
+- ((yo) - 1) = . (1.45)
[7rg + lrbrYO)] (r 0  ___7rg + 7r (Yo)] 1 7rp
As a consequence, ci, (q) < coo (q) for all q < q (yo).
We compare the terms with braces in equation (1.45) versus equation (1.44). The first term in braces in
(1.45) is a weighted average of terms with mean p, with a higher weight put in the lower term. Therefore,
it is less than p. The second terim in braces can be rearranged to make clear that it is the probability
weighted harmonic mean of (P - Po - and (p - po + which is less than the expectation (p - po).
As a consequence, < - (yo). This proves that for some intermediate range of prices, ci, (q) < cI (q).
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From the Proposition 1.1, at q = 1, for any project, full continuation dominates (1, ,) and (0, 0). There-
fore, c1 1 (q) < ci (q) and c11 (q) < coo (q) for q sufficiently close to 1.
It is also possible to show that crossings occur only once, as using an Envelope Theorem and the inequality
involving the arithmetic and harmonic means,
c'1 (q) = p - po + 711> P - Po > 0
c (q) = o - 7f(1 - 7rp) + 7rp [7rg + 7br/ (71)]
E (0, p - po)
c'o (q) = 0.
As a consequence, there exist two thresholds - and q, delimiting areas of optimality for the three continuation
policies.
Next, we prove the behavior of the optimal policy regarding 7 in each of the three regions.
i) For the region with x xb = 1, yI (q) satisfies the first-order condition #' (1*1) = (q-). Therefore,
-*1 (q) < yo and, given convexity of #, it is an decreasing function of q.
ii) For the region with xg = 1 and zb = , it can be shown that CK < 0, indicating that the
(P-PO+')a-aq
solution y*, (q) it a increasing function of q.
iii) For the region with full termination, it has already been argued that the optimal choice for is
70o (q) = yo-
Last, it is necessary to show that for sufficiently high q between the q and q, amplification is optimal.
Notice that at il ('7o) this will be the case, as
ciK ( (-7o) ; 7o) = coo (q (7o) ; Yo)
However, 23
acis (-Y(o) ; -Y) <
<Y
which implies that once project choice is incorporated, ci, (q (Yo)) < COO (4 ('o))
Finally, I show that at 4(yo), all projects 7 < yo are dominated by the choice of 'yo and termination
upon distress. For that purpose, note that
(7)+ Ip(r (P - Tb -| r, (7) (P -- )]I + (g (7) 0) (P - PO-K 7 Y -)>(1 
- 7rp) + 7rp [7rg + 7ra ('7)1
since # (-y) > d (-7o). The term on the right-hand side is at least as great as coo (q (7o) 'Yo) iff
7rg ) +?tb r (7Y) (P + p-- po]-- 4 P  g179( P- 1r, rb + -- ((70) - 1) ( ;)> .-Y
[17rg + 7r (7)] 7rp [7rg + 7r(7)] - 1 - 7rp
"Writing cl (4 (7o) ; Yo) =
(1-7p)(P-po--) +7r, [ 9(P-P - +7(ppo+ )
and using c1, (q ('7o); yo) = coo ( ('70); 'yo) is helpful for showing this inequality.
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The LHS is decreasing in 'y and equality is reached at -y = -yo, from the definition of ( (-yo) - 1). Therefore,
ci, (q (-yo) ; y) > coo (q (-yo) ; yo) and no policy involving dampening of fluctuations can be optimal. As a
consequence, the optimal project choice is given by some -y*, (- (-yo)) > yo. From monotonicity of y*p (q),
this will also hold for higher levels of q.
L
C. Proofs of Results from Section 1.4.2
Proofs and Equilibrium Characterization for Section 1.4.2.1
A note on notation: I will make use of the Lemma 1.2 and restrict attention to x(w) only for the financial
distress states. To simplify notation, x, and xd will denote x (u, p)and x (d, p) .
Given assumptions A1-A2, constraint 1.9will always bind. Otherwise, no solution would exist, as the
surplus of a policy of continuation if and only if financial distress does not occur goes to infinity as leverage
goes to infinity. Therefore, one can substitute the constraint into the objective function to write it as
E [1,(-;q; 
-y a)]IA
F{Bo(w;q;y,x,n))'
One should also note that with liquidity premia in place, over-hoarding of liquidity is dominated, i.e.,
entrepreneurs need only to hoard enough state-contingent liquidity to set the liquidity constraints (1.10) to
hold with equality. Liquidity is only valuable as long as it is useful for enabling a decision x (w). Therefore,
one can restrict attention to
ai (x, 1) = (p po) X (i, r) 1.
Thus, problem 1.27 can be re-written, as
max p1 - c (q; x)
x c (q; x) - po
where
1 +7rpp [7ruxu +7lr I]+ ZiE (qi - 7rizi) (p-p 0)x'
c (q; X,, Xd) 1 + 7ra) + 7r , [$ (1.46)
(1 - 7rp) + 7rp [7ruzu + 7rdXd)
represents an average cost per project unit completed. Given that each unit completed generates the same
social surplus and there are constant returns to scale, the entrepreneurs' problem can be written in terms of
minimizing this average cost function.
Let the value function of the cost minimization problem be written as
c* (q) min c (q; Xu, Xd) , (1.47)
O<X,,,Xd/<l
and notice that for its partial derivatives
'ac r IpP + qi (p-po) - 7rPc* (q). (1.48)
8xi 7rizi
The solution to the individual problem can be represented in terms of 4 regions, as seen in Figure 1-3.
We first demonstrate the propositions below.
Lemma 1.4. Let qo be the price vector free of liquidity premia, in which qi = ,rizi, for i = u, d. At this
level, a policy of full continuation leads to the lowest possible equilibrium level of c (q; x) , c* (qo) = 1 + 7ipp.
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Proof. Notice that Al implies that,
1
c (qo, 0,0) = c (qo; x) > c (qo;1,1) = 1 7rpp,
where inequalities are strict for any x with an interior xi component. Since c (q, x) is increasing in q, and
equilibrium requires q > qo, this is the lowest value that c (q, x) can achieve.
Lemma 1.5. The cost function is bounded by 1 , i.e., c* (q) < 1 And for sufficiently high q, in a
vector sense, a policy of full termination in case of financial distress is optimal.
Proof. For a policy that leads to full termination in case of distress, c (q; 0, 0) = 1_ . Since that policy is
always feasible, the first part of the lemma follows. For the second part, notice that the first-order relationl.48
has a single negative component, the third one, which is bounded at c* (q) = 1 . Since the second term
grows unbounded in qj, for sufficiently high liquidity premia, the sign of the expression becomes positive,
meaning that it is optimal to set the continuation shares x (w, p) to the corner level of 0.
LI
By continuity, for sufficiently low liquidity premia, a policy of full continuation is optimal. We proceed
to determine thresholds where partial or total continuation becomes optimal.
Lemma 1.6. Indifference between a policies (x,,xd) = (1,1) and (xuxd) = (1,0) is given by a straight
line in the liquidity premium, , q1 -space, with a slope lower than one. Above that line termination
in (x,,,xd) = (1,0) is preferred to (x,,,xd) = (1,1) and the opposite is true below it.
Indifference between full continuation and full termination in (u, p) is given by another line, with a slope
above 1. To the right of it, (Xu,xd) = (1,0) is preferred to (Xu,xd) = (1,1) and the opposite is true for
r, combinations that lie to the left of it.
These two indifference loci cross over the 450 line, at the point where 7rpp+ - 1 (P - po)-?rp 1_,
0, for i = u, d.
Proof. The first indifference is reached in the locus in which
c (q, 1, 1) = c (q,1,0) .
That implies
1+7rpp+ > 7ri 10 (P -Po) = P+ ( qd (P-PO)
d 1ri i ?rdZd ?rp
1- (1 p + 7ru _ 1) (P p) = 71d ( -1" (P Po).( FUZ,7FP '7FdZd
Which means that indifference is a locus of the forim
1d =a+b q? -1I
-7d~d ( 7rZU
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with a =-(1--)p 1-7r 7rd - 1 > 0 and b =P" 1- r ) '-1 < 1. It crosses the 45-degree line at
with) a 7, 1-7r,7rd (1-r,)+7r 7r,( qd ( U 0,
7TdZd 1 -b
(p-po) 1-7 1 ,
Since c (q, 1. 1) is strictly increasing in (g while c (q, 0, 0) does not depend on it, this locus divides
the space in regions where c (q, 1, 1) < c (q. 0 0), which lies below it, and where the opposite is true, which
lies above it.
An analogous procedure leads to the locus of indifference between termination in (u, p), given full con-
tinuation in (d, p) being described by
- a'+b' ( 7rdZd
where b' 7 P r" < 1 and a' 1((1 rp)p (1 -I.7." . It crosses the 450 line at the same point, which
is their single intersection. In an analogous way to the first part, this locus also divides the space in a region
of dominance of (0, 1) over (0, 0), to the right of it, and the opposite to its left.
Lemma 1.7. q- < q, for q implicitly defined in 7rpp ± (-- 1) (p - Po) - 7rp 1 ? = 0, is necessary and
sufficient for c (q; 1, 0) < c (q; 0, 0). Analogously, 1 < g is necessary and sufficient for c (q; 0, 1) < c (q; 0, 0).
Proof. Indeed, c (q; 1,0) < c(q;0,0) -> p+ - - 1) (p- po) < 1 - < .
Characterization of optimal continuation decisions
Notice also that given linearity of the entrepreneurs' problem, at the thresholds of indifference between
the four policies in the corners of the continuation possibilities square 24 , any convex combination of these
extreme optimal policies is also optimal. The combination of the lemmas above, justifies the characterization
of the entrepreneurs' optimal continuation choice as functions of liquidity premia which is represented in
Figure 1-3 in the main text.
Characterization of Equilibria
Proposition 1.7. The following four statements hold:
1. Equilibrium prices cannot lie at any point (6--, q1 where (Xu, Xd) = (1, 1) is not in the set of
optimal policies.
2. If in region where (1,1) is the unique optimal policy, there cannot be a liquidity premium on an, i.e.,
equilibrium q- = 1.
3. Equilibrium prices cannot lie in the segment where (1,1) and (0,1) are the only optimal policies.
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2(X , Xd)] E { (0, 0) , (0, 1) , (1, 0) , (1, 1))1
4. Therefore, equilibria can only lie in loci (i)-(v) as depicted in Figure 1-4.
Proof. (1) Equilibria cannot lie in the interior of dominance regions of (0, 0), (0, 1) and (1, 0) as aggregate
entrepreneurial demand for an asset carrying a liquidity premium would be zero, which contradicts market
clearing. The same reasoning holds for the segments of indifference between (0,0) and (1,0) and between
(0,0) and (0,1).
(2) If in this region, aggregate entrepreneurial demand for a, is (P-POW and for ad is (P-PO). Market
clearing in ad requires
(p - po) *< L,
Zd
which given z, > Zd forces market clearing in a, to be satisfied with a strict inequality, implying that
(3) If this were the case aggregate demand for a, would be strictly less than aggregate demand for asset
ad. Since supply of both assets is given by L, this would again imply that 1 = 1, which is a contradiction
of the necessary indifference condition.
Proofs of results from 1.4.2.2
Again we make use of Lemma 1.2 to restrict attention to policies that always lead to full continuation when
the projects are self-financing. To make notation less cumbersome, we will define n, (-y) and nd (-Y) for the
number of investment opportunities offered by project -y in the states of nature involving u and d payout
from the tree.
In a similar manner as in the previous section, it is possible to rewrite the entrepreneur's problem in
an average-cost-minimization form. First, one writes the minimum level of asset purchases as function of
{ , Y, Xu, Xd}. Therefore,
ai = (p - po) xin (w, y) I (1.49)
can be used to write the entrepreneur's problem as
min c (q; 7, Xu, Xd) (1.50)
Y;0<X,d <1
where
A (-y) + 7rpp [7ruxun (-Y) + 7rdXdnd (-y)] + Z2  (qi - 7riz1 ) (P-po)2fli(y)
c (q; -y, X u, Xd) 1 - .+ 7 vr~x~n, b) ± 7IdXdnd ()] (1.51)
We can define a change of variables to make the cost minimization problem 1.50 even more in line with
Problem 1.47, which was extensively analyzed in the previous section. We set
mx~ri, (-Y)
and
Ed = Xdnd (-Y)
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as the relevant choice variables, so that problem 1.50 for a fixed project becomes
. () ± rpp [7ru + lrdd] + E=,,d (qi - 2rizi ) (
c (q;y) - mm
2,2 1 - 7rP + 7rP [7r, xi + 7rd-xV]
s.t.
0 < z, : n, (y),
0 < zda < nd b) .
Proof. Proposition 1.4:
Using the change of variables suggested above, one can write the
s.t.
1nax E [BI (q; zi, )] I
A + E [Bo (q; i, -y)] I ;> 0
nu(Y) > zu> 0
nd (7) > _0.
entrepreneurs' problem as
(1.52)
Here
Pi1 irp + rp (7ruzu + 7rbd)]
-- #(F) - 7bia) - E (qi -
i=u,d
7riz2) (- P) zi
'-'
and analogously for E [Bo (q;.i , -y)] with po replacing p1.
Let p be the multiplier associated to the leverage constraint and pi, for i 'u, d, be the multipliers
associated to the constraints of the form ni (y) > i . Then, the first-order condition on i is given by
9E [B1] BE [Bo]
O,+ p1, - pi < 0, with = for xi > 0,89xi 9xi
where aE[B1 ] + p aE[Bo] = 7p7ri (pi + ppo)-(l + p p7rp7ri+i + 1 (p-po))-
Optimization on -y is associated with
>0
OE[B1 ] +E[Bo] I 1=0
Dy Dy u
1<0
where the left-hand side becomes
ify=7
if y E (Y,7)
if Y = 'y
Tu + td
7l'u 7rd
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E [Bi (q; i, y)]
Note that
7 2Zi Fir Z- 7i 7_71
Therefore,
_" < qd == (-) > 0771 Z11 irdZd
->= 7 > 0.
Uniqueness in project choice follows from the observation that, even with multiple solutions for the
entrepreneurs' problem, constant returns to scale implies that each one of the solutions achieves the same
optimal value - E[Bi(q;) A - pA. As such, they also have to share all pi and the same unique solution toE[Bo (q;!,y)]
the project choice problem.
Last, we rule out > q as this would generate nd > n., for every individual entrepreneur and
zd > zu. Since Lz, > LZd, this is not compatible with asset market equilibrium.
Proofs of Section 1.4.3
As before, we simplify notation by using Lemma 2 and restriction attention to the characterization of
Xg - X (g, p) and Xb - Xb (b, p). Given the presence of the two assets described in the text, we can restrict
attention to strategies setting
9 X-
and
ab = P - PO - XbJ,
7rb
since asset purchases are only valuable as long as they help relax a liquidity constraint in one the states.
Again, we might work with the minimization of modified average cost functions of the form
@ L+ +7rp 77Fx) (P - +?7ob (P+ -)] (qg - -g) (P - PO - xg - (go - gro) p o+ x
cr (q; x,9 7)
(1 - 7rp) + 7rp [7rgog + 7rbXb]
(1.53)
or with a formulation as
max E [Bi (w; q; y, x, & (x))] I (1.54)
s.t.
A + E [B (w; q;y, & (x))] I > 0.
Lemma 1.8. With non-degenerate project choice, no optimal investment plan will ever feature an interior
solution for continuation shares xg or Xb.
Proof. Suppose some optimal o-* features an interior x* for i equal to g or b. Then, C 1 and o- 0 which
coincide with a* except for, respectively, setting xi to 1 or 0 will lead to the same value for the objective
function as the original optimal strategy o*. Common optimality and constant returns to scale would
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mean that the Lagrangian associated to Program 1.54, C (q; a) would feature the same multiplier p* for the
leverage constraint for a = , 1, o.r0* However, either L, (q;, o' > L- (q; , a*) > Ly (q; , '
or L, (q; , 7' < Em (q;, a*) < La q; , cr o hold showing that the use of one of the corner xi and an
associated re-optimization over the project 'y can lead to an improvement in Program 1.54 contradicting the
optimality of a*.
Proof. (Proposition 1.5) First, we show that for some sufficiently high prices on the state contingent assets,
entrepreneurs would prefer to specialize in two projects, one leading to amplification and another one to
dampening, and to be fully exposed to the risks of financial distress in one of the productivity states, while
fully insured in the other one.
A equilibrium with fully specialized firms requires that for
# (qY) + 7rp7r (--7-) + (q, - rg) p - pO-
cio (qg, -y) = r(1 - 7rp) + 7rg
#(Y) +? rprb p+ 7) +(qb -7rb) (P--PO +
coi1 (qb, -Y) = F(1 - rp) + Trb
c (qy) +irpp}+(q - 7Tg) p - PO - -1) + (qb -Fb) P - Po +--
7rg grb
c o o ( q ; ) 1 - r
min cio (qg, y) = min co (qb, 'y) < min c1i (q, y) , mnin coo (q; -y) . (1.55)
-y-Y - -Y
Additionally, let
7y5 (q) =- argminlyci (q;-y) , f or 7" E {11, 01, 10, 00}
Notice that 'yoo (q) = yo.
I show that there exist prices that satisfy condition 1.55.
Let ci (q) = min-y ci (q, -). Notice that
Dcio acoi 0 (1.56)
9qg' Oqb.
since no project is ever self-financing in a financial distress state. Then,
cio (qg) = cot (qb) (1.57)
defines a path in (qg, qb)-space which is strictly increasing. That represents the locus of asset prices that
would lead to indifference between policies that involve to full continuation and full termination in opposing
states of the world. Given 1.56, for a sufficiently high 4 = (49, 4b) pair, cIO (49) = coi (4b) = coo (4) = ()
We show that at 4, cul ( ) > coo (e). Suppose towards a contradiction that c 1 (l ) < (_7 which implies
(4g - 7) (p - Po - + (4b - 7Tb) (p -- p + M -t- + (11 (')) - 4 (yo) (
pr + -
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and therefore either
Wa q) (e - 7rg) p ' - Po - 11M + # (-11 (M) - # (70) ('Yo)
7r9 7rp 7 1-rP
or
11 (q)) (qb - 7rb) (p-po -|- + ± (711 ()) - Cy7) 7Q(7)
p O L !)+0blM -o < .o
7rb 7pr7b 1 - 7FP
This, in turn, implies that co (qg,yi (4)) < coo (4) or coi (4b,y11 (4)) < coo (4). Since neither cio (4g, Y)
nor C0oi (b, Y) feature y11 (q) as a critical point, re-optimization around -y ensures that cio (%) < coo ( ) or
coi (4b) < coo (4), achieving the desired contradiction.
By lowering q. and qb away from 4 along the path defined by (1.57), one achieves points where policies
with xi = 1 and x- = 0 are strictly preferred to full termination and partial termination. Eventually, a
lower bound qwhere equality (and indifference) with respect to c11 (q) is reached. Above this lower bound,
all demand for assets comes from these extreme policies reaching the value functions coi and cl.
From the definition of Bo (w; q; y, x) and c (q; y, x), the leverage constraint can also be written as
I = {(1 - rp) + 7rp [7gx+g rb]} 1 (c (q; 7, x) - po)-1 4
Demand for assets in this price path (1.57) can be described by
ag (q)= p o 1q (
D 71 (q) 1
ab M '0 - Po + ?rb 1 ()
where the aggregate scales 10 (4) and 101 (4) solve
Io (4) = {(1 - 7rp) + rp7rg } (co (q) - po)~1 Aio
Io1 (4) = {(1 - 7rp) + 7rp7rb}- (col (q) - po) 1 Aoi
and Aol and A 1 0 represent the distribution of entrepreneurs (and their net worth) across these two policies
and, besides positiveness, have to satisfy Aoi + A 10 = A if q < 4 and Aoi + Aio < A if q = n (as a full
termination policy is also optimal at q = ). Notice that Aio and A01 will be able to adjust freely to make
sure that -+ = 1, since the supply of external liquidity does not vary across states of the world.
Equilibrium with L = 0 is trivially constructed by setting q = and Aio = Aoi = 0. For higher L, prices
might adjust downward and asset demands will increase continuously, as long as q > q, the price point at
which the policy involving x, = Xb = 1 becomes relevant for the equilibrium.
(PART 2)
With interior project choice, the optimal decisions associated to the (x 9 , Xb) = (1, 0) and (x_, Xb) = (0, 1)
policies are given by first-order conditions
'(y1 (q)) = rp + q-1
4'r (71 (q)) = - 7r, - qb-
(7rb
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Using symmetry of #, I will show that whenever indifference (1.57) holds liquidity premia are higher in the
ag asset, so that q- > IL and the rest of the proposition follows. First, notice that11
*g 7r
# (y1 (qg)) + 7rp7rg (P - !io ) + (q9 - grg) (P - po -
c( (qg) 1 -g) + 7rprg
and
# (o1p(qi)) ++p (p-Yo1b) ) + (qb - rb) (p -P+ o, (b)
coi (q)() + 7-brco I (b) =_(1 
- grp) +7rp7b
If < - was true in the locus defined by (1.57), then
#l ('710 (q))| < ||@ ('mol (qb))
which would imply, given symmetry, that
$(-yio (qg)) < (-yo1 (qb)).
That cannot be true, otherwise both
# (71l0 (q)) 4(7 01 (gb))
(I - 7rP) 
- (17-r")
and
710~~~~y (g 1(qp?-70 (b))( i Ym(q) 7 r-)(-u-.i() ±'u) + (7- ) P- 7rb)
\P - g / +p \ 7r O-!Xg7b / Ap
As cio (qg) and coi (qb) are weighted averages involving, respectively, the terms on the left-hand side and
right-hand side of the inequalities above, this would lead to a contradiction. Therefore, 1- > - when (1.57)
holds, implying that individual amplification is higher for the entrepreneurs choosing to be pro-cyclical,
(xe, £b) = (1, 0), as in ||#' ('m1 (qg))|| > ||d' (yo1 (qb))|| .
Another force for aggregate amplification is in place since, in equilibrium in this regime,
L = a' (q) = P PO o yo q 110 MQ
L = a (q) = p0 - po + 101 ,
which implies
110 (M > Ioi (1
more investment is made in the pro-cyclical projects.
D. Constrained Efficiency (Section 1.5)
The planner has asset reallocation, net worth redistribution at t = 0 and project choice as possible instru-
ments, but is subject to the same constraints on the initial bilateral arrangements and resource feasibility.
64
Before proceeding to the proof, it is necessary to add some notation that was not required for the rest of the
text. Let AF represent the aggregate endowment of lenders/consumers at period t. For simplicity, let it not
depend on the aggregate state. Also, let CL (w) be the aggregate consumer/lender consumption at time t
and state w E Q.
The proof use is similar to the usual proof of the first welfare theorem and its version available in
(Holmstr6m and Tirole 2011). However, it exploits the fact that complete markets for external assets are
not necessary in the environment studied, given equivalence between consumption across different periods.
Proof. (Constrained Pareto Optimality - Proposition 1.6) - Suppose there is another set of pairwise financial
arrangements, that leads to a Pareto improvement over allocation -. Let &j = { IY, {M (w)}Z 7 ,ij d}
and j = (-, f.' (w) j2 (w)} be the financial contract decisions (scale, continuation, project choice, asset
holdings and transfers) involved, as indexed by entrepreneur j and the associated lender. From the feasibility
of investment and consumption for entrepreneur j we have
+= (~)I + iE (1.58)
i( = p (w,i) (w)I+c E(w) (1.59)
z(w) .j+ p1(w,g) y (W)Z (W) E p) (1.60)
That leads to the following level of utility being achieved by entrepreneur j:
E [pi (w,1 ) fY (w) - p (w, i) f (w) - # ( ')] i + Z + E [ rT (O) + E [z (w) -dj.
In order to satisfy interim incentive compatibility of a lender associated to entrepreneur j, this new
allocation needs to satisfy, for each w E Q,
rj (W) + r - (L) < 0
and, given limited pledgeability, it also needs to satisfy
- ~ (w) < z (w) -d + po (w, j) Z (w). (1.61)
The last two constraints, combined with non-negativity of entrepreneurial consumption, imply that
p (w, ) zy (W) fy <_ z (s) -& + po (w, ) zY (W) fy .
As a consequence, any allocation implemented by the planner also needs to satisfy the same liquidity con-
straints that entrepreneurs face. From (1.58), (1.59) and (1.61) and non-negativity of entrepreneurial con-
sumption, we have that Aj+E [EZ i (w)] +E [po (w,~) zY (w) - p (w, ~y) £Y (w) - # (fj)] fj+E [z (w) -dj] > 0.
Implementation of the decision dj, if feasible, under the original competitive equilibrium would lead
to a value E [pi (w, i) zy (w) - p (w,~) zj (w) - # (SQ)] Ij + A - (q - z (w)) - dj for the entrepreneur (from
Lemma 1). There are three possibilities to consider. If A + E [Et j (w)] < A - q - d, the plan & would
have been feasible under the competitive equilibrium for entrepreneur j, but would have failed to make
the leverage constraint bind, being dominated by the equilibrium plan. That leads to a contradiction of a
possible improvement. In the case in which A + E [EZ i (w)] = A, the & (j) plan would also have been
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feasible, while no strict gains can be made for entrepreneur j and the leverage constraint would hold with
equality A + E [Bo (w; q; igj, i3 , ad)] I= 0. Therefore, for strict gains to be possible for entrepreneur j, we
need A + E, [Et ~r (w)] > .4 - q - d, which implies that the leverage constraint under the competitive
equilibrium is violated by plan &, or A + E [Bo (w; q; - ,i. , 6a)] I < 0. As a consequence, improvements
for entrepreneurs require A + £ E, [BO (w; q;ij, aT, <) j 0, with strict inequality if a positive mass of
entrepreneurs is made better-off.
Under the previous equilibrium, average consumer/lender utility was given by COL+E [C1 (w) + Cf (w)]
Z1 Af + q -L, as they did not participate in the surplus of investment, but could consume their endowments
and the value of of assets sold. Another necessary condition for a Pareto improvement over the original allo-
cation follows, with CL + E [Cf (w) + Cf (w)] '> AL + q - L, and a strict inequality being necessary if a
positive mass of consumer/lenders is made better-off. Combining the two, we obtain the necessary condition
for a Pareto improvement over the initial allocation
C+ E [CF (w)+C[ (w)]- [ (w;E (B ( 174,)] Zdj > A+ A + qL. (1.62)
Feasibility at aggregate levels at t = 0 and t = 1 requires
CO + Co"+ $(13 Idj < AL + -4
1 -40
CL (wj)+ CE (L')+ pL~gId
Since only the pledgeable component of output can be transferred to lenders, lender consumption at = 2
is bounded by
C2 (w po (Li, g)z, (w) _Ijdj+ AL+ Z(W)-L
Weighting the three previous constraints by their event probabilities and adding them up, we get
CL + E [ ()+C()]-E [(po (Li, j) - p (w, ~yg)) z--)j # (ij))] dj < A + 47 + E [z (w) - L] .
Finally, the constrained planner cannot create any of the assets, given the underlying lack of commitment
of consumers, which forces f djdj < Lk. Multiplying each of these constraints by its positive price qk from
the competitive equilibrium and adding them to the previous inequality, we obtain a reversal of 1.62 and the
desired contradiction.
F]
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Chapter 2
Constrained Optimality and Taxation in a Dynamic Hidden
Information Economy
Abstract
This chapter studies the characterization of the constrained optimal allocation in an economy with
hidden dynamic endowment shocks, in which agents are also able to trade bonds unobservably.
Production is monitorable and might be controlled or distorted by a planner, which is also capable
of indirectly affecting prices on the unobservable trades. The constrained optimal allocation can
be implemented in a simple decentralized way, which takes the form of a bond market economy
with taxes. Conditions for the sub-optimality of the untaxed economy and for an optimal tax rule
are offered. Around the untaxed economy, the sign of a welfare improving tax on capital depends
on the covariance between marginal utility and asset holdings in the cross-section of agents. This
expression can be extended into an optimal tax condition, which also takes into account effects that
tax changes have on revenues across periods.
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2.1 Introduction
This chapter addresses the issue of constrained efficiency in economies with stochastically evolving
hidden endowments and non-monitorable private asset trades. It discusses how the manipulation
of the production side of the economy might help the provision of insurance to risk averse agents.
Despite the lack of knowledge about each agent's asset position at any moment in time, the capital
stock and public debt levels are informative about the aggregate savings of the economy, influence
the interest rates on the unobservable trades and are valuable policy instruments. The constrained
optimal allocation is shown to be implementable in a simple decentralized way, with the introduction
of a wedge that separates the interest rate at which agents borrow and lend from the investment
cost perceived by firms. A condition for verifying the suboptimality of an untaxed bond economy
is provided. It depends crucially on the covariance between marginal utility (or consumption) and
asset holdings in the cross-section of the population at each period. This condition can also be
extended into an optimal tax formula in which additional terms based on the induced variation in
revenues appear.
The starting point of the analysis is an economy with idiosyncratic income shocks, as in the
Bewley-Aiyagaril class of models. Papers in that tradition typically assume an exogenously in-
complete asset market structure through which agents self-insure, while the present chapter takes
a mechanism design approach.2
Along the mechanism design tradition, (Allen 1985) shows that, while in a pure hidden informa-
tion moral hazard problem3 with controlled consumption, some risk-sharing between the principal
and agent is possible, that is no longer true once the agent has unmonitored access to credit markets
at the same interest rates faced by the principal. (Cole and Kocherlakota 2001) extend that anal-
ysis to an environment in which agents can only save hiddenly through the same linear technology
available to the principal, without the ability to borrow.
In that situation, under a few additional conditions, the constrained optimal allocation is equiv-
alent to the allocation that would be achieved by allowing the agents to borrow and lend freely at the
same rate of return of the linear technology. As a consequence, the welfare level of that is achieved
in the constrained optimal arrangement is the same which follows from the decentralized trading
of a single riskless bond. This result can be interpreted as providing foundations for the apparent
ad hoc incompleteness of insurance instruments common in the Bewley-Aiyagari framework.
'As in Bewley(undated) , (Bewley 1983), (Bewley 1986) and (Aiyagari 1994).
2 Along the first tradition,(Aiyagari 1995) analyzes the taxation of savings in a model with heterogeneity, random
evolution of labor endowments and limited possibilities for the taxation of labor income. A planner needs to raise
resources to finance a stream of public goods. It demonstrates that positive capital taxes are an useful instrument in
that environment, even in a steady state. This result, a consequence of incomplete markets and dynamic heterogeneity,
is at odds with the Chamley-Judd result ((Chamley 1986);(Judd 1985)) of the sub-optimality of asymptotic taxation
of capital, which holds under a general set of conditions, as explored in (Atkeson, Chari, and Kehoe 1999).
3A pure hidden information moral hazard as defined by Allen (1985) is equivalent to an environment with
unobservable income fluctuations.
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However, the assumptions that agents can directly access the most efficient saving technol-
ogy without detection, or that their technology has a rate of return that cannot be targeted by
the planner even through indirect means, is central for the equivalence and constrained optimal-
ity results. More generally, the taxation of markets in the presence of externalities, incomplete
contingent claims or private information might lead to potential welfare gains, as first studied by
(Greenwald and Stiglitz 1986) and further formalized by (Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis 2008),
(Bisin, Geanakoplos, Gottardi, Minelli, and Polemarchakis 2001) and (Citanna, Polemarchakis, and
Tirelli 2006) among others.
Therefore, capital taxation can potentially help relax incentive compatibility constraints and
have non-trivial redistributive consequences. Additionally, taxation helps decouple the shadow in-
terest rate perceived by the planner from the rate on savings that agents observe on the market.
(Doepke and Townsend 2006) have provided a computational example in which, whenever those
rates are sufficiently different, the equivalence of self-insurance and the second-best with unmon-
itored savings breaks down 4 . The present paper starts with an environment similar to the one
studied by (Cole and Kocherlakota 2001), but allows the manipulation of aggregate savings and
the rates at which agents can save, and analyzes which channels make these instruments helpful
for the provision of insurance against income fluctuations.
In another related paper, (Golosov and Tsyvinski 2007) have studied a dynamic Mirrlees econ-
omy 5 in which agents have non-monitorable access to a retrade market. In such environment, agents
have hidden information about their labor productivities and might engage in deviations that both
misreport their types and use the asset market to reallocate the consumption streams they receive.
They show that the competitive allocation involving private insurance is constrained inefficient and
provide examples in which a simple tax or subsidy on capital can be welfare improving, with the
sign of the optimal distortion depending on the nature of the skill process involved.
In this chapter, I analyze a simple dynamic structure which involves both asymmetric informa-
tion about endowment realizations and non-monitorable access to credit markets. The aggregate
savings technology is monitorable and can be targeted by a planner. The distortion of the aggregate
technology gives an additional instrument to this planner, beyond the use of any revelation games
about the endowment shocks. Three different arrangements for the provision of insurance are in-
vestigated: self-insurance through a riskless bond market, competitive insurance, both subject to
the presence of fiscal policy, and public insurance provision. Both competitive insurance and public
insurance provision are shown to be equivalent to the competitive equilibrium of a self-insurance
economy with the appropriately chosen fiscal policy.
The underlying form of moral hazard, which consists of hidden information about endowment
4 Due to different modeling assumptions regarding the savings deviation possibilities, this computational result
does not translate directly to the environment studied in this chapter. Incentive compatibility will require that
transfer stream have to have the same NPV at market prices, which does not occur in (Doepke and Townsend 2006).
5 The standard Mirrlees problem involves private information about labor productivity, but fully observable labor
income.
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shocks, allows a simple characterization of the set of allocations that can be supported in the
economy. The presence of unobserved consumption and trades on financial markets constrains the
incentive compatible transfer streams not to have different net present values at the market interest
rate, which is faced at the margin by all agents. The manipulation of such rate is an important
instrument for achieving the constrained optimal allocation and can be done with a simple linear
tax. By controlling agents' marginal rates of substitution, and possibly allowing it to differ from
the marginal rate of transformation, the planner can manipulate pecuniary effects and achieve
some redistribution and insurance between agents that end up with different endowment histories,
even if no redistribution seems to occur at market prices. Therefore, in terms of welfare ranking,
self-insurance with appropriately chosen fiscal policies dominates laissez-faire self-insurance, which
in its turn dominates autarky.
Given the equivalence results, there is a very simple way to implement the constrained opti-
mal allocation through decentralization. As the constrained optimal allocation is a competitive
equilibrium with taxes of an incomplete markets economy, it suffices to choose taxes appropriately
to maximize the welfare function. The study of the constrained optimal allocation in this hid-
den information economy with unobserved trades is reduced to a taxation exercise: a non-standard
Ramsey problem, with the presence of dynamic evolution of heterogeneity and availability of anony-
mous lump-sum transfers. In contrast to the richer Mirrlees environment studied by (Golosov and
Tsyvinski 2007), in the economy with pure endowment fluctuations which this chapter studies, an
appropriately chosen fiscal policy not only improves welfare, but fully implements the constrained
optimal allocation. No exogenous restrictions are imposed on the tax instruments, but personalized
transfers are restricted by the presence of asymmetric information and hidden savings possibilities.
Guided by the equivalence results, I provide conditions for the presence of welfare improving tax
interventions, or for the sub-optimality of the untaxed economy. These conditions rest centrally on
the covariance between marginal utility and asset holdings in the self-insurance economy without
taxes.
Two computational examples are provided. In the first example, the stochastic process for
the endowments is composed of independent and identically distributed shocks. The technology is
linear and its returns are set to simply offset intertemporal discounting. As a consequence, agents
with high initial income save, while agents agents with lower income borrow. Given that pattern, a
welfare improving positive tax on capital allows for redistribution across agents. This redistribution
occurs as agents with higher expected discounted wealth save more and are responsible for a larger
share of the funding of a lump-sum rebate. The second example highlights that capital subsidies
might be optimal, although under less realistic conditions which generate a positive covariance
between savings and marginal utility. In that example, a higher initial income is associated with
bad news about the discounted value of wealth. As a consequence of the positive covariance, an
optimal negative tax on the formation of capital is identified.
The remainder of chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the fundamentals of the
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economy, Section 3 presents the different institutional frameworks for the provision of insurance,
Section 4 discusses the main results obtained, Section 5 presents two examples in which the tax
wedge has opposite signs, and Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Model
Time is discrete, finite and indexed by t = 1, 2, ..., T. A single consumption good is present in each
period. This good can be converted into capital at a rate of one-to-one. Regarding notation, xt
denotes the current value of variable x at time t and xt denotes the history vector of all values of
xt up to time t.
Households - The is a continuum unit mass of ex ante identical households. At time 1, each
one receives a random endowment 01 of the consumption good, drawn from some finite set 08 E R++
according to the probability distribution 7ri (01). At period t, they learn the value of the current
period's endowment, drawn from the same set E with probabilities 7rt (t180- 1) . Households have
preferences defined over consumption streams according to
T-
U (c) = E [:#t-u (ct),
.t=1
for some # E (0, 1) and u (c, 5) -+ R, where u E C2, U' (c) > 0 and u" (c) < 0. To ensure
interiority of the solutions to saving problems, we assume Inada Conditions limcnu' (c) = +-O
and limuc,-u'(c) = 0 and use natural borrowing constraints. We assume a law of large number
holds, so that the mass of agents that suffered income shock history 0 t+s after 6t is given by
Wrt+, (Ot+sjIOt).
Production - There is a representative firm for each period t > 1, producing consumption
goods at time t from capital Kt-1 purchased and installed at time t-1 according to a weakly concave
production function yt = F (Ki1). Assume full depreciation and that F (Kti1) is continuously
differentiable and F (0) = 0. Each firm behaves competitively and has access to the asset market.
pod
For simplicity, assume the firms' profits, Kro, are directed to the government, which can rebate it
back to agents. 6
Markets - At each period t, there exists a financial market in which riskless bonds are traded
at price qt, for a repayment of 1 unit of consumption in the following period. There are also a
6 This is without loss of generality, as given the absence of initial heterogeneity and private information about
initial asset positions, the government can use lump-sum taxation to capture any profits generated by the firms.
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markets for consumption goods and capital. For ease of notation, let us also define the prices
q -, = 1,
s-1
q,t+s =- 1 qi+,', for s > 1
S'=0
the cost at period t of buying one unit of consumption at t + s.
Information - Each household's endowment is private information, as are asset positions and
consumption. The transformation of consumption goods into capital is assumed to be observable
and can be distorted or controlled by a planner.
Government - The government can tax the transformation of consumption goods into capital
at t < T at any rate rt E (-oo, oc). This way, a firm that wants to have Kt units of capital installed
in the beginning of period t + 1, has to buy Kt (1 Tt) units of goods at t with a future cost of
K, (1+Tt) at t + 1. This raises revenues TtKt at t. Additionally, the government might issue a valueqt
qtBt of bonds and rebate the proceeds uniformly to the agents at t. The total lump sum rebate
at t, -yt, equals the net change in the government's position in financial markets, plus the revenue
collected and profits earned. At T, the government receives profits from production and uses lump-
sum taxation -yT to repay the outstanding debt. Therefore, the budget balance conditions for the
government are given by
q1B1  = y -T 1K
= prod.
qt Bt = 7t - TtKt - ,rl" + Bt_1
A fiscal policy is a tuple p = (Bt, -yt, t1
Contracts - A dynamic mechanism determines distributions of transfers T (ht) and action
recommendations at (ht) after public histories ht. Without loss of generality, one can restrict
attention to mechanisms that are direct and induce obedience from the agents ((Myerson 1986);
(Doepke and Townsend 2006)). These involve public histories containing only messages from the
household about its current endowment shock O8 and a recommended savings decision at from the
mechanism back to the household. Additionally, at each moment in time, the household will have
a private information set including all information on the public history plus all actual previous
endowment realizations and private actions.
A direct mechanism allows the agent to choose strategies that specify report functions $t (ht , at 1,8-1)
and actions a, (ht, a'-1 , Ot, at), conditioning on the relevant private histories at the moment the de-
cision is taken.
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We will restrict attention to deterministic mechanisms. On those, the transfers and recommen-
dations evolve deterministically given the reports chosen. Therefore, there is a one-to-one mapping
between public histories ht and sequences of reports 51. Additionally, it is possible to describe
a strategy o, in the deterministic mechanism as simply the specification of $t (0t) : 0t -+ E and
at (0t) : 8t - R for each t E {, ... , T} , 0t C O. Let E define the space of all possible report and
saving strategies.
The expected utility of playing strategy o- C E, given the contract F i (Ti, h)[ 1 and prices
q - {qt} -i , is defined as
T
V (o,, IF, q) = E E #t-lu (ct (0t, )0,F, q ,
1t=1
where
ci (01, , ,q) 01 - qia[ (01) + Ti ($1 (1
c, (0t, u, F, q) = 02 + a 1 (o'~1) + T (&' (0t)) - qta (at-1) ,
aT = 0.
Incentive compatibility then requires that given the truthful and obedient strategy, (TT E 
which sets
&t (0t) 0t, Vt,
(truth-telling) and
at (0t) = &t (&t (0t)) ,Vt,0Ot
(obedience), the following set of inequalities holds
V (UTT, F, q) > V (,F, q),
Vg- C EZ.
For notation simplicity, let us write ct (0t, F, q) for ct (t, aTT, F, q) suppressing the dependence
on the truthful and obedient strategy rTT.
2.3 Environments
It is possible to analyze the outcomes of different institutional arrangements for the provision of
insurance on the economy outlined above. One can focus on the self-insurance through incomplete
markets, competitive private insurance or public insurance. The first one is an environment where
households have only access to a bond market and can achieve some insurance by solving an optimal
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savings problem. Additionally, firms invest in capital and are able to physically transfer resources
across periods. Also, the government chooses a fiscal policy. The second framework adds a layer of
competitive insurance firms, which need to offer incentive compatible contracts to the households. It
is worth noting that incentive compatibility requires both truthful reporting of endowment shocks
and obedience on the choice of savings. The third and last framework analyzed is a planning
problem, in which a planner controls production and offers contracts to the households, subject to
the need for incentive compatibility. The solution to this problem describes the set of constrained
optimal allocations.
2.3.1 Self-insurance through Incomplete Markets with taxes
The first important benchmark to have in mind is the analysis of outcomes of self-insurance through
the use of a single riskless asset, as in the Bewley-Aiyagari tradition. This is also commonly referred
to as the permanent income environment. Here, we add the possibility of use of a tax on the
representative firm's purchase of goods for investment.
On that framework, each household, after observing the value of the initial income shock chooses
its bond holdings to solve
T~
maxE E 13 -'1u(ct)1, (2.1)
at (01) t=1.
s.t.
ct (o) = 0 (ot- qtat (ot) + y + at1 (t-1)
ao = 0, aT = 0.
The representative firm of period t solves a standard profit maximization problem, described
by
max F (Kt-_1) - K-(1+rt). (2.2)
g_1
The government is taken to be the first-mover and announces the commitment to a policy p.,
describing capital taxes T {Tt}I- 1, bond issues B = {Bt}I_- 1 and lump-sum rebates -y = {Y7t}I .
A competitive equilibrium with taxes is given by the definition below:
Definition 1. A competitive equilibrium with taxes in the single riskless asset self-insurance frame-
work is defined by a policy p = (Bt, ,t)7 1 , asset holdings at (0') and consumption ct (0t) for
each t < T,6 C E t, capital levels {K}i_- , bond prices q = {qt}[_1 and profits {rt}71 such that:
(i) asset holdings and consumption decisions solve the household's problem described above,
taking q and the government's policy p as given;
(ii) each representative production firm chooses Kt_1 to solve its profit maximization problem
and pays out dividends irro, that equal its profit at t. The representative firm that produces at t
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issues (1+- im)A1 bonds at t - 1 to finance its capital purchases;qt- 1
(iii) there is market clearing in goods at each t:
E[c1 (0)] = E(0 1)-K1, fort= 1
E[c, (0t)] E (O,)+F(Kt-1) -K,, for 1 < t< T
E [c (OT) = E (OT)+ F (KT1), for t = T
(iv) there is market-clearing in the bond market at each t < T;
(1 + -r) KtEat (01 = Bt+ t
(v) the government's budget balance is respected.
2.3.2 Competitive Private Insurance
Insurance firms offer exclusive contracts F = (Ti, ) competitively and receive the rights to
all lump-sum rebates from the government to households. These contracts are signed before any
uncertainty is resolved, so that there is no initial adverse selection problem. All insurance firms
maximize their dividends 7rins at T and there is free-entry of firms. They finance themselves on the
the financial market, borrowing the capital necessary to pay out any transfers at t. Let dj denote
the debt issues of firm j for payment in period t + 1.
Each insurance firm then solves
T~
min E [(qiY-Tt (at (2.3)
r=(Ti,It)T T) i
s.t.
v (o-TT,vq) = U,
V (-TT,F,q) > V(o,F,q).
Notice that since firms finance themselves through borrowing in the bond market, given a
contract F3 = (Ti, aj) T firm j needs to finance EO [Ti' (0t)] -- -y at period 1 for a mass one of
contracts sold. This is done by issuing d - bonds and owing that amount at the
beginning of period t = 2. At any future period t, an insurance firm j brings in, for each mass one
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of contracts sold, a net debt in the total value of
d1 Eo (qti,t T, 06(01')
._1t1=1 t
and needs to finance an additional E [(Ti' (0t) - . For that, it needs to issue
d =E0 (qt', 1) (T( 
-
bonds at t.
Definition 2. A competitive equilibrium with taxes and private insurance is defined as a policy
p, a contract F* (Ti) and market share j > 0 for each active firm j7, an utility level U,
bond prices q = {qi} 1 and capital levels {Kt}iT1 such that:
(i) given the policy p and prices q, the contract Fj T , t) solves the insurance firm's
problem above, which requires incentive compatibility;
(ii) insurance firms earn zero profits;
(iii) agents choose the firm offering them the highest utility U;
(iv) each representative production firm chooses KI_1 to solve its profit maximization problem
and pays out dividends -rFOd that equal its profits at t.
(v) there is market-clearing in goods at every t;
(vi) there is market clearing in the asset market at t < T;
E,oa (01)] = Ej [dj + Bt + (1 + Tt) Kt
qt
where the expectations of asset holdings are taken with respect to both market shares and
income realizations 01.
(vii) the government's budget is balanced.
2.3.3 Public Insurance Provision
The third framework analyzes the problem of a benevolent planner that can control production and
the public sector, chooses consumption distributions through the choices of conditional transfers
and is constrained by the existence of hidden access to a credit market and the necessity of incentive
compatibility.
7The market share is only necessary for condition (vi). since there is some indeterminacy on the contract regarding
whether firm holds debt or agents hold debt.
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Since the planner controls and finances production and can thus control the net supply of
assets, the equilibrium condition in the hidden bond market is simply reduced to no agent wanting
to change their savings at the market prices q. Even though the planner does not control q directly,
whenever all agents' marginal rates of substitution are equated in a feasible allocation, that common
marginal rate would clear the hidden asset market by avoiding any re-trade gains for agents.
The planner solves the problem of choosing a contract F that determines the constrained optimal
allocation described below:
Definition 3. The constrained optimal allocation (ct (0', F) , Kt) 1 is given by the solution to
T
max E #' -1U (c1FKt,q t=1
s.t.
and
(ot, F, q)) (2.4)
(2.5)V (UTT F,q) ;> v(,F, q) ,
E [ci (01, F)
E [ct (0 ', F)
E [CT (T, )]
(2.6)= E [01] - K1,
= E[0t]+F(Kt1) -Kt
= E[OT]+F(KT_1).
2.4 Results
The first result obtained is much in the spirit of the original (Allen 1985) result. Since agents
have uncontrolled access to a credit market and no informative signal can be observed about their
endowment shocks, the presence of any transfer stream with a strictly higher net present value at
market prices would ensure that all agents would report to have had the endowment history that
leads to such stream. Additionally, every agent should always be expected to be saving optimally.
As a consequence, we show, in Proposition 1 below, that incentive compatibility of contracts can
be reduced to a condition about the constancy of the net present value (NPV) of transfer streams
at market prices and Euler equations for savings decisions.
Proposition 1. Incentive compatibility
V (cTT,F,q)
Vcr
> V(aF,q),
C E
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can be reduced to an Euler equation for savings on the equilibrium path
u' (ct (o, r, q) = -E ,' (ct+1 (0t1p '] , Vt < T, VO C 8',
and all transfer streams having the same NPV at market prices, which implies
T T
1,t (0t) = q1,tTt (E() VOt, & C.
t=1 t=1
Proof. Appendix.
Proposition 1 allows a very simple characterization of the set of incentive compatible contracts,
given the interest rates the agents perceive for any reallocation of their resources. Transfers and
asset holdings have to respect inter-temporal optimality from the agents' point-of-view and no
transfers of wealth across households with different histories is possible at the prevailing interest
rates. Another direct consequence of the NPV condition is that transfer stream might not depend
on the endowment realization at the last period, OT, as
T T-1
ql,TTT (o) Eq1,tTt ((-)) - ql,ti ( ,t)
i=1 t=1
where the right-hand side does not depend on OT. The impossibility of controlling household
consumption severely limits what competitive insurance firms can provide to agents, to the point
of rendering any private insurance provision useless, as indicated by Proposition 2 below.
Proposition 2. Any consumption distribution and capital accumulation (ct (0t, F, q) , Kt)TI that
can be achieved in a competitive equilibrium with private insurance firms and policy p, can also be
achieved through the same policy p as a competitive equilibrium in the self-insurance framework.
As a consequence of incentive compatibility, private insurance firms cannot make payment
streams with different net present values to households with distinct reported histories. Therefore,
the zero profit condition for insurance firms guarantees that, for every reported history, households
receive a stream of transfers with the same NPV of the government rebates they were initially
entitled to. An incentive compatible private insurance contract then has to satisfy
u' (ct (0 ',) = E [u' (ct+1 (t+1, F) | ,
Vt < T, Vo tE E
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and
T
q1,tt (0t) q,tyt,
ct (01 , q) 0 (0t) - qt&t (o1) + t-1 (ot61) + T (01)
ao = ,aT = 0.
There is indeterminacy in the contract Fr that solves these equations, as a change in transfers
T (61) , Tt+s (0t+SIgt) that does not affect the net present of the stream and a change in mandated
asset holdings {it/ (6 tf that compensates for it as to keep the same consumption stream( ' =1
leaves indifferent both the household and insurance firm, which borrow and lend at the same rates.
In other words, a change in the timing of transfers from the insurance firms to households is exactly
offset by a change in their asset holdings path.
However, any contract 1Fi that solves the equations above leads to the household-firm pair
having the same net aggregate position in the asset market, which equals &i (01) - d at time t, as
the insurance firm finances any transfers in excess of the rebate "it with borrowing.
The conditions for optimality in the self-insurance framework are given by
u' (c* (6t,q)) = E Lu' (c*1 (0t+1,q)) lot
Vt < T, Vot E o
ct* (0') = 0, - q a* (0t) + a* 1 (0'-1) + 7i
ao = ar=0.
Comparing both systems, it is possible to verify that at (01) Zt=1 (qs,t+1) 1  - - T/ (0t)] +
at (0) = -dt- + at (0t) in the solution. Consumption at every period t is unchanged for every type
01 E 61. Equilibria on goods and asset markets for the equivalent self-insurance economy at the
same consumption and capital allocation as the private insurance follow from this observation.
Therefore, fixing policy a p, for every equilibrium consumption distribution and capital values
in the competitive insurance environment, there is a competitive equilibrium in the self-insurance
framework with the same consumption and capital allocation.
In this environment, competitive insurance firms end up not providing any valuable services for
households, are redundant and any arbitrarily small operational cost would justify their shut down
and the use of a pure riskless bond market as a Pareto superior alternative. Indeed, Proposition 3
below shows that there are even stronger arguments for decentralized institutional arrangements,
since a riskless bond economy, once taxes are chosen appropriately, can implement the constrained
optimal consumption path.
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Proposition 3. (Decentralization) If a constrained optimal allocation is obtained as the solution
to Problem 2.4, it can be achieved as a competitive equilibrium with a riskless bond market and
taxes for some policy p.
Proof. Appendix. L
The proof is constructive. The optimal capital tax or subsidy is the difference between the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption at I and t +1 faced by all agents in the solution
to Problem 2.4 and the marginal rate of transformation of the consumption good between periods.
Due to the impossibility of taxing asset holdings or monitoring consumption, the planner uses
distortions in the aggregate access to the saving technology to ensure that such a wedge is actually
in place, separating returns on both sides of the credit market and manipulating prices as perceived
by households.
Other elements of the fiscal policy could be used in multiple ways, as long as the total rebate
to agents has the appropriate net present value using bond market prices {qt}tj and the partic-
ipation of the government in bond markets respects its budget constraints. In the decentralized
implementation, the government has to roll over assets relative to profits and tax revenue net of
previous rebates to agents. Since there are multiple ways of implementing lump-sum rebating to
agents while keeping the same net-present value, there are also different fiscal policies consistent
with the constrained optimal allocation.
Using the decentralized implementation, it is possible to conclude that under quite general
conditions, that is, except if a tight condition on the covariance between asset holdings and con-
sumption holds, there is the presence of a wedge in the constrained optimal allocation. Typically,
a planner has incentives to distort interest rates in the direction that benefits households with
histories that lead to higher marginal utility of consumption. The covariance between asset hold-
ings and marginal utility is the key statistic to look at in order to determine in which direction a
wedge should go for small deviations away from the untaxed economy, as suggested by (Chamley
2001) for different dynamic environments and, in a earlier reference, by (Diamond 1975) for a static
multi-person environment.
To illustrate this point, it is useful to write a Planner's problem in a primal form, as in
Wo (Ko = 0) = max Vo (0, q,vy (2.7)
s.t.
qtE [at (q, y)] - E [at-1 (q, y)] - 7y + F (Kt_1 ) = Kt
-0 = 0,Ko=0
aT = 0, KT = 0,
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where the objective function Vo (0, q, y) is the agents' indirect utility function from the optimal
savings problem, evaluated before the realization of any uncertainty, given prices q and lump-sum
transfer stream -y. The program above aggregates the productive side of the economy and the
government's accounts, allowing the planner to choose lump-sum transfers and consumer bond
prices, subject to resource feasibility. Wedges are defined implicitly as a function of the marginal
productivity of period t's capital and the inverse of bond prices.
Assumption: E [at (q, -y)] is C' for each t E {1, ..., T}.
Proposition 4. Around an untaxed economy where Tt = 0, Vt E T, i.e., qt = [F' (Kt)]1 ,Vt E T,
first-order welfare gains from distorting asset prices exist unless
Cov (u' (ct), at) = 0,
Vt E {1,...,T}.
Proof. We look at a perturbation around a point (q0, -y0, K 0) in the direction of a vector v =
(Aq, Ay, AK) described below.
For a chosen time period k E { 1, ..., T}, the perturbation sets
Aqk = 1
Ay = E[at_1].
For all t E {1, ..., T} , such that t # k,
Aqt = ANy = 0.
To make sure it has no first-order impact on the constraint set around T = 0, set
AKt = qtE [ +at  at E [at]] , for each t E { . T}.&qk +'Yk 1eht ,
This direction of perturbation has no first-order effects on constraint set, since qt= [F' (K?)] 1
Then,
dWo _ V1 o DVo
= a + E[ak]dv - qk 8-Yk
S -k- 1E [u' (ck) ak] + /k-1E [U' (ck)] E [ak]
= -k-ICov (u' (ck) , ak)
Once away from a zero-tax allocation, further changes in asset prices have not only the redis-
tributive effect identified by the covariance between marginal utilities and asset holdings but have
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also effects on the tax revenue, which can be raised to finance lump-sum rebates. This is, indeed, an
essential trade-off that appears when characterizing the optimal tax policy using a primal approach.
The necessary first-order conditions of Problem 2.7 are
Vai 1 T1E [at ]
qk : -- AkE [ak) + Z (Atq - At+1) =a 0 (2.8)
uqk t=1 Sqk
-> 1 k- 1E [-' (ck (0)) aM (o')J + AkE [ak] + -1 ( OF- 1 [ =t -
t=1
T -1 -
-- UE[ ' ( Ck -- ' A * - E[a E (Atqt - At+1) =q 0
t=11
K Ak + K , (Atq A± ) 0 (2.9)
t=i 19-Yk
Kt ~ ~ k -A 1(t A + = 0Aq (2.10)
These equations can be combined to write
- Co0 (u' (ck) , ak) + E At+1, + Ij d]I = 0 (2.11)
and
- At + F' (K,) At+ 1 = 0. (2.12)
Equation (2.11) provides characterization of the essential trade-off between using lump-sum
rebates or a tax wedge on capital accumulation. The first term is the redistributive effect from
increasing the price of a bond and rebating the revenue, while the remainder is the resource cost
that this reform introduces, as individuals change their asset demands in response to it. These
resources are evaluated at the shadow cost to the planner, which is given by production prices, as
seen from equation 2.12.
The presence of private information and dynamically evolving heterogeneity, which is shown
to be equivalent to endogenously incomplete markets, adds welfare improving capital taxation
possibilities, even when lump-sum taxes are available. This contrasts with the fact that without
dynamic endowment shocks and hidden side-trades, the availability of lump-sum taxes typically
results in an even stronger case against capital taxation, extending the zero-taxation benchmark
result to all periods.
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2.5 Examples
In this section, I provide two two-period examples, discussing the direction of the welfare improving
tax wedge found. In both, I compute a local solution to
{Tt(0t)}I ttet,q,T E0 O 0 t('
qtu' (Ot + T (1) - /E [u' (6t+1 + T ( 0t+1)) 10] =0,
Vt < T1 t .
T
E q1,tT (0' = T,
t=1
,VOT E"T.
and the resource constraint
Ko = 0, K2 =0,
F (Kt_1) - K = E [Tt (0t)] , for t < T.
Problem 2.13 is equivalent to Problem 2.4, with the substitution of the equivalent incentive compat-
ibility constraints and the use of zero asset holdings for agents on the unobservable asset markets,
which is without loss of generality8 .
2.5.1 Example 1
For the first example, let us assume u (c) belongs to the constant relative risk aversion class with
a coefficient of relative risk aversion of p -- 3, under the parametrization u (c) = 1. The
intertemporal discount factor is # 0.95 and technology is linear with a rate of return R #-1.
The underlying process for endowments is independent and identically distributed with Ot E {1, 1.5}
and equal probabilities.
Given this structure, in the self-insurance economy without the tax wedges, agents with 01 = 1
are borrowing, while agents with 01 = 1.5 are saving. Aggregate savings and capital are positive.
Since the distribution of endowment shocks is i.i.d., agents that suffered the high endowment shock
at t = 1 are intertemporally richer and end up consuming more at the initial period. Therefore, on
81f (F, Kt, q) are compatible with a feasible allocation, setting a (0') = 0 and 'i (0t) = T (0') - qdta (0t) +
(t_1 0'-1) which transfers the asset holdings to the government leads to the same allocation.
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the untaxed economy Cov (' (cl) , al) < 0 which generates the possibilities of improvements from
taxation.
Indeed, in the optimum obtained q = 1.14 which leads to an implicit tax wedge of T = 0.2 on
the installation of capital. The welfare gain from the introduction of the wedge is in the order of
0.3% in terms of the expected utility of agents, which given the CRRA assumption is equivalent to
the same welfare impact of an increase of 0.15% in the consumption at each state.
The main element that leads to the presence of the tax wedge can be interpreted as the corre-
lation between savings and marginal utility which is caused purely by agents with better histories
choosing to buy more assets, as the transition probabilities for the endowment process are the same
for all types.
2.5.2 Example 2
All fundamentals are the same as before, except for the stochastic process for the endowment. Now,
there are two equiprobable initial shocks 01 C {1 -, 1 I+ } for small positive E and two possible
final shocks 02 {0.2, 1.8} However, most of the effects of the endowment shocks are informational:
agents with 01 1 - E learn that they are more likely to receive high endowment in the following
period, while agents with initially higher endowment learn they are more likely to receive 02 = 1.8
in the next period. The transition probabilities are 7r (1.811 - E) = 0.9 and 7r (1.811 + E) = 0.1.
In the untaxed self-insurance economy, there is a positive covariance of marginal utility and
savings and c (01 1 - E) > c (01 = 1 + E), indicating that agents with good news about their
future endowments (low current endowment) consume more at t 1 in anticipation of the higher
likelihood of high endowment at t = 2.
As expected given the positive covariance, the local optimum found has a negative wedge, which
is equivalent to a capital subsidy of T = -0.28. This leads to an increase in terms of the expected
utility of 1%, which, given CRRA preferences, is the same increase that would be achieved if an
increase in consumption of 0.5% happened in every state.
In this example, agents with initially (marginally) higher endowment at t = 1 have bad news
about their future endowments and end up saving more in anticipation. Despite their initially
higher wealth, they consume less and are the agents with the highest marginal utility at t = 1. To
redistribute towards these agents, the planner moves intertemporal prices towards increasing the
returns on savings q1 1 faced by consumers. That can be implemented by implementing a capital
subsidy T1 < 0, which decreases qi.
2.6 Conclusion
In the constrained optimal problem, the fictitious planner can choose the contract offered to all
agents and controls production subject to incentive compatibility and feasibility. As agents can
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retrade away from any consumption stream that the planner could offer, incentive compatibility
takes a simple and interesting form. As in (Allen 1985) and (Cole and Kocherlakota 2001), transfer
streams offered to households cannot take different net present values at market prices and inter-
temporal smoothing is required. However, as the planner chooses all contracts in the economy at
the same time, the interest rate for any retrades is endogenous.
Due to the simple form of incentive compatibility present in the model, the solution to the
planner's problem can also be implemented in a simple decentralized way. It suffices to induce a
wedge, which can be introduced through a tax or subsidy on capital installation, separating the
financial costs of investment, as perceived by firms, from the interest rates at which agents could
reallocate their consumption streams. Therefore, properties of the mechanism design problem and
allocations can also be studied through the characterization of economies with incomplete financial
markets and simple taxes on firms.
As no redistribution can occur at market prices, insurance becomes a matter of choosing the
appropriate prices to manipulate the pecuniary effects they have on ex ante welfare. The redistribu-
tive effects of a tax change at each period, around the untaxed economy, are given by the covariance
between marginal utility and asset holdings in the cross-section of the population. In an economy
with a constant-returns-to-scale production function, a very clear result emerges: it suffices to have
a non-zero covariance in any period for the constrained suboptimality of the zero-tax system.
As a final remark, while the feasibility of the introduction of a wedge between the returns on
savings faced by the planner and the ones faced by agents are central to the results, adding another
concave productive technology, even a non-monitorable backyard technology, is expected to make
the analysis more involved, but not revert the equivalence and suboptimality results.
2.7 Appendix: Proofs
Proof. (Proposition 1)
Necessity:
Assume towards a contradiction that some history 6T receives a transfer stream with a higher
NPV at prices q then every other history 0 T E OT, with strict inequality for some history that
happens with positive probability. Then, set a deviating strategy & according to which the agent
always reports St (0') = 8t (5), consumes ct (ot, F, q) for t < T and consumes the maximum
possible CT. At T and history BT, this agent has received, in terms of consumption at t = 1,
T T
t=1 t=1
while consumed
T-1
gl,t ct (0', F, q).
t=1
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The availability of resources for consumption at history 0 T can be found through
T-1
Z ql,t [T ) - ct (0, F, q)
t=1
T-1
> q1,t
L=1
(t tF,q)±a0t)I+
ql,T-qT -1 atl (a1&Fq)] + q1, TTT (aT (6T))
> ql,T-1qT-1 lat-1 (t- 1TT
1 (oT
1 (T-
1 &q) +
1 J0,TT F, q)
F, q)I + q1,TTt (0t (T
T (OT (-T))]
T F
With ql,T > 0, this implies to
C aT c q) CT (T ) TT q)
for each 0 T E 8T, with at least one inequality strict for a history that has positive probability.
Therefore,
V (&,F ,q) > V (0TIrq)
and the desired contradiction is reached. That implies that all transfer streams have the same NPV
T
giq,tT (6' (6T)
t=1
T
= giTt (1' (1T ,
t=1
(2.17)
VOT, T E 8T.
Now, let us reach the first-order condition for savings. Obedience along the equilibrium path
requires
U (at + T (a-1) qi (0 t) + 6t-1 (0t + fE [V 1 (pTTqOt+1) 1t] > v (r, 0, q, ,
VC, C E.
In particular, for a continuation strategy that involves a deviation setting at (0t) = at (0') + e after
history 0' and reverts back to truth-telling and obedience not to be profitable it is necessary and
sufficient that
U (ct+1 y(6, r, q) ) . (2.18)
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+ ot (0t)] + ql,TTT (0t (6T ) (2.14)
q1,TTT (aT ))
ql,T [aT
> ql,T [aT
) I
(2.15)
(2.16)
U/ (c o, r, q) =- E
[t ---(T) Ct
Now, we prove the sufficiency part of the main statement. If
T
E q1,tT (01 (T))
t=1
VOT, T
T
= q1,1Tt (6t (6T))
t=1
cE) T.
U' (c, (t, F, q) )
Vt
= E
qt
< T ot
I ' (ct+1
E 8,
(6t, F, q l , (2.19)
then
V (UTT, F, q) > V (a, F, q) , Vu E.
We start from any strategy o- c E and we might split the problem in two parts: a revelation
part and a distribution of consumption or savings part. Take a strategy o' C E that reports shocks
in the same way as a, but also saves optimally. As a consequence,
V (u', F, q) > V (-, F, q) .
Let
T T
T = q1,tt i T q1,tit ( (
t=1 t=1
VgT I5 ET I7
which implies
T
T = q ict (01, a, F, q) - Ot,
t=1
Vt < T, O' Ee8
Then ct (Ot, o-, F, q) solves
max E [#t-1u (ct)]
ct (62o ,' , q)
s.t.
T + qi,Ot 2 3q1,t ct (ot 
-, F,q) (2.20)
The solution is characterized by the necessary and sufficient FOC (2.19) and (2.20). The set of
equations is also satisfied by c (Ot, oTT, F, q) and has a unique solution due to the strict concavity
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and
of a (-) . Therefore, it follows that
V (-TT, r, q) = V (o-', F, q) > V (-,,q)-
Proof. (Proposition 3) The constrained optimal allocation can be described by the functions c* (0t)
Ot+T '* (0t) , plus the choice of capital path {K*}[ -1 . In that allocation, all agents have their MRS between
consumption at t and consumption at t + 1 equalized, so that no further trades would be possible
1 - (n' ct ()) Vt < T 0' (E E.
qt #E [u' (ct+1 (01+1)) 1|t]'
To find a policy p, first set
(1I+ t) qF' (K*) , (2.21)
-, =0, Vt < T,
t -1
qt Bt q,t - F ( Ks*_-) + K*) - eK*,
and
T
'YT q- T * (0t) q-T-'
5=1
T
=q-1 c* (0') - Ot),
s=1
which does not depend on 6T due to incentive compatibility.
Let {at (0t, q,7 y) }, tet be the solution to Problem 2.1, the individual savings problem.
Now, it is necessary to verify that a competitive equilibrium with the same consumption distribution
will be achieved.
i) The individual savings problem leads to the same consumption allocation as the planner's problem.
It is characterized by the solution to
U' (ct (t)) E [u' (ct+1 (0t+) Oj , Vt < T, 0' E 0' (2.22)
qt
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and
ao = 0
c, (0t) = 0 t + ati (0'-l) - qtat (0t)
CT (T) = OT + aT_1 0- -)+ --.
It is possible to isolate each at (01) and write the set of constraints above as a single present value
version
T
Z q1,t ct () -[, = qlTYT
t=1
(2.23)
= T.
Since a is strictly concave the solution to 2.22 and 2.23 is unique. As, by construction qi,TyT
f, the distribution of consumption which solves this system is the initial {c* (0') }tt e 1 that solves
the constrained Pareto optimality problem. We can iterate forward using ao = 0 and at (0')
qt-1 (0t + at_1 (Ot-1) - c* (01)) to find the solution of the savings problem terms of asset sequence
{at (0t, q, -) gt .
ii) Representative firm maximization and profits. The representative firm of time t solves
max F (Kt) - q 1 (1 + Tt) Kt.
Kt
The solution is characterized by the FOC
F' (K*) = q- 1 (1 + -rt),
which coincides with (2.21) and leads to profits
7r 1 = F (K*) - qt 1(1+ Tt) K*,
generated at period t + 1 when production occurs.
iii) Market Clearing in Goods at each t. At t
allocation
1, from the feasibility of the constrained optimal
0,K+ = 0,
E [c* (t) ,for t < T.
Since the consumption distribution is the same, as well
feasibility.
as {Kt* }i-1 market clearing follows trivially from
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F (Kt*_1) + E [0t]|- K* =
iv) Market Clearing in Bonds at t,
at (0', q, y)
E [at (0t, q, y)
= q-1 (Os - c* (0s))
S=1
=q- E [(Os - c* (Os))
S=1
= q-1 [K* - F (K 1)]
S=1
That implies
E[at (', q, B =B+ (1+ Tt) K,
qt
where (1+)Kt are the bond issues necessary to cover the financing needs of the representative firmqt
that produces at t + 1.
v) Government's Budget. We have to verify that
q1 B 1 = -T 1 K1
qtBt
(2.24)
(2.25)
(2.26)
prod + Bt_1,
-TtI~t -7[t +B
Y = - _ rprodT BT-I+ 7T
are respected for the proposed allocation. 2.24 is trivially satisfied. Substituting for Bt_1 and 7r
on 2.25,
qtB = -tTKt - F (K*_1) + q- 1 (I + Tt- 1) K*1
+qt 1  q7_1 (-F (K*_1) + K,*) - rtlK*_1
,=1 S 
-
t-2
--tKt - F (K*_1 ) + q-j1 1K* 1 + q -1  1 (
-=1
F (K*_1 ) + K*)
t-1
= -tKt + q- (-F (K*_ 1) + K,*)
8=1
as it was necessary to verify.
Finally, we verify 2.26,
T-1
ST- ITT-1IKT-1 - qT 3 q T~-j (- -K1 ) + Kt*) + ?7 .Td
t=1
K*) + F (K+-1) ,
T -1
= qi-' ( F ( Ks*_- )
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which implies
T
q1,TYT ql,t [F (Ki1) - Kt].
t=1
We can use the individual present value budget constraint, obtained as (2.23) to write
T T T
q1,t [c* (0t) -- t] 1,qtE [c* (0') - 6, = qi,t
t=1 t=1 t=1
[F (K* 1) - K,*]
which holds as a consequence of period-by-period feasibility (2.6) of the initial (c* (0') , Kt
Proof. (Proposition 4)
First, we might write the individual saving problem with taxes in recursive form as
Vt (6t, at_1, q, 7) = max u (t + 7t + at_1 - qtat) + #E [V%+1 (Ot+1,atq,-) Iot]
VT (oT, at_1, q, y) = OT -1 -|- +T
So,
0, if s < t
-u' (ct (0')) a*, if s = t
#OE avt+1( 9 + ,at ,q,T) o
0, if s < t
_ u' (ct (ot)) , if s = t
#E avt+1 (0'+ ,at,q,T)lo
1E [-' (c. (0S)) a* (t
= #-Q1 E [u'(cs ())]
F1
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Chapter 3
Runs on debt and the role of transparency
(joint with Plamen T. Nenov)
Abstract
Financial instability is often characterized by increased uncertainty, debt rollover difficulties and as-
set liquidation at depressed prices. The present chapter studies a debt roll-over coordination game
with dispersed information and a market-determined liquidity scenario. We describe conditions
under which an improvement in the precision of individual information about financial institutions'
fundamentals leads to greater financial stability. For the limiting case of arbitrarily precise private
information that condition obtains a simple form in terms of payoff elasticities. Conversely, we
characterize when an increase in uncertainty leads to a higher frequency of debt runs and show how
this deleterious effect is amplified by the deterioration of prices for liquidated assets.
Key words: transparency, stress tests, living wills, bank runs, fire sales, global games
JEL Codes: E44, G01
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3.1 Introduction
Financial crises are commonly associated with an increase in uncertainty about asset quality1 . The
episode of 2007-2009 is no exception, given the substantial increase in uncertainty about the quality
of various asset-backed securities combined with opacity of financial firms' portfolios2 . A leading
narrative for the cause of financial crises, including the most recent one, relates the resulting lower
quality of information about portfolios to the incentives of depositors and short-term lenders to
run on them by refusing to roll over their demand deposits or loans 3. This triggers asset sales in
markets with limited absorption capacity, leading to fire sale effects 4, which, in turn, deepen the
crisis by spreading the runs onto healthier financial institutions, leading to a potential collapse of
the whole financial system. Such a view of the nature of financial crises would call for a policy
response aimed at increasing transparency of financial intermediaries' balance sheets.
This chapter theoretically evaluates whether deterioration in information quality can indeed
lead to a higher failure rate of financial intermediaries and examines how fire sales can amplify such
shocks. We study a model of the financial system with the risk of coordination failures by short-
term lenders that leads to bank runs and failure. In the model, short-term lenders make rollover
decisions but face a complementarity in their actions through the ability of their respective financial
intermediary to withstand a run and bring long-term projects to completion. However, short-
term lenders have imperfect information about the quality of their respective financial institution,
which makes them uncertain about the actions of other lenders but also directly affects their own
expected payoffs conditional on bank survival or failure. Additionally, an asset market in which
banks liquidate assets creates a systemic link between the rollover decisions of short-term lenders
in different institutions.
We derive conditions, under which more precise information by lenders improves financial sta-
bility, by reducing the likelihood of rollover difficulties. If differences in financial intermediaries'
portfolios lead to differences in the "upside" risk associated with a higher probability of repayment
of long-term lenders conditional on bank survival, then increasing the uncertainty about banks'
portfolios lowers bank failure rates. In this case, lenders effectively become more optimistic about
the value of each bank's promises conditional on survival. Conversely, if portfolio differences mostly
drive differences in "downside" risk associated with lower repayment of long-term relative to short-
term lenders in the case of bank failure, more precise information improves financial stability. In
this case, higher uncertainty about portfolio qualities increases the likelihood of intermediary fail-
ures. In the limiting case of arbitrarily precise information, we show that the condition boils down
1(Mishkin 1991)
2 (Flannery, Kwan, and Nimalendran 2010).
3 See, for example, (Gorton 2010). As (Gorton 2010) notes about previous banking crises: "The problem was
that no one outside the banking system knew which banks were the weak banks, which banks were risky. Even other
banks might not have known. Without knowing which specific banks were the riskiest, depositors were cautious and
withdrew their cash from all banks."
4 (Shleifer and Vishny 2011).
94
to a simple rule relating the relative sensitivities of the payoffs from rollover and running with
respect to changes in bank fundamentals.
After clarifying when increases in transparency can be beneficial for improving financial stability
we proceed to examine how limited demand for liquidated assets interacts with shocks to portfolio
uncertainty. In particular, the adverse effects of increases in portfolio uncertainty on bank failure
are amplified endogenously through asset markets. The dependence of a bank's ability to survive a
run of short-term creditors on asset prices creates a downward sloping supply curve for bank assets,
which combined with an elastic demand curve, leads to fire sales and amplification. Thus, increases
in uncertainty can have important systemic effects.
The issues of transparency, complexity, and quality of information in the context of the recent
financial crisis have attracted much recent interest both among academics, aiming to understand
the causes of the crisis, as well as among policimakers. Two particularly important recent papers
on this topic are (Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom 2009) and (Caballero and Simsek 2012). The first
paper examines the effects of asymmetric information on aggregate liquidity provision. It shows that
more information actually reduces welfare as it reduces trade between agents. Debt contracts are
optimal for the provision of liquidity as they minimize the incentives of agents to become privately
informed and maximizes trade. Therefore, increasing transparency in this setting or increasing
agents' incentives to acquire more precise information reduces welfare. The second paper shows
how complexity, defined as a financial intermediary's uncertainty about its cross-exposure and
counterparty risk amplifies the effect of shocks in the financial system and interacts with secondary
asset markets to create fire sale events. In that context, reduction in uncertainty has a beneficial
impact for the financial system. Our work complements this growing literature by studying how
changes in the quality of individual information can influence the coordination problem implicit in
any run or roll over crisis episode. In this way, it clarifies when increasing portfolio transparency, for
example, through stress testing is desirable as a tool for improving financial stability. Additionally,
it provides an analysis of fire sales in intermediation models featuring coordination as a central
element, showing how fire sales can endogenously amplify uncertainty shocks in these models and
exacerbate any deleterious effect of uncertainty.
The chapter is also related to models of bank runs ((Diamond and Dybvig 1983)) and the effect
of idiosyncratic information on the coordination problem of depositors ((Goldstein and Pauzner
2005) and (Rochet and Vives 2004)). However, it differs in its modeling approach and in the focus
of our analysis, which studies the effects of quality of information and transparency, particularly
in the presence of an asset market. The model is similar to (Morris and Shin 2004), who examine
the effect of coordination risk on the price of corporate debt has a different focus and conclusions.
In its emphasis on the effect of information on equilibrium behavior in a coordination game, the
chapter is closely related to the work by (Morris and Shin 2002) and (Angeletos and Pavan 2007)
who consider the welfare effects of more precise public and private information in economies with
strategic complementarities.
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The chapter is most closely related to recent work by (Moreno and Takalo 2011), who investigate
the effect of transparency on a model with bank runs and find that increasing transparency has
an unambiguously negative effect on the probability of bank runs in their framework. In contrast
to them, we find that this effect is ambiguous and that increasing transparency during a financial
crisis may in fact reduce the probability of bank runs and the severity of a crisis. Additionally, we
examine the amplification effect that fire sales have on increases in uncertainty in this framework.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 studies the basic model of a financial system
subject to the risk of run by short-term lenders. Section 3.3 presents the main result of this work,
which states conditions under which transparency reduces the probability of bank runs. Section 3.4
extends the model by including an asset market that determines liquidity conditions and shows the
amplification effect that fire sales have on shocks to information quality in the model. Section 1.6
provides a discussion of optimal transparency policy in our framework, as well as brief concluding
remarks.
3.2 Model with exogenous liquidity conditions
3.2.1 Set-up
The economy lasts for two periods: t = 1, 2. In this economy there exists a set of financial inter-
mediaries, which are indexed by i E [0, 1]. Each of these has originally invested in an independent
project, that delivers random returns and only fully matures at t = 2.
Each intermediary has a relationship with a continuum unit measure of lenders, which hold
claims on the project. These claims are in the form of short-term debt, which gives each lender
the option to roll it over or not. Formally, a debt holder has two actions available at t = 1. She
can either refuse (a = 0) or agree (a = 1) to roll over the current debt. Because of the mismatch
in the maturity structure of assets and liabilities, intermediaries are potentially illiquid: too many
refusals to roll over their current debt lead to failure at t = 1.
For each intermediary, there are three relevant events: failure at t = 1 due to rollover difficulties,
failure at t = 2 due to project failure, or successful completion at t = 2. The probabilities of these
events are influenced by the strength of the bank's fundamentals, 02 E [0,1], with 02 ~ U [0,1], and
by a measure of aggregate market liquidity, 1. The index I identifies the facility in liquidating a
limited volume of the project's assets, generating revenues for the payment of agents who refuse to
roll over, or in finding other sources of funding.5
There is imperfect information about the fundamentals of projects. Each debt holder j of
intermediary i, receives a signal Oij = Bi+rij, where qij ~ U [ -e, e], with e > 0 and relatively small.
This particular structure is helpful in disciplining both beliefs about fundamentals and about the
information obtained by other agents and their likely actions.
5 For the model in this section 1 is held fixed. However, in Section 3.4 we allow for a feedback from bank's asset
liquidations in to I to capture fire sale events.
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We proceed to the formal description of the production technology held by intermediaries. There
is limited reversibility at t = 1, which means that the technology is only capable of generating a
limited amount of resources without leading to early termination. Formally, each intermediary fails
at t 1 if the proportion of agents choosing to allow the rollover of its debt (x) is less than the cut-
off g (0i, F). This cut-off is jointly affected by fundamentals (0i) and by a vector F -- (R, K, l).This
vector specifies both aggregate liquidity conditions (1) and elements of the previously designed
debt contract, soon to be described. Therefore, failure occurs whenever x < g (0i, F). The cut-off
function g (0i, 1) is continuously differentiable and naturally satisfies ag(a ,) < 0 ag(oa,) < 0, and
ag(oiF) > 0, where K is the payoff that a lender collects if she refuses to roll over and the bankaK
does not fail (see Table 3.1 below)
If the intermediary fails at t = 1, lenders who choose to roll over receive a liquidation payoff
Xa=1 (9) and lenders who refuse to roll over receive a payoff Xa=o (9). Xa=1 (0) and Xa o (0) are
continuously differentiable and satisfy d= 0 - d4n2=L < 0, that is, the higher the bank's fundamentals
the lower the net payoff difference across lender types.
A project that survives to period t = 2 succeeds and generates a return R for each remaining
debt holder with probability p (9). It fails to deliver any output with probability (1 - p (0)) . These
payoffs as functions of relevant events are represented in Table 3.1.
Refuse Accept
Project Fails at t 1 XR (9) XA (9)
Project Fails at t = 2 K 0
Project is successful K R
Table 3.1: Payoffs
We assume that Xa=1 (0) < Xa=o (9) < K < R. Since what ultimately determines a lender's
decisions is the difference in payoffs between the two available actions, we define k (9) = Xa=o (9) -
X=1 (9) > 0 as the net payoff from running in case of bank liquidation. Given the properties of Xa=1
and Xa=O it follows that k (.) is continuously differentiable and decreasing in 9. The assumption of a
0 payoff for agents that roll over when the project fails at t = 2 can be obtained from normalizations
and does not lead to any loss of generality. Then, the net payoff from rolling over versus running
is given by:
(0, F -k (0), if x < g (, F) (31)
p (6) R-K ,Zf x;>g (O, )
or
7r (0, x, F) k (9) Ix<g(o,y) + (I - Iz<g(o,r)) (p (9) R - K) (3.2)
It is represented in Figure 3-1.
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(a) Fixed (x, F). (b) Fixed (0, F).
Figure 3-1: Net payoff from rollover decision, a = 1.
3.2.2 Dominance regions
We make the following set of assumptions about the properties of the underlying economy.
Al. There exists 0, such that for all 0 < 0 and all F, g (o, F) = 1.
A2. There exists #, such that for all 0 > 0 and all r, g (0, F) = 0 and Rp (0) - K > 0.
A3. 0 > c and (1 - ) > e.
(Al) ensures the existence of a lower dominance region, i.e., a region in which fundamentals are
so weak that, in a perfect information benchmark, refusing to roll over debt becomes a strictly
dominant action. (A2) ensures that an upper dominance regions exists: for sufficiently high funda-
mentals rollover is a strictly dominant action. In principle, both dominance regions can be made
arbitrarily small as long as 1 assumption (A3) is satisfied. We impose assumption (A3) to ensure
that whenever a signal 0, C [e, , is received, the support of the posterior about the 0 fundamen-
tal is bounded away from zero and one. This avoids unnecessary complications in the Bayesian
updating process that would emerge close to the extremes of the unit interval.
3.2.3 Examples
In this section, we provide two model environments that satisfy the conditions described previously.
These illustrate different illiquid investment technologies, with specific failure thresholds, which
when funded with short-term liabilities might lead to liquidity crises and inefficient liquidation.
Example 3.1. A bank holds a set of assets, including a resellable portfolio and intangibles with
limited transferability, that jointly offer a return of R with probability p (0). Of this set, a (0) are
liquid assets that can be sold at t = 1 at a price of 1, where 0 E [0, 11 parametrizes the strength of
the bank's portfolio. Note that a (0) is a smooth increasing function of 0. The bank has a measure
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one of short-term lenders, who, in case of refusal to roll over, receive payoff K as long as the bank
has not failed. Otherwise, they receive 0 < k (0) < K, where k (0) is decreasing in 0. If they roll
over, they receive R in case the project is successful and 0 otherwise. The bank pays off creditors
that refuse to roll over by selling liquid assets from its portfolio. The bank fails whenever it runs
out of liquid assets given the demand of creditors for repayment, i.e., K (1 - x) > 1 - a (0) which
implies g (0, F) =1 - Ka (0). Note that go < 0, gi < 0, and 9K > 0.
Example 3.2. Similarly to Example 1, each bank has a productive asset that pays off R with
probability p (0) at t = 2 and delivers a t = 1 cash-flow of f (0)6, and a measure a of liquid assets
that can be sold at t 1 at a price of 1. Note that f (0) is a smooth increasing function of 0.
The bank has a measure one of short-term lenders that choose to roll over their short-term debt at
t = 1 up until t = 2. If they refuse to roll over they receive payoff K as long as the bank has not
failed, otherwise they receive 0 < k (0) < K, where k (0) is decreasing in 0. If they roll over they
receive R in case the project is successful and 0 otherwise. The bank pays off creditors that refuse
to roll over by selling liquid assets from its portfolio. The bank fails whenever it runs out of liquid
assets given the demand of creditors for repayment, i.e. K (1 - x) > f (0) + I -a, which defines the
threshold~~ g(,T (0)±l.athreshold g (o, r) = 1 - (K Note that go < 0, g, < 0, and 9K > 0.
3.2.4 Equilibrium
We first study the properties of the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in the rollover game, taking as given
aggregate liquidity conditions. This allows us to characterize outcomes and the extent of inefficient
intermediary failure in a partial equilibrium setting. In Section 3.4.1, we study the consequences
from the endogenous determination of aggregate liquidity conditions.
We define a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium for the rollover game, in which the vector F is taken as
given, as follows.
Definition 3.1. A Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) for the rollover game consists of a strategy
a : E -+ {0, 1} and a fraction x : 9 -+ [0, 1] of lenders that roll over at t = 1 s.t.
1. a (0) solves a = 1 if E0 10 , [7r (0, x (0) , F)] > 0, a = 0 if E0 10 , [7r (0, x (0) , F)] < 0 and a E {0, 1}if
E010, [7r (0, x (0) , F)] = 0;
2. x (0) = Eo, o [a (02)].
We focus on equilibria involving cutoff strategies such that a (02) = 1 iff 0 > 0*. Equilibria in
cut off strategies can be characterized by making use of Proposition 3.1 below, which ensures the
existence of a unique equilibrium threshold.
6 Allowing for negative cash-flows, interpreted as additional financial distress resource requirements, is necessary
to allow the existence of a lower dominance region.
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Proposition 3.1. Every BNE in cutoff strategies of this economy can be described by a unique
threshold 0*which solves
/ 7r (0* + c - 2e -x,x,F)dx = 0. (3.3)
Proof. In the Appendix. 0
The proof of Proposition 3.1 follows the intuition for uniqueness results in global games ((Morris
and Shin 2001)). A lender at the cutoff 0* has Laplacian beliefs7 about the fraction of other lenders
who roll over. Since that lender is indifferent between rolling over and running, her expected net
payoff given these posterior beliefs equals zero, which gives Equation (3.3). Lenders who observe
lower signals than 0* are more pessimistic about both the bank's fundamentals and the expected
fraction of other lenders who roll over and, in turn, prefer to run. The opposite holds for lenders
who observe signals greater than 0*.
A related way to characterize equilibria is to look at the threshold, Of, at which banks fail.
Given an equilibrium with a cutoff 0*, the share of agents willing to roll over debt is a smooth
function of the state, as given by
1> 0* (F) +e,
X (0, 0* (F)) =0-(c*(F)-) , E [0* (F) - e, 0* (F) + e)
0 , <0*()-e.
Therefore, Of satisfies
of -(0* e ) = (f~,(3.4)
2Eg (of, IF),(34
or, equivalently
0f = 2 eg (o, F) + 0* - e. (3.5)
A lender that observes a signal 0* believes that 0 U [0* - e, 0* + e]. Since such a lender is
indifferent between rolling over or not, we have that
Eo* [k (0)10 < 0f . Pro* (0 < Of ) + KPro* (0 > O)= Eo* [Rp (0) \0 > OfJ Pro* (0 > Of), (3.6)
in which both expectations and probabilities are taken with respect to the posterior belief of the
agent that received the cut off signal. The left-hand side represents the payoffs of refusing to roll
over, while the right-hand side represents the payoffs from rolling over debt. Expressions (3.4) and
(3.6) jointly determine two equilibrium cutoffs: a failure state and a rollover trigger. 8 Substituting
7 That is, agents with 0o2 = 0* believe x (0, I') to be uniformly distributed on the [0, 1] interval.
8 Note that from equation (3.5) it follows that of < 0* <=- g (f, F) < }.
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for 0* in equation (3.6), we get the following equation for the failure cutoff Of:
fo/+2e(1-g(oJ,r)) 1 of0:IRp (0)d6 = k (0) d6+ K 1 - g (Of, . (3.7)15 2e 0f-2eg(of,r) 2 6
Note that g (of, F) has an important interpretation as a probability. If we consider the probability
that a lender observing the threshold signal 0* assigns to his bank failing we have that
of of 1 1o(of
Pro. (0 < 1f) -- dO = -dO = g (Of, ) (3.8)
0 *-e 2E of -2eg(of,r) 2e
This probability is distinct from the prior probability that a bank fails,
Pr (o < of) = Of. (3.9)
In fact, the two probabilities move in opposite directions with Of with the former decreasing in Of
and the latter increasing in Of. This distinction will be important for the discussion of the effects
of transparency in Section 3.3 below.
Additionally, note that in a limit economy, where e -- 0, the two strategic and failure thresholds
converge, so that * 0 = 0/_ . They are determined from
0 [Rp (O ) - K] (1 - g (o, F) - k (Of 0) g (o 0 , F) , (3.10)
which can be interpreted in the following way. The agent who receives the cut off signal knows the
type of his intermediary to be arbitrarily close to 0*_. However, there is still residual uncertainty
about where she ranks in the distribution of posteriors about such fundamental, so that strategic
uncertainty about the action of other agents is still present in the limit. That agent therefore
believes that the probability of failure of his intermediary is g (06*o, F), according to equation (3.8),
so that the term on the right-hand side is simply the net payoff difference between rolling over
debt, which has an expected payoff of Rp (0* o) (1 - g (0* o, F)), and refusing to do so, which has
an expected payoff of K (1 - g (o*o, F)) + k (0* ) g (0*, F).
3.3 Understanding the role of noise
How does the quality of lenders' information about the institution's portfolio affect their rollover
decisions? When does more transparency decrease the probability of bank failure and can it ever
increase it? In this section we address these issues. We look at the effect of private information
precision on the failure threshold, Of in our general framework. The following proposition provides
an answer to this question for the case of small amounts of idiosyncratic uncertainty.
Proposition 3.2. Consider the above model of investment financing with short-term debt and let
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Of be the threshold of fundamentals for which failure occurs at t = 1. Then 81 > 0 iff
(1 - g (of, r)) {Rp (of + 2E (I - g (of,r))) - E0. LRp(0) 0 > .<
< g (of, r) {k (Of - 2Eg (of, r)) - Eo- [k (0)|0 < Of
Furthermore, lima 0 (!) > 0 iff
1 - g (ofo, )) 2 R -p' (Of ') < g (of ., r) 2 k' (Of ) (3.12)
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3.2 gives a clear condition under which more transparency lowers the liquidation
threshold. What is the intuition for this condition? First, note that lenders have rational expec-
tations about the bank failure cutoff Of, but are uncertain whether their bank is a failing or a
surviving bank. Consider the payoff of a lender at the strategic threshold 0*. Such agent is indif-
ferent between running and rolling over, as seen in equation (3.6). A marginal increase in signal
uncertainty has two countervailing effects for such a lender. On the one hand, it increases the
payoff from rolling over conditional on bank survival, as the lender now expects her bank to have
a higher expected type 0 when it survives. Nevertheless, it also increases the payoff from running
conditional on bank failure, as the lender expects the bank to have a lower type 0 conditional on
failure.
If the expected increase in the payoff from rolling over given the increase in uncertainty is lower
than the expected increase in the payoff from running, in order for a lender to be indifferent, she
must rationally expect the failure probability to be lower. The probability of bank failure, is simply
given by the probability that an insufficient fraction of lenders roll over, as Figure 3-2 shows, i.e.,
Pro. (0 < of) = Pro. (x (0) <g (of, )) . (3.13)
Since an indifferent lender has Laplacian beliefs about the fraction of other lenders that roll over,
that probability is just g (of, r). Therefore, in order for a lender to be indifferent, she must
rationally expect the failure cutoff Of to increase. Conversely, if the expected increase in the payoff
from rolling over given the increase in uncertainty is higher than the expected increase in the
payoff from running, in order for a lender to be indifferent, she must rationally expect the failure
probability for the bank to be higher.
In other words, as idiosyncratic uncertainty increases, if the expected increase in payoffs from
rolling over is lower than the expected increase in payoffs from running, then the marginal failing
bank must be able to withstand a run by more lenders, as more lenders are better off running, and
vice versa. That means that a bank at the failure threshold should have stronger fundamentals,
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Figure 3-2: Bank failure threshold
indicating that the equilibrium Of should increase.9
It is even clearer to see the two countervailing effects when looking at the condition for the
limiting case with E -+ 0. From equation (3.12) we have that lim,,o (2L) > 0 iff
(1 - g (of=, F)) R -p' (O,{) g (o[= r)E=< F=(3.14)
g (Of 0, F) k' (Of ) (1 - g (Of )
Combining this with the condition for determination of the failure cutoff in the limiting case as
e -+ 0 from equation (3.10), we get that
(1 - g (f o, F)) R -p' (Of) g (O 0 , F) R -p (6O) - K
g 0f F< (f0 (3.15)g ( I"o,F) ||k' (Of)I| (1 -g ( 0 ,F k E=1)
or equivalently
77Survival (of=) g (o 0f=, r) -Pr. (=o < Of)
Sf f(3.16)7IFailure ((=0) - 9 =03 F 1 Pro. (=
9 1t is important to note that in the case with uniform prior, studied here, changes in the variance of idiosyncratic
noise lead to changes in the posterior variance without changing the posterior mean. This is not the case with more
general priors, where changes in the variance of the idiosyncratic signals would change other moments of the posterior
distribution, as well. Furthermore, unlike the uniform case, with a more general prior, changes in the variance of
idiosyncratic signals also affect the uncertainty about the actions of others of the marginal agent observing a signal
at the strategic cutoff. Therefore, the uniform prior case serves as an important benchmark where increases in the
variance of idiosyncratic noise only affect the posterior uncertainty about the bank's fundamentals without affecting
the uncertainty about the actions of other. Decomposing the effects of changes in payoff uncertainty and uncertainty
about others' actions is then an important issue that arises when one considers the case of a more general prior.
Understanding the effects of both types of uncertainty would be an interesting question to pursue in future research.
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where 7)Surv'ival (0) = fj and qrFailure (0) k'(O) are the elasticities of the payoff from
rolling over with respect to 0 conditional on bank survival and the payoff from running conditional
on bank failure, respectively, evaluated at 0 = 0' Then a marginal increases in uncertainty
about bank quality will increase the failure threshold if the ratio of the sensitivity of the payoff
from rolling over conditional on survival to the sensitivity of the payoff from running conditional on
failure is less than the bank failure odds ratio that a lender who observes the cutoff signal assigns to
his banks. If portfolio differences mostly lead to differences in the "upside" risk associated with a
higher probability of repayment of long term lenders conditional on bank survival, then increasing
the uncertainty about individual portfolios lowers bank failure threshold, as lenders effectively
become more optimistic about the value of each bank's promises. If, however, portfolio differences
mostly drive differences in "downside" risk associated with lower repayment of long-term relative
to short-term lenders in the case of bank failure and restructuring, then increasing transparency is
what lowers bank failure.
3.4 The effects of market liquidity and short-term debt
As discussed in Section 3.3, under some conditions increases in lender uncertainty about bank
portfolio quality may increase the likelihood and magnitude of banking crises. In this section we
examine the systemic effects of changes in market liquidity and excessive reliance on short-term
debt on the size of a banking crisis. The former effect is of particular interest given the potential
role of fire sales for the exacerbation of financial crises ((Shleifer and Vishny 2011), (Duffie 2010)).
Proposition 3.3. Of is a decreasing function of I and an increasing function of K.
Proof. See Appendix.
As Proposition 3.3 shows, a decrease in market liquidity affects bank failure adversely: it
increases the fragility of each bank by lowering its ability to survive a run by short-term lenders.
A simila result obtains for increases in short-term debt obligations, K. Therefore, whenever market
liquidity responds to asset liquidation volumes, a crisis contagion mechanism emerges. In that case,
it can have important amplification effects of shocks to lender uncertainty. We turn next to the
study of such amplification effects.
3.4.1 Endogenous Liquidation Value - an Example
To illustrate our ideas about how market liquidity may endogenously respond to bank failure we
first describe an extension of Example 1. Consider a case in which liquidity conditions are given
by a price, 1, which is determined endogenously in an asset market. Asset supply is determined by
the liquidation required to repay short-term lenders who choose not to roll over debt. On the other
side of the market, there is an asset demand which is not perfectly elastic, indicating some limited
absorption capacity by other market participants.
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Asset demand is then given by
I = h (a) (3.17)
with h' (.) < 0. Asset supply, on the other hand is given by
as max {a (0), (d x)=K d
/0f 0)d K fo*+e (I _ (0* + d1 a(O)d+-j (1-s (± )d6=
0 1 of 2c
= a(O)dO+iE(1-g(O,F))a (of).
Therefore,
1 = h ( 7 6 d a(O) O+E(1 -g(OF))a (of , (3.18)
which implies that I is a decreasing function of Of and c. In the next section, we look at a general
relation between I and Of motivated by this example and endowed with these properties.
3.4.2 General equilibrium determination of liquidity conditions
We assume that the locus H (of, F, c, 1) = h (Of, F, c) - 1 = 0 describes equilibrium conditions in
an asset market, with a < 0 and !H < 0. As discussed in the previous section, these properties
arise because of limited absorption capacity on the demand side of an asset market, which would
lead to a fire sale effect. We first provide a definition for an equilibrium in the model augmented
with an asset market.
Definition 3.2. An equilibrium for the rollover game augmented with an asset market consists of
a bank failure cutoff Of and an asset price 1 s.t.
1. Of satisfies:
/9f+2e-2cg(of,r) 1 ofF)
(o/,I ) - -Rp () dO - -k (1 ) dO - K (1 - g (of, I = 0(o ) 2e O-2eg(ofr) 2e
(3.19)
2. 1 satisfies an asset market equilibrium condition:
H (Of, F, E, l) = 0 (3.20)
The next result clarifies the conditions under which an endogenous asset price leads to a fire sale
and an amplification of the effect of increasing uncertainty in lenders beliefs. First, we characterize
the equilibrium effect of E in the next proposition.
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Proposition 3.4. Let 2 denote the general equilibrium effect of e. Then
-_ - - l(3.21)Of sof al '
Proof. See Appendix.
Therefore, as long as H < 1, we can write equation (3.21) as
E_ =1 ± ( IH)(k + KI) (3.22)80__ i 801 00f 09 al1 ac
The condition 1'l I H < 1 holds if the asset market equilibrium condition, H, is sufficiently flat
in (0, /)That occurs as long as the demand function is not too inelastic, so that variations in the
liquidation threshold generate moderate price changes and the term E'o ( ( 1 ' ) l converges.
We can interpret the equilibrium change in the failure threshold in the following way.
First, notice that l I is the direct impact of the increased noise on the failure threshold,
taking I as fixed, as given by the equilibrium of the game described in Section 3.2.4. In addition
to that effect, as the asset market equilibrium condition, H (.) = 0, potentially depends on the
support of noise as well, an increase in noise has a direct impact on I through the asset market,
given by L l. In a first iteration, that should lead to a change in the cut-off of 2f l 1 H.ac
However, any increase in the failure cut-off leads to more assets being sold and is reflected into a
lower price in asset markets, which feeds back towards a bigger change in the failure cutoff. The i-th
feedback interaction gives rise to the term (Q[ I, ' |H) , which adds to the direct consequences
of an increase in noise, so that any direct impact is amplified by a factor of EZ o (1 h H>'
1
Therefore, provided that the feedback effect is bounded, any direct impact of an increase in
uncertainty in financial fragility is amplified through asset markets in a loop, in which more debt
rollover crises lead to lower liquidation prices, which lead to rollover difficulties, which in turn lead
to more liquidation and further price depression. Indeed, the amplification mechanism discussed in
this section applies not only to decreases in the precision of noise but to any effects of exogenous
variables on financial fragility. For example, an increase in the return upon success R leads to a
reduction in the failure threshold, which is endogenously amplified through a positive impact on
asset prices 1.
As an additional thought exercise, we can imagine a decrease in the precision of information that
applies only to a limited (positive measure) set of intermediaries. Under the conditions previously
discussed, that leads to an increase in the failure thresholds for those institutions. In turn, this
leads to more asset liquidation among this group, which impacts negatively market prices for the
liquidated asset. The effects of this reduction in prices impact all intermediaries in the economy
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and generate a feedback loop. Once the repercussions are intermediated by and amplified through
asset markets, they are no longer restricted to the original set affected by the lower precision of
signals and propagate to the whole set of intermediaries in the economy.
3.5 Policy Discussion and Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we study how information quality affects short-term lenders' debt rollover decisions
and bank failure. When liquidation payoffs are sufficiently sensitive to the bank fundamentals,
relative to the sensitivity of rollover payoffs, a decrease in the precision of individual information
leads to more frequent rollover crises. An endogenous asset market can serve as an amplification
mechanism for this reaction, as rollover difficulties lead to more asset liquidation, lowering prices
and precipitating further deterioration of liquidity conditions. Therefore, affecting the level of bank
portfolio transparency can be an important policy tool for dealing with runs and systemic events
by short-term lenders but whether this entails increasing or decreasing transparency depends on
the effect of a bank's portfolio quality on lenders' payoffs.
Examining the relative sensitivities of liquidation versus rollover payoffs conditional on survival
in order to understand the role of transparency is ultimately a matter for empirical investigation.
However, considering the nature of banks balance sheets, we conjecture that the former should
dominate the latter substantially. Debt is limited in its upside conditional on full repayment and
banks have equity buffers to absorb losses and protect debt holders from losses. On the other hand,
whenever a bank goes bankrupt and its equity is wiped out, debt holders become residual claimants
and bank asset quality together with being the first in line for the proceeds from liquidation starts
mattering considerably.
Consider, for simplicity, the extreme case where rollover payoffs do not depend on the quality
of the bank's portfolio. Therefore, increases in uncertainty affect only the expected payoffs from
liquidation and hence affects adversely bank failure probabilities. In that case, a policy that aims to
reduce uncertainty about portfolio quality such as a stress test clearly helps stabilize the financial
system. There is indeed a common view the stress tests of major U.S. financial institutions of
2009, the so called Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP), helped stabilize the financial
system by providing information about bank portfolios to financial markets ((Peristian, Morgan,
and Savino 2010)). This reduced uncertainty, decreased bank CDS premia and increased stock
prices prompting banks to seek new equity financing from financial markets ((Greenlaw, Kashyap,
Schoenholtz, and Shin 2012)). In fact, the success of the 2009 stress tests for stabilizing the
financial system has made has made annual stress tests of important financial institutions an
import component of the Dodd-Frank act.
However, stress tests may not be informative enough regarding the payoffs to debt holders in case
of bank failure, as they primarily provide information about future capital shortfalls, which can serve
as a low precision signal about portfolio quality and an even lower precision signal about repayments
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conditional on liquidation. Another possible policy, which is substantially more informative and
aims to reduce uncertainty precisely regarding liquidation payoffs is the so called "Living Will"
requirement mandated by the Dodd-Frank act and which regulators of financial intermediaries in
the US and Europe have recently begun implementing. A "Living Will" effectively forces a financial
intermediary to disclose how its liquidation payoffs would look like conditional on insolvency and
failure. In particular, banks are required to produce information on winding up trading books and
to arrange potential buyers of their assets in case of failure ((FT 2011)). In the context of our
work, this requirement can be rationalized as aiming to stabilize the financial system by reducing
the incentives of short term lenders to run on banks during a crisis episode.
Nevertheless, a thorough welfare evaluation of these and other policy interventions requires the
addition of a contracting stage in the environment we study, as our analysis was conducted with
a fixed pay-off structure for the debt-repayment game, taking previously determined contracts as
given. This additional stage can help shed light on the relevant ranges for pay-off parameters and
the magnitude of the essential comparative statics and interactions we study. In the presence of an
endogenous asset liquidation market and miscoordination in rollover decisions, individual contracts
and strategies do lead to externalities. For example, the presence of fire sales and the increased
financial fragility that more short-term debt creates as shown by Proposition 3.3 imply that there
would be a fire sale externality in short-term debt contracts similarly to (Stein 2012). As such,
properly designed policies targeting contracts, asset markets and taxing pay-offs from investment
decisions can lead to welfare gains.
3.6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof. Let us first dcfine x (0, 5) as the fraction of lenders that roll over debt for a bank of type 0 when lenders
follow a strategy with cutoff 0. Secondly, we define v (0i, 0, F) - f x (6, x (0, 0), F) dO as the expected net
payoff from rollover for a lender that observes a signal O and expects other lenders to follow cutoff strategies with
cutoff 9.
We first show several important properties of t (0j, 0, F). Firstly, v (0i, 0, F) is continuous in 9i as x (0, x (0. 5) , F)
is bounded and the limits of integration are continuous functions of 64. Secondly, the function D (5, F) = v (5, 5, F) is
continuous, non-decreasing in 0 and strictly increasing for 9 > 0. To see this, note first that x (9, 5) is continuous in 9
and 7r (9, x, F) is continuous in x, so it (0, x (0, 5) , F) is continuous in 9. It is also bounded and the limits of integration
are continuous in 0, so (0, F) is continuous in 0. Lastly, let 61 < 02. Then, for 0 we have that x (9, 1) =  -( 2)
for 0 e [0-c, 0+ ej or inverting this function, 9 -e+ 2c (1 - x). Hence, we can do a change of variables in the
integral 3 (0, q) and rewrite it as
(5, F) 1j(2c) 7t (+ c - 2c - (1 - x) , (1 - x) , F) dx (3.23)
or equivalently
S(F) ( + e - 2c -x, x, F) dx (3.24)
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Then, looking at D (52 ,)-i (51 ,F) we have f 7r (52 + c - 2e -xz, IF) -7r (51 + c - 2c .x,x,F)] dx. Note, however,
that 7r (0, x, F) is weakly increasing in 9, Vx. Therefore, D (#2 , r) - (51, r) > 0, V5 1 < 62. Furthermore, note that
for 9 < 52 this holds with strict inequality.
Given the above properties, ii (0, F) > 0 and 5 (0, F) < 0, it follows that
6 (0*, F) = 0 (3.25)
has a unique solution 0* (F) and 9* (F) C (0,5). Note that 9* (F) describes the cutoff for an equilibrium in cutoff
strategies iff
v (0j, 0* (F) , F) > 0, V91 > 0* (A) (3.26)
and
v (0j, 0* (F) , F) < 0, V9, < 0* (A). (3.27)
Notice that av(o,,o*(r),r) = [7r (6* + e, x (* + E, 0* (F)) , F) - 7r (6i - c, x (oi - E, o* (F)) , F)] > 0, as 7r is increasingaoi
in (0, x). Using
1>9*(F)+E
X (9, 9* (F)) = - ) , E [0* (F) - , 0* (F) +j (3.28)
0 , <6*(F) -C
and 7r (0, x, F) = -k (9) Ix<9(o,r) + (1 - Ix<g(o,r)) (p (0) R - K), at 9* (F), we obtain a strict inequality since
9v(9A,*(F),F) 1(p(0*+E)R-K-k())>0
66i p=+k 2>
That inequality is also strict in a neighborhood of 0*, from the continuity of x (0, 9* (F)) - g (9, F), which guarantees
that there exists a neighborhood of 9*, in which av(OO*(r),r) is continuous. As a consequence, (3.26) and (3.27)
follow.
Therefore, the solution to:
7r (0* + c - 2c - x, x, F) dx 0 (3.29)
describes the unique cutoff for the equilibrium in cutoff strategies.
F1
Proof of Proposition 3.2
Let
O/+2e 2eg(Of,r) 1 
-9f
(of, F) f -Rp (0) dO - -k (0) dO - K (1 - g (Of, F)) (3.30)
.1o f 2e Jo -2eg(Ofr) 2e
so that ) = 0 implicitly defines Of. We can then compute
[p (f + 2E - 2eg (Of, F)) - p (f)] - go [Rp (Of + 2E - 2cg (Of, F)) - K + k (f - 2Eg (f, ))]
( k (Of) - k (f - 2Eg (f, F))] > 0
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and so li o = ftp' (Of) (1 - g) - k' (of) g - go [Rp (Of) - K + k (Of)] > 0. Similarly,
= - (1-g (OfF,) ) RP (Of + 2, - 2eg (62,2\ ) - Rp (0) d6
1 (t, F) k (f -- 2g (of ) -r) Of1 k (0) d l
oF f -2Eg(of,r) 2E
or
1 - (O f , F ) ) ( R p (O f + 2 c ( 1 -g (o f , r ) ) ) - E [ p ( ) 6 > 6 ]
-kg (O, F) {k (Of - 2cg (Of, F)) - E [k (0)| 1< Of]}
aolofBy the implicit function theorem, =- - and so a > 0 iff
oi
(1 - g (Of, F)) Rp (O + 2c (1 - g (O, )))- E [Rp (o) o > of] < g (of, F) (k (Of - 2eg (Of, )) E [k (0)| < Of
Furthermore. we have that lim 6 o , (1 - g (of, F)) 2 ip' (of) + g (of. F)2 k' (of), leading to
ln (o6 (1 - g (Of, F)) Rp' (Of) + g (Of, F) k' (of)
E o DE ~ Rp' (Of) (1 - g) - k' (Of) g - go [Rp (Of) - K + k (07)]
Therefore, limEo > 0 iff (1 - g (of, F)) fRp' (o) + g (6j, r)2 k' (Of) < 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.3
Using the function @/ defined by equation (3.30), we have that
a )= --g1 [ Rp (Of + 2c - 2eg (Of, 1) ) - K + k (Of - 2cg (Of, r )] > 0
which by the implicit function theorem and given that a,. > 0 , implies that 2 < 0. Similarly, we have that
K (1 - 9 (Of, F)) 9K [Rp (Of + 2E (I - g (Of, )))- K + k (Of - 2Eg (Of, F))] < 0
which implies that 0 > 0.aK
Proof of Proposition 3.4
We have
H(Ofy, C) = 0
H (la, iae)e= 0
The linearized system is given by
V)o 51 d6f de.
Ho HI d] He
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Therefore, the partial derivatives are given by
ao I
As a consequence,
O4bH H
80f HV, e-@VIHE To-5 -eHi
ace 0 Ho -@VoHi~ 1' H
lo oll
1- 001 .|H
111
1 
4Ho -oH; He -HO
V1 jc.
-@ 1
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